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POSTHUMANISM AND HUMAN EXTINCTION:

APOCALYPSE, SPECIES, AND TWO POSTHUMAN ECOLOGIES

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Abstract: Posthumanism is a philosophy that is based on the critique of the negative consequences of humanism and the correct conceptualization about the possibility of the posthuman. This study takes these posthuman claims at face value by elaborating a subsequent connection of posthumanism to the problem of the meaning of the possibility of human extinction. Historically, the demise of the world and humanity has been formulated in relation to the problem of the apocalypse. Thus, the first part of the study is dedicated to the description of two basic posthuman narratives (posthuman ecologies) about the end of the man. The second part of the study is focused on a critical analysis of the posthuman approach to the convergent problem of human species extinction. We will argue, that some types of posthumanism fail, rather paradoxically, to properly grasp and solve the problem of the meaning of the world after (post) humanity.

Key words: Posthumanism; human extinction; apocalypse; human species; ontology; posthuman ecologies; critique of humanism; critique of posthumanism; technology; new religions.

1. Introduction

Martin Rees, United Kingdom's Astronomer Royal, and a staunch supporter of global disarmament, predicted in 2003 that by December 31 2020 one single intentional bioterrorist or accidental bioerrorist event would cause a million of human casualties (Reese 2003, 74). Reese formulated his prediction as an official public bet. The bet is still available on the website portal (Longbets 2003, bet no. 9) of the Long Now Foundation (benefactor Jeff Bezos), which is dedicated to the so-called accountable prediction (and bets) of long-term trends. The Rees bet is stated rather sparsely, but the technical parameters specify that the counted number of future casualties shouldn't include indirect deaths caused by the pathogen, but ideally should include victims requiring hospitalization as counted by WHO, CDC, or PBPHS (Longbets 2003, bet no. 9).

In reaction to this kind of thought Michael Moyer, a physicist and awarded scientific popularization journalist, noted in a 2010 editorial entitled *Eternal fascination with the End* that the Rees bet along with the rogue nanobots hypothesis (Drexler 2006, 355) are remarkable examples of an unscientific apocalyptic obsession of some scientist with doomsday predictions (and bets) (Moyer 2010, 40). According to Moyer, people (and by people Moyer means that scientists, sadly, are not the exception) often disproportionately worry about the disasters that are unlikely to occur (Moyer 2010, 40). As Moyer in connection with Rees bet (likely) ironically concludes: so far, no takers (Moyer 2010, 40).

In some regard, Moyer's critique may be valid. It is for example possible that humans are mostly creatures that instinctively seek patterns in a strange, potentially dangerous, and chaotic world (Moyer 2010, 40). This could, for instance, explain why also a respected scientist as Reese would publicly propose such an extravagantly macabre gamble. However, contrary to Moyers well-intentioned optimism from the past, nowadays it seems more understandable, that some, as Moyer calls them, unlikely disasters, may also have non-stipulative effects and may actually become a grieve reality. Certainly, the validation of Rees bet depends on the definition of a catastrophe and the British proposer didn't give any precise ramification of his notion of the bioerror, but as it stands it is a fact that on the end of July 2020 the 187th WHO situational report states 635173 deaths caused by a previously unknown virulent factor (WHO 2020, 187). Or to put in another way, as has an anonymous commentator on the Martin Rees bet page rather cynically concluded: "Last ~~minute~~ year save by Martin?" (Longbets 2003, 2020 comment on bet no. 9). And the consequences of this save of the bet? According to the current official

information on the website: If Reese wins then the amount of 400\$ (Reese opposing challenger is Steven Pinker) goes to an effective altruism-focused charity organization (Longbets 2003, bet no. 9).

However, Reese isn't alone in this and Reese also isn't the full picture of this. Another famous supporter of the effective altruism movement, namely the Australian philosopher Toby Ord, has predicted (wisely enough not in the form of a bet) that the probability of human extinction in the 21st century is one to six (Ord 2020, 40). Ord maintains that this high probability of human extinction depends on the fact of an ever-growing problem of the rapid loss of biodiversity (Ord 2020, 114-122). Experts from the Intergovernmental science-policy platform for biodiversity and ecosystem services also assess that the current problem of the gradual loss of biodiversity is a more prevalent predicament than the familiarly known threat of climate change (Vidal 2019). One statistic tells it all: Since the 1970s has the animal population, due to human activities, decreased by the scandalous amount of 60% (WWF 2018). Therefore, some scientists even posit, that we are currently at the beginning (and the creators) of the sixth massive extinction of species (Kolbert 2014). With all this in mind, there are justifiably growing doubts about humanity's ability to survive its own epoch, the Anthropocene.

Thus, sadly, it seems pretty straightforward that the humanity of the 21st century is finding itself in a completely new situation. Specifically, in the situation of an ever-increasing probability of a full-blown demise of humankind by humanity's own actions and other risks. The novelty of this situation and the pressing issue of the consequences of this situation have, in the last years, also led to a growing discourse in the humanities. Many authors point to reasons that could prevent environmental damage, loss of species, doom of humans, and the end of the world as we know it (Cunsolo and Landman 2018; Winsberg 2018). These types of analyses are mainly oriented around questions such as: What should we do to prevent the causes of environmental destruction? How should we react to the consequences of this unprecedented environmental crisis? These questions are undoubtedly sound and beneficial, but in this study, we would like to take another route to the problem of human destruction. What does it mean, if anything, that we really are the last man? Therefore, our interest isn't only on the Reese bet, but also on the consequences of the hypothesized reality and the meaning of the death of man and humankind.

The thematization of something past the humans is currently prominently associated with the philosophy of posthumanism (Hayles 1999; Badmington 2003; Bostrom 2008; Braidotti 2013; Roden 2014; Sandu 2015; Cudworth and Hobden 2017; Sýkora 2019, Mocan 2020; Ferrando 2020, Lacko 2020). Thus, this article is centered on the analysis of the relationship of posthumanism to the problem of the reality of human extinction. The structure of our article is therefore as follows: Historically,

the demise of the world and humanity has been conceptualized in connection with the problem of the apocalypse (Section 2). Hence, a brief definition of the apocalypse will help us to identify two basic types of relevant forms of posthumanism (Section 3). This analysis will then allow us to critically analyze the approach of posthumanism to the problem of human extinction (Section 4). We will try to show that some types of posthumanism fail to properly grasp and solve the problem of the world after (post) humanity. Hence, posthumanism is not, rather paradoxically, a philosophy for post (after) humanity. However, that doesn't necessarily mean that posthumanism is false. It just means that posthumanism on its own may be equally useless (meaningless) regarding the problem of extinction like many other philosophies and all creatures.

2. Apocalypse

The stories of the end of it all are all, but new. Moyer may have been right that the central notion of apocalypse is eternally looming in many (scientific and unscientific) human hearts. Nonetheless, the term apocalypse can have many different meanings. First of all (and Ω) the apocalypse is a set of Judeo-Christian apocalyptic and eschatological revelations presented in the form of specific canonical (Rev.) and apocryphal works (e.g. Apoc. Pet.). These works are usually, but not necessarily, influenced by a plethora of mythology, spirituality, philosophy, socio-political realities of classical antiquity, and are in confident ways related to the writings and beliefs of the Old Testament prophets (Collins 2020). These apocalypses typically use emotionally valent and cataclysmically prevalent language to depict (or predict) the course of the end of the world, as revealed by transcendent beings. However, this genre-specific meaning of the term apocalypse is too narrow for our topic, as it is tied to the non-neutral problems of explicit traditions.

The second meaning of the term apocalypse is associated with the popular use of the word. The popular usage of apocalypse is usually linked with the symbolism of vague images about the catastrophic end of the world (Himmelfarb 2010, 1) In this meaning, the term apocalypse is used mainly as a synonym for destruction, disasters, chaos, confusion, doom. Therefore, the popular notion of apocalypse is mostly tied to the idea that apocalypse is just something (very) bad. The problem with this notion is that something (very) bad can be, from a certain viewpoint, anything. Hence, the popular meaning of the apocalypse is too broad for our topic, as it is built upon the notion of non-neutral classification of an apocalypse.

The third way of conceptualization of the apocalypse comes from the idea of neutralization of historic and context-specific notions and meanings around the term apocalypse. From this point of view apocalypse

isn't just something (canonical) or anything (popular), but mainly a form of figurative apprehension of alternative processes of/in the world (in the broad sense), that usually require explanation and/or activities. Apocalypse is, in this sense, one of the basic narrative structures that describe the transformation in which recurrently the new can (will) arise from the old. This apocalypse typically consists of the operation of structures such as crisis, time, warnings, sings, destruction, revelation, new beginning. For short, this apocalypse is based on storytelling (Joyce 2018).

However, there are among others, three relevant types of responses inclined in the storytelling of this approach to the apocalypse. If there is going to be a transformational event, then we could try to make steps that forego, overcome, or embrace it. This leaves us with three relevant modes of the apocalypse: Regressive apocalypse is dedicated to the thought of the necessity of preclusion of the apocalypse. Progressive apocalypse is dedicated to the idea of the outperformance of the apocalypse. Responsive apocalypse is dedicated to the concept of enclosing of the apocalypse.

From this broad definitional point of view, the apocalypse then isn't tied to any specific groundings. It may come in the form of supernatural, natural, sophisticated, or even sportily mundane such as bet. And maybe this is also the cause why Moyer has criticized Reese. The problem of Rees bet isn't just the expertise and empirical groundings, but a perpetuation of a form of undifferentiated storytelling. Of course, Reese with his bet didn't mean any harm, but if one assumes a position of a storyteller then one is also responsible for some far-reaching consequences. The problem is not the bet on its own (apart from other things and manners), but the possible misunderstanding of the moral of the Rees story. For the public, it may or may not be clear what concrete mode of apocalypse is Reese bet telling. Science and scientist may or may not be the culprits (Moyer 2010). However, our article isn't devoted to the flames about the true way of popularization of science, so let us continue with posthumanism.

3. Posthumanism

Quite not a few actors of the posthumanism discourse are explicatively stating that posthumanism can sometimes be thematized as a notoriously vague concept (Ferrando 2013, 26; Gladden 2018, 33). And precisely for this reason many opponents of posthumanism furiously and swiftly point out that posthumanism can mean too many different things (Koterski 2019). But, exactly also, for this reason, many proponents of posthumanism happily and repetitively contend that posthumanism really means many different things (Wolfe 2018). For example, some proponents and opponents of posthumanism assume that posthumanism can be conceptualized as a specific literary genre (Wallace 2010), philosophical

movement (Ferrando 2013), technology (Bostrom 2014), biology (Nayar 2013, 125-150), policy (Cudworth and Hobden 2017), art (Harraway 1991), future (Fukuyama 2002), knowledge (Braidotti 2019), or/and a dance (Badley 2019). In this sense, posthumanism repeats some facets of the well-known trajectory of the once fashionable term postmodernism. However, also in the case of posthumanism, it is possible to reduce the definitional multipolarity by formulating basic distinctions along the axis of a specific problem. After all, what would posthumanism be, if it wouldn't somehow be indebted to the question about the post of the human and humanism?

Certainly, humanism may come in many colors, but one of the more common believes of humanism may be the assumptions, that humans are somehow, or in something special, singular, and exemplary (Figdor 2020). Humanism usually affirms a distinctive value in human life and assigns it a unique status (special status). Humanism also usually believes that this unique quality is shared by all people. That is, all people are somehow connected by this quality and are contributing by it to the common category of humankind (singular status). This shared and unique quality is moreover the reason why humans, humankind, and humanism may have praiseworthy merit (exemplary status). The crux of humanism then depends on the quarrels about the definitions of this quality (e.g. cognition, Wilkes 1993), community (e.g. human and nonhuman nature, Thorpe 2018), and excellence (e.g. progress, Pinker 2018). Hence, humanism is closely tied with a specific (even if broad) type of anthropology and anthropocentrism. Humans are distinct (anthropology) and paramount (anthropocentrism) to other creatures (Roden 2014, 10-11).

So, let us suppose that you don't like this view at all. Let us presuppose posthumanism. Posthumanism, as the name has it, is then a view constructed around a determined reaction and point-blank critique of the aforementioned view on humans and humanity. Posthumanists usually believe that this kind of human-centered thinking is false, delusional, and dangerous (Badmington 2003). However, this posthumanistic dismissal of humanism doesn't just come from the usual abstract, rationalistic, pragmatic, traditionalistic, and pluralistic critiques of humanism, but from the supposed realities of our current lives. We are living in societies, or modes of beings so to speak, that aren't adequately understandable if we perpetuate theoretical speculations and entrapments of dualism (human/non-human) of humanism (Ferrando 2013, 31). Thus, according to posthumanism humanism isn't just theoretically false, humanism (and even its all mirrors) is false per se. And if humanism is really false, then we should abandon it, or more accurately, we should abandon the appearance of it. Hence, for posthumanism humanism is a denigrating philosophy by the sole virtue of its unreal simplicity. That is also the very reason why many posthumanists claim, that the world as

such is (Wolfe 2018), or will be posthuman (Nayar 2013), and we should go beyond the human (Badmington 2003).

However, there are two broad branches of posthumanism. Technological posthumanism assumes that current and imagined future technologies are the examples par excellence of the inadequacy of humanism. Certainly, humanism doesn't have to be anti-technological and unscientific (quite contrary), but a supporter of technological posthumanism points out, that the far-reaching possibilities of transformational technology aren't comprehensible by the standards of humanism. Technology isn't just something that is there for the human, as humanism and most humans believe. Technology can be better understood along with the concept of remediation (Suwara and Pisarski 2019, 7). Technology then can create matters, that are far beyond any human and humanistic imagination and cognition. What this precisely is, is a bit (well not a bit) of a mystery. It is speculated (hence, sometimes referred to speculative posthumanism, Roden 2014, 5), that it will be something past the human, the posthuman. And if humanism is false, as technological posthumanism believes, then we should focus our utmost attention and action on the possibilities of these alien (technological) modes of beings. Nevertheless, technological posthumanism isn't a version of some kind of naïve techno-optimism. Technological posthumanists believe, that the problematic character of our technological possibilities should desperately motivate us to the need of pushing our concepts, notions, biases about the human to the limit (Ferrando 2013, 28-29). For short, humanism is useless, because there will be posthumans and we should figure them/it out.

This critical impetus brings us to the second form of posthumanism. Methodological posthumanism is, for the most part, not centered on the technological problem of future posthumans, but on the methodological problem around the current state of the being (Braidotti 2013, 143). According to methodological posthumanism, some of the current beings are under a false spell of species-focused, conscious-obsessed, subject-object-duality egotism. From this point of view, objectivity isn't just something that is there for the human, as humanism and some humans believe. Objectivity, realness is something that is far beyond any human and humanistic imagination and recognition (Harman 2018, 250). Or to put in a less mysterious way, we simply are not humans in the false sense of humanism, because we are the result and creators of myriads of various interactions (think social, biological, symbolic, physical, virtual, and much more), that are (and forever will be) beyond the scope of our recognition and hopelessly one-sided dreams about the world. And we should try to constantly neutralize the existing perceptual, linguistic, and functional grids (Tomašovičová 2019, 78). Therefore, this kind of posthumanism is an attempt at a constant critique (hence, often referred to as critical posthumanism, Herbrechter 2018) of humanism. However, posthumanists

usually don't think that methodological posthumanism is just a theory, because they intend it as a vigorous practice. What this practice exactly is and what it should be is a matter of an ongoing debate (Taylor and Hughes 2016). Nonetheless, the main aim of methodological posthumanism is to systematically and practically encourage current posthuman modes of being. Thus, according to methodological posthumanism we aren't humans anymore, because we already are (and always were) posthumans (Wolfe 2018). For short, humanism is pointless, therefore we should embrace/support the end of the human.

And what about the apocalypse and the relation to posthumanism? It is pretty straightforward if you recall, that we have thematized apocalypse in a figuratively specific meaning (section 2). The two previously articulated types of posthumanism can be understood as two different modes and responses to an apocalypse of humanism, the end of man. The technological kind of posthumanism seems to be more inclined to the progressive response to an apocalypse. Maybe, we could or should overcome the apocalypse by something like future posthumans. The methodological kind of posthumanism seems to be more devoted to the responsive understanding of an apocalypse. Maybe, we just shouldn't search for another delusional meaning and instead should embrace our critical situation, that is the end of the human. The differences between those two views are very simple, even if potentially exuberant. In the progressive posthuman ecology future posthumans simply (technologically sophisticatedly) outperform, overcome, outsmart, outmaneuver the apocalypse. Or more expressively, flight the apocalypse. Therefore, it will be an ecology of constant flux. In the responsive posthuman ecology present posthumans simply (methodologically complexly) emphasize, accept, support, understand the apocalypse. Or more expressively, hypostatize the apocalypse. Therefore, it is an ecology of constant presence.

4. Posthumanism and human extinction

The conundrum of the end of the man and the possibility of human extinction have provoked many philosophically inquires. For example, Samuel Scheffler (2013) has recently argued that the imagined possibility of human extinction points to the inherent altruism of humans. Scheffler offers a striking thought experiment (actually two versions of it) about the impending human species extinction which according to him shows that humans always, even if only implicitly, care for the benefits of future human generations and the world. Why so? Imagine that your life will be the same as it will be, but you without a doubt know that thirty days after you die all of humanity will be destroyed (Scheffler 2013, 18). Or imagine that your life is the same as it is, but you and everybody knows that all

humans are irreversibly infertile (Scheffler 2013, 39). What would you do? Scheffler believes that most people would somehow change their lives. After all, if the end is nigh, why would you continue to pursue, let's say, your cancer researcher career (Scheffler 2013, 42). The meaning of your scientific project would be lost forever, or it would be gravely diminished. Scheffler presupposes that this also applies to many of our current projects be it extraordinary or ordinary: science, knowledge, technology, medicine, education, activism, relationships, activity (Scheffler 2013, 24-26). Thus, Scheffler argues, that humans recognize that only the existence of an ongoing future of the world and humans can render their current lives meaningful.

Well, the current state of the world and the environment would beg to differ. Nonetheless, a full-blown critique of Scheffler's thought experiment isn't the object of this study. It isn't the object of this study, because Scheffler's thought experiment isn't just a thought experiment. If one presupposes current scientific knowledge, then Scheffler is telling a specific literary story (and for this reason also disputable), but about reality. For example, findings about the evolutionary realities of the past massive extinctions and the current understanding of the anthropogenic causes of extinction give rise to informed consent about the probable reality of human species extinction (Ord 2020). Well-established theories in physics also entail that the universe will only be habitable by life for a finite period of time (Handfield 2018, 275.) Certainly, both biology and physics have alternative hypotheses about the ultimate fate, but none of them entail, that our species could exist forever (Oppy 2001). From this point of view, then Scheffler's argumentation is valuable because it points to possible weaknesses and critical responses to the state of real human extinction.

First of all, Scheffler may have intended to show that humans are altruistic (and it is reasonable to support this), but he also accidentally has disclosed that human-species-centered humanism may be simply false and meaningless. If Scheffler's argument isn't just about a fictional story and rather about reality, then most (or probably all) of our current practices are not just hypothetically, but really and necessarily meaningless. That means, that if just an ongoing future of humans as a species can render the current particular lives of the human species meaningful as Scheffler argues, then the reality of future extinction of our species renders our current lives devoid of any meaning. And it is just not about us. Every human form the past is in this conundrum. They just didn't know it and foolishly believed in a lie. And what's the lie? Species eternalism. However, species are eternal, only if you don't believe that they are real. From a realistic species ontology point of view, Scheffler's argumentation shows mainly, that if you bet all your belongings only on the future of humans and the eternality of human species, then you are in for a nasty surprise. Sure, there is a difference in the timescale, and therefore there are/will be

windows of easy-minded (for example) personal lives for some of the time-spatial-bounded individuals (people). But if the meaning of our action is necessarily dependent on the eternity of humans and humanity, then we must necessarily and by all means establish the human species eternally (immortally). And that is a very difficult or even a rather absurd position (Terec-Vlad 2015; Odorčák 2020). The problem of Scheffler's argumentation is that he is telling the story from the point of false species-humanism that is indebted in turn to the regressive version of the apocalypse (section 2): We must halt the apocalypse at all cost, because if we don't, then all of our lives will be doomed forever. This can be seen as mobilizing (altruism), but if the apocalypse is inevitable as physics and biology tell us, then by the logic of this any humans really shouldn't care. And that is false. Maybe we should try to search for something different than human-centered eternalism. So, what to do if the apocalypse will be real?

Maybe the easy solution to this conundrum would be to create something that just could outlive the apocalypse of human species extinction. Technological posthumanism is fielded around the idea that in the future, there may be artificially created beings with possibilities, that far exceed our current imagination. The powers of these beings, by stipulation, would be far greater than what we can, at present, even possibly adhere to the meaning of our notion of power and far greater. These artificial beings (from our current point of view) would be posthumans. Nobody knows what they will be, but it is speculated that they may be some kind of assemblages of interactions of enhanced biological, biotechnological, cybernetical, virtual, artificial, intelligent (you name it) qualities. The combination of these qualities would, at the start, slowly create just something very different, weird, strange, and then would by its exponential grow explode into some kind of unfathomed super-intelligent hyper-object (Roden 2014, 21-22). And by this wide fetched superlative rationale it would be also possible to assume, that these posthumans could somehow outdo the inevitable end. But let's not make a mistake. Humans would be long gone because they aren't posthumans. Posthumans would be past humans. Thus, this idea is built upon the save of the day by the future of posthumans. It is a progressive mode of storytelling of the apocalypse. The posthumans are/will be the constant flux horizon, the excellence, the overcomers, yet even the salvation of (past the) humans.

The problem with this is, that it is just a speculation. It is very sympathetic that many posthumanists of this type try to fathom a future and, in this regard, reevaluate the boundaries and possibilities of our species concepts. The modes of creative thinking on and around the problem of powers of technologies are none, but inspiring and needed. Therefore, if one understands technological posthumanism in the broader sense, then it possibly would be best to thematize it by the concepts of

new religions, positive or negative techno-theology. Many have already pointed to this connection (Sandu 2015, Schusler 2019, Shcherbina 2020). However, the problem of technological posthumanism may be also in the disputable and inconsistent eschatology on human extinction: posthumans could save us. But how? If you are optimistic, then you could claim and preach that posthumans will outlive, outperform the apocalypse. Stipulation granted. But what has this to do with our extinction? Either posthumans somehow are the continuation of humans, or they are not. The story from the first assumption goes, that if posthumans will be the continuation of humans (say it by some resemblance in intelligence or whatever), then we will live in them, outlive in them, be them after the apocalypse. But precisely this is the fatal mistake. This line of thought is based upon a flawed ontological dualism (Odorčák 2015, Bakošová 2018). The dinosaurs didn't outlive their apocalypse, even if there currently are very intelligent ladies and gentlemen that think, write, construct their lives around them. The nonavian dinosaurs are at the moment (after the Cretaceous–Paleogene extinction apocalypse) an abstraction of a null class of a species. And from the point of view of posthumans, we would be the dinosaurs, even if they would understand that their life is somehow deducible to us and our catastrophes. Sure, you could stipulate a more robust connection between humans and posthuman. But then you are at the start of the absurdity that haunts Scheffler's humanism: this time its trans-species eternalism. Posthuman would be just superhuman – but the Sisyphus kind. Therefore, this sort of technological posthumanism would just preach super-humanism. And by that, it would also superbly multiply the problems of humanism. However, you could just swallow the pill and maintain that posthumans would not be in any form human (the second option). That for sure seems more plausible and frankly, but then the technological posthumanism can't propose any meaning for the problem of human extinction, apart from a brief period of techno-entertainment. You either can un-bound the posthuman, but then you will be lost, or you can bound the posthuman, but then he will be lost. So, or so technological posthumanism seems to be useless on the problem of human extinction.

The last option is the understanding of the apocalypse by the merits of methodological posthumanism. Many methodological posthumanists build their theory around the critique of the falseness of humanism, but also on the critique of the absurdity of super-humanism (as in the bad variant of technological posthumanism). As has Katherin Hayles once alluded, how would any intelligent being believe in such a silly separation (Hayles 1999, 1)? Hayles's remarks are dedicated mainly to theories of computationalists (as she sees H. Moravec's theories of mind uploading), but they have also a wider meaning. If one assumes that humanism is false and that the death of man is real, then the substitute option of technological posthuman is just another form of decoy separation. In the

history of humanism, there were countless of them. This new version just has the internet. However, methodological posthumanism isn't anti-technological and radically categorial. That would be a grave mistake because then methodological posthumanism would just repeat the many of the known errors of atavistic critiques of humanism. For methodological posthumanism posthumans of the technological kind are what they are, namely something and everything, a conceptual tool (Lacko 2020). We should not repress them, prevent them, exclude them. And we shouldn't separate not only from them but from anything. Thus, methodological posthumanism believes mainly that the right answer to all of reality is a critical acceptance. But you may ask, what has anything of this to do with human extinction? It's relatively very simple. Methodological posthumanism usually maintains that we should use every of our best, edge cutting, scientific theories without a division to describe the reality. If your theory entails that humans are a temporal species, then you should tell it, mean it, and not falsely hide behind marketing slogans about human progress or posthuman enhancement. Thus, methodological posthumanism isn't also antiscientific. Quite the contrary, according to methodological posthumanism current science shows, that we are the posthumans, namely that we are finite, fragile, interdependent beings that are interwoven in myriads of complex interactions, but are also fated for the demise, apocalypse, the extinction. Hence, methodological posthumanism tells the responsive story of receptiveness to the apocalypse. For short, we should teach posthumanism to children.

And the problem with this? Even if we all know all of this, we don't and can't act according to it. After all, how could you, if you already are past the human? Methodological posthumanism may be truthful regarding the problem of humanism, but is meaningless in regard to the problem of human extinction.

5. Conclusion

We have tried to show that two prominent versions of posthumanism may have some unintended and grave consequences from the point of view of the problem of human extinction. Technological posthumanism and methodological posthumanism can be seen as two versions of storytelling about a possible apocalypse, and thus even as religiously inspired, but secularized narratives about the promises of salvation from a possible end. They both take this end seriously. They both make claims about a true redemption. However, both also usually operate mostly from the point of view of transformational events regarding the validity of humanism. These posthumanistic allusions, claims, and explications about the end of humanism may be believable, sound, analytical, and even practical. Nevertheless, the situation changes if we assume, that the

apocalypse hasn't just some metaphorical or ideological meaning. If we assume current empirical descriptions and scientific explanations about the reality of human life, life as such, and extinction, then the usefulness of posthuman concepts may change. Technological posthumanism promises the salvation of humans by some higher technological beings. And it is true that faith may save lives, but not if it is premised around the inconsistent conclusion of the necessity of human exclusion. Humans can be saved by technological posthumanism only then when posthumans aren't them (man). Therefore, technological posthumanism can't be seen as a solution to the problem of our own demise. The situation is similar in the case of methodological posthumanism, even if this type of promise isn't built upon a problematic recursion to a substitute belief. Methodological posthumanism maintains that we should face up the reality of our demise without the helping hand of stories, but the solution seems to be inclined to the hypostatization of the vagueness of the concept that is the whole point of the problem of human extinction. Even if you aren't a human in the supposed ideological meaning of humanism, then you still stay a human in the persistent meaning of the human. Thus, the problem continues. However, this doesn't mean, that this problematic uselessness of posthumanism implicates the usefulness of human-centered humanism. No, if one presupposes the necessity of human species eternalism for the validity of the meaning of the human species or his own life, then he is simply false. The solution is simple albeit, for sure, challenging. We shouldn't try to be eternally meaningful; we just should live meaningful lives now and to the end. And the different philosophies may help.

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