Abstract: The present article investigates how psychological theories of morality approach the relation between morality and religion, debating the role religion plays in human moral development in contemporary societies. Firstly, we critically discuss how the major approaches of morality in psychological theory and research view human moral conduct and moral reasoning. Secondly, we appraise cultural psychology conceptualizations of morality, depicting how they fit religion in a relativist approach on what is moral. Thirdly, capitalizing on the findings of cross-cultural research regarding the relation between morality and religion, we debate and present a pilot study on directions in researching the relation between religion and a psychological approach of morality.

Key Words: psychology of morality, religion and morality, cultural psychology and moral development
Introduction

Contemporary societies are clearly defined by radical changes of values systems. This axiological metamorphosis prompted numerous dilemmas pertaining to what is ethical and moral, and how morality is linked to religiousness and spirituality. In psychological theory and research, the concept of morality is predominantly employed, and hence we approach a psychology of morality more so than a psychology of ethics. Psychological approaches on morality comprise a variety of theories and taxonomies, which are often contradictory, focusing on specific and often divergent aspects of the phenomenon. Therefore, an analysis of key theories in moral psychology is necessary. This will aid the construction of an accurate picture on psychological constructs and processes woven into the intricate pattern of human morality and will facilitate a better understanding of where religion and spirituality stand in a contemporary psychology of morality.

Psychological approaches of morality

Numerous moral codes have been created since ancient times, indicating the perpetual interest and importance given to what is right or wrong, good or bad. In those times, such codes were often associated with religious contexts and were integrated into religious writings. Subsequently, philosophers developed a complex and diverse literature on the subject of ethics. As psychology has its roots in the philosophical domain, but strived to impose itself as a science, it developed new approaches to human morality, placing a very strong emphasis on their empirical bases.

Annuuka Vainio pointed out that it is difficult to find a consensus in psychology regarding the definition of morality. On the one hand there are differences between common-sense and scientific theories of morality. On the other hand there are multiple conceptual and methodological divergences among researchers in the field of moral psychology, which we next succinctly approach. Psychological models of morality have their roots mainly in philosophy and sociology, capitalizing on the works of Hume, Kant and Durkheim. Stemming from the works of these philosophers, two main theoretical directions emerged, which prescribed distinct research tenets and methodologies: (1) the universalist approach based on Kant’s writings and (2) the relativistic approach based on Hume and Durkheim. Psychologists like Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Elliot Turiel and Carol Gilligan emphasized the universalist character of morality, based on the writings of Kant. On a different note, Richard Shweder and Joan Miller pointed out that morality is relativist, intrinsically dependent on the social and cultural context, following the direction traced by Hume and Durkheim. More recent psycho-social theories subscribe to a relativist
nature of morality, bringing forward the role of individual conduct and its link with reasoning and context, with little focus on global conceptualizations of morality.

The field of moral psychology has long been dominated by universalist models based on the works of Kant. According to these models, morality and moral judgments are universal, derived from human rationality and independent of social context. Moral appraisals are objective and moral judgments do not reflect personal experiences or social contexts. Lawrence Kohlberg represents a reference figure of moral psychology, as his work set trends and directions of research, guided the development of methodologies and applied interventions in educational settings. His theory has roots in the works of Kant and capitalizes on Jean Piaget’s research concerning cognitive and moral development. In the spirit of Piaget’s assumptions, Kohlberg believed that the development of moral reasoning is a universal stage-wise process, though not all people attain the highest levels of moral judgment.

The model elaborated by Kohlberg focuses on structural dimensions of moral development, independent of the contents of moral problems. He identified three distinct types of morality: (1) a preconventional morality based on constraint; (2) a conventional morality founded on respect for authorities, rules and conventions; and (3) a postconventional morality, mainly anchored in a moral of justice. Each of these three stages of morality has two sub-stages. Advancement from one stage to another follows a precise order. Socio-cultural factors can accelerate or decelerate one’s moral development, but they cannot change the direction of this development. Each stage is conceived as including the characteristics and achievements of the previous one(s). Lawrence Kohlberg tried to integrate the different manners of thinking about morality by organizing them in a stage-wise process, valid for all humans. As we will see in the following section though, he failed to explain situations where the stage-wise sequence is not respected and could not account for the cultural diversity of morality.

Studies conducted in the late 1980s brought forward evidence which contradicted Kohlberg’s assumptions. More precisely, a host of studies showed that a stage-wise order in moral development does not always follow the precise succession Kohlberg postulated. There are situations when a person is in a conventional stage with regard to a certain moral content and in a postconventional level for another moral content. The research of Elliot Turiel pointed out that young children are capable of distinguishing between morality and conventions. This finding invalidated Kohlberg’s theory that young children use a preconventional morality based on constraint, and make moral choices only to avoid punishment, without differentiation between good and bad. Hence, Turiel believed that there are no stages of moral development, but rather distinct domains of social judgment. The social-cognitive domain theory advanced by Turiel is
based on four main ideas: (1) we can distinguish three domains of social judgment: moral, conventional, and personal; (2) a distinction between these domains can be attained early in a child's development, around the age of three or four, through personal experiences and social interactions; (3) this distinction is universal, as it is grounded on rational criteria; (4) moral, conventional or personal judgments are a result of the interaction between the individual and the characteristics of the situation.5

The domains of social judgment Turiel subscribes to his approach encompass: a personal domain, a conventional domain and a moral domain. The personal domain brings together aspects concerning personal choices and the manner in which children learn to understand personal agency. The conventional domain includes social conventions which reflect how social rules are understood, and depicts which aspects are required for an adequate social functioning. Religious practices are considered to be a part of the conventional domain because they are based on authority norms and are applied only in reference to a specific religious context.6 Turiel states that “Practices of importance to religion, but of conventional type, are judged differently in that they are seen as binding only to members of the religion and contingent on rules and authority within the religious system.”7 The moral domain contains judgments made upon concepts like welfare, justice and rights. These types of judgments are applied on prototypical contents of morality, such as hitting someone, stealing, or transgressing human rights. Non-prototypical aspects, like abortion or homosexuality, cannot be exclusively integrated in any of the three domains Turiel approached.

Turiel also postulated several characteristics of moral rules: (1) they are objective and prescriptive, in that they do not depend on the authority of an individual or an institution; (2) they are general, prescribing behavior in any context or time-frame; (3) the violation of a moral rule includes hurting a person, transgressing his rights or behaving unjust towards him; (4) the breach of moral rules has a more negative valence than the infringement of conventional rules.8 The value of Elliot Turiel's theory resides in its in-depth analyses of moral domains and its inquiries into young children's capability to differentiate between morality and convention. Nevertheless, the limit of Turiel's theory resides in the fact that cultural differences are not taken into account, his aim being to demonstrate the tenets of a universal morality. The theory of social domains also fails to clearly define the boundaries of non-prototypical moral issues, such as abortion or homosexuality.

The universalist approach of Kohlberg was partially deconstructed by Carol Gilligan's research findings on gender differences in moral judgments. Gilligan postulated that we can talk about two different moralities, highly genderized: a morality of justice, specific for men, and a morality of care, specific for women.9 These two “voices” of morality are not mutually exclusive, but are two ways of thinking and talking about
moral issues. Both men and women have them, but the voice of justice is dominant in men. Gilligan believed that women, who generally score lower in Kohlberg’s criteria of morality, are mainly oriented toward an ethic of care\(^\text{10}\).

Based on in-depth interviews with American women, Gilligan also postulated the existence of an ethic of love and solicitude, which is defined by affection, attention and care given to others and is rather focused on specific situations than on general rights. The ethic of care has three stages: (1) an orientation toward individual survival; (2) being good as a manner of self-sacrifice; (3) a morality of non-violence\(^\text{11}\). This approach was highly criticized, as it radically attributed the ethic of justice primarily to men and the ethic of care mainly to women\(^\text{12}\). It opened up though the perspective of differences among individuals in conceptualizations of morality, facilitating the transition from universalist to relativist approaches.

*Psychosocial theories* focused mainly on the role the context and social factors have on moral judgment, and the manner in which the link between reasoning and conduct, behavior is modeled by these factors. Studies of social psychology showed that after individual do reprehensible acts, they have the tendency to find rationalizations in order to justify these acts\(^\text{13}\). There are a number of *strategies that legitimate morally reprehensible acts*, most of them being grounded on principles of cognitive dissonance reduction. Among them, psychosocial approaches analyze the reconceptualization of behaviors, the mechanisms of obscuring causal links, the reconsideration of negative effects. Other studies indicated that there are multiple influences of context on behavior, as is the case for the lack of altruistic behavior, the submission to authority or forced submission. Some inconsistencies between judgments and behaviors may be explained by the attribution of responsibility and possible errors of judgment that appear in the attribution process\(^\text{14}\).

**Cultural dimensions of morality: can we fit religion in?**

The cultural psychology approach proposed by Richard Shweder brings forward cross-cultural peculiarities and differences in morality and moral development. Capitalizing on his studies of Asian and North American cultures and also on analyses of Western and Eastern philosophical writings on morality, Richard Shweder first employed an anthropological approach to what moral means\(^\text{15}\). While the great merit of Carol Gilligan’s research relied in pointing out possible gender differences in moral conceptualizations and orientations, Richard Shweder and his collaborators questioned the universality of moral criteria and moral development. Their tenets relied on anthropological research conducted in diverse cultures (Indian, Japanese, Brazilian, North American, etc.), which brought forward the relativism of moral appraisals\(^\text{16}\). This *moderate*
relativism sustains that “there can be more than one correct and mature morality”\textsuperscript{17}, and it is counterpoised to the universalist approach of Elliot Turiel and the developmental approach of Lawrence Kohlberg.

In different cultural contexts, appraised on global dimensions like individualism and collectivism, the cultural construction of morality brings forward specific criteria for appraising what moral means\textsuperscript{18}. For instance, a somewhat mundane behavior like having one’s hair cut after the death of a parent has no moral value in Christian cultures, but is considered as extremely immoral among Brahmans. While such a moral rule might seem bizarre for a Christian, it can be easily understood in the context of the Brahman culture, being explained by the process of death pollution and migration of pollution to the extremities of the body. This process refers to the manner in which the living relatives help the spirit of the dead to escape the corpse and reincarnate, by absorbing the death pollution in their bodies\textsuperscript{19}. Such cross-cultural differences in definitions of moral beliefs and behaviors have prompted cultural psychologists and anthropologists to view morality through the peculiar lenses of cultures and sub-cultures.

Shweder derived three types of ethics from his cross-cultural research on criteria for approaching morality, namely: the Ethic of Autonomy, the Ethic of Community and the Ethic of Divinity. Each of these orientations focuses on specific moral reasons and goals.

The Ethic of Autonomy puts the individual at the foundation of moral authority. Shweder conceptualizes the individual as “a preference structure, [where] obligations come from being a person”\textsuperscript{20}. This ethic is concerned with aspects referring to freedom, individual rights, interests and well-being, bringing forward the personal desires and preferences. In this acceptance morality represents the recognition and fulfillment of one’s needs and desires, special attention being given to the development of individual autonomy, independence, and personal responsibility.

The Ethic of Community conceptualizes people as integral components of a social group, which can be operationalized at a macro level (nation, ethnic community) or a micro level (family, peer group, school). Hence, moral development contains the fulfillment of one’s roles in a specific community, and adequately relating to community members, while following the rules, customs and mores of that community in order to ensure its positive functioning. Morality is defines in terms of loyalty, duty, respect, self-control and obedience.

The Ethic of Divinity defines individuals through their spiritual and religious nature. This moral orientation is concerned with how the self can attain purity and come closer to the Divine, which is not necessarily linked to a particular religious orientation. It refers to virtues like humility, sanctity, awe. Sacred authorities and texts often are the source of moral guidance for individuals, providing injunctions and lessons for spiritual development and avoidance of spiritual degradation. The fundaments for
an Ethic of Divinity were derived from studies on two religious traditions: monotheistic (North American Christians) and polytheistic (Indian Hindus)²¹.

Further research on the three ethics approach in India, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. pointed out that employment of different ethics is linked to social class, education and age. On these coordinates, use of specific combinations of ethical approaches leads to different patterns in specific cultures or subcultures²². In 1993 Jonathan Haidt and collaborators analyzed the three ethics in a cross-cultural analysis of children and adults in Brazil and the U.S., using social class and educational level as a group selection criteria. The researchers pointed out that both cultures employ the ethic of autonomy more than the other two orientations, with non-university U.S. citizens relying mainly on autonomy, while non-university Brazilians use both autonomy and community-driven moral structures²³. In a 2001 research, using samples from the Philippines and the U.S., Kristin Vasquez and collaborators uncovered that in the Philippines people make active use of all three ethics, while in the US the ethic of autonomy is dominant²⁴.

Lene Jensen refined this analysis by investigating U.S. subcultures on criteria of age and social class. Her research brought forward that middle-class young adults employ the ethic of autonomy more than midlife and older adults, who balance the three ethics in constructing their moral orientations. The concept on life-long development of morality is not new in psychological discourse, as both Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget envision a stage-wise increase in the complexity of moral reasoning. Cultural psychology proposes now a cultural developmental template, with Lene Jensen’s work focusing on how specific cultures and subcultures balance different ethical orientations in their ontogenetic development²⁵. The universalist view on moral development that to some extent still dominates the psychology of morality is hence questioned and a more contextual approach on morality arises.

As the relation between morality and religion represents to this day an underexplored dimension in psychological approaches of morality, a cultural developmental approach could facilitate the analysis of how the Ethic of Divinity fits into one’s moral development. The cognitive-developmental manual of criteria for moral reasoning, elaborated on the precepts of Kohlberg’s approach, contains 708 scoring criteria, but as Lawrence Walker and collaborators accurately observed, it includes only a single criterion that refers to religiosity, spirituality or divinity²⁶.

The nature of cultural and community conceptualizations of the Divine and its role in individual life determines, from a developmental perspective, how the Ethic of Divinity evolves in a person’s life, from childhood to adult age. Lene Jensen points out that the differentiation between religiously conservative and religiously liberal groups in the same cultural context can lead to different moral development patterns,
throughout the lives of group members. For instance, in depicting an age pattern for the Ethic of Divinity in Catholicism and Judaism, increased attention must be given to religious traditions and ceremonies in early and mid-adolescence that connect personal responsibility with religious teachings. Jensen makes references to the Confirmation ceremony in Catholicism and the Bar Mitzvah in Judaism. These types of ceremonies are supposed to be markers for an increase in the use of conceptions of Divinity in acts of moral reasoning. Hence, it is possible that late adolescence brings forward a similar pattern of dynamics for the three ethics to those of adults in the same community.

On a different key, T. S. Saraswathi indicates that such an age pattern for the Ethic of Divinity is relevant only for some cultures. He offers counterarguments in the Hindu culture, where children have extensive every-day access to Divinity related constructs and hence actively employ them in moral reasoning starting from a young age. This every-day access to the Divine refers to the fact that in Hindu communities religious beliefs are expressed in mundane activities like bathing or dressing, worshipping activities can be conducted in many designated places in the home or on the streets, while there are many people in the community that are considered to have a direct link to the Divine.

Other taxonomies were created in order to make sense of various theoretical developments in the psychology of morality. Richard Schweder and Jonathan Haidt talk about three strategies of dealing with the diversity of moral psychology approaches: (1) the universalist strategy mainly employed by Turiel, which focused on emphasizing the “communality in a more universal deep structure”, disregarding apparent differences; (2) the developmental strategies that grounded the work of Piaget and Kohlberg and focus on ranking existing differences in stages of moral development; and (3) the moderate relativism strategies proposed by Gilligan and Shweder, that accept the plurality of views on morality and the fact that there is no “correct and mature morality”.

Possible directions in researching the relation between religion and a psychological approach on morality

From the theories previously presented, we can easily conclude that little reference is made to religion when moral aspects are approached in psychology. On the one hand, this is explained by the fact that the struggle to identify a universal structure of morality prevents researchers like Lawrence Kohlberg, Elliot Turiel or Carol Gilligan to focus on the contents of moral problems. They were mainly interested in the reasoning involved, the moral judgment. On the other hand, the theory advanced by Turiel includes some aspects referring to religion, such as religious practices (respecting religious celebrations or ways of dressing) in the conventional domain. Aspects related to moral issues are considered to
be influenced by other factors beside religious rules, even in the case of religious people. Turiel believes that “it is not necessarily the case that people with strong religious commitments judge moral issue by religious dictates. (...) Although it is sometimes thought that religious doctrines determine the moral course for religiously committed persons, our research has shown that more involved processes are at work.”

Discussions on the religious foundations of moral judgments are predominantly found in cultural psychology approaches, more precisely in Richard Shweder’s work, previously discussed, and researchers who were inspired by his work, like Lene Jensen or Jonathan Haidt. Religious influences on morality are integrated in a psychology of morality particularly when research integrates cultural and historical influences on moral judgments. This line of research represents a promising direction in the investigation of the relations between religion and the psychology of morality. Particular attention must be given though to aspects referring to the content of moral problems. The gradual attempt of psychology theorists and researchers to approach morality by means of charting its contents and domains and subscribing individual pursuits to predetermined categories has to some extent limited its understanding. The organization of morality relevant contents is a necessary pursuit in operationalizing this complex concept for psychological research. Unfortunately, when one operates on the basis of predetermined codes and categories, research findings can become just self-fulfilling prophecies, as it is rather difficult to interpret information outside the conceptual box one uses.

The role and applied value of cultural approaches on morality are supported by the findings of a pilot study we conducted on Romanian university students, employing the methodology described by Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Kathleen Ramos and Lene Arnett Jensen, capitalizing on the three ethics approach of Schweder and the coding manual of these three ethics developed by Lene Arnett Jensen. We conducted semi-structured interviews with ten university students at the Faculty of Psychology. All participants were female, with ages ranging from 21 to 29. Two of the interview questions were those employed by Arnett et al., namely: “1. When you get toward the end of your life, what would you like to be able to say about your life, looking back on it? 2. What values or beliefs do you think are the most important to pass onto the next generation?” Participants took part in the study on a voluntary basis and signed a consent form regarding their involvement in the research and the confidentiality of their responses. All interviews were transcribed verbatim and responses for the first two questions were coded using as guide the coding book developed by Lene Jensen. In this pilot study we only focused on a qualitative analysis of the three ethics, without employing quantitative codes. In order to ensure the anonymity of responses, we coded each participant with an indicative from s1 to s10 and
each interview excerpt is followed in parenthesis by the ID given to that person.

Our results were similar to those obtained in the U.S. university context, in that most participants were oriented toward an ethic of autonomy and an ethic of community, and only to a less extent toward an ethic of Divinity. For the question “When you get toward the end of your life, what would you like to be able to say about your life, looking back on it?”, responses focus on personal achievements or on personal wellbeing and the wellbeing of one’s family. One participant subscribing to an ethic of autonomy stated that: “When I look back, I would like to be able to say that I became a legend, that I remain in the memories of others, that I became someone, I became known through something that I did, so that others can remember me as someone who left traces” (s1). An ethic of autonomy can refer to oneself but also to significant others. Regarding the personal autonomy dimension, one participant states that: “I would really like to know that I did all I wanted and to not regret that I could have done something and I didn’t” (s5). When an ethic of autonomy includes references to other people it taps into teaching autonomy to one’s children: “I would really like my child to be, above all, always, I hope, happy, […] and to have achieved self-realization, from all points of view” (s3).

The ethic of community is reflected in a focus on the wellbeing of one’s family and one’s community. It can refer to having “a happy family… this above all” (s2) or “that I helped a lot of people to go through the hardships of life, that I had a harmonious and peaceful family and that I raised my children well” (s9).

For this first question we had only one answer that pertained to an ethic of Divinity: “to thank God that He blessed me with the life He gave me” (s7). A focus on the ethic of Divinity was more poignant in responses to the question referring to values one would like to pass on to future generations: “I believe that religious values should be above all. At least those were the ones that were passed on to me and I would like that I myself pass them on… and some of the moral values too…” (s2). From this response we can notice that the participant makes a differentiation between morality and religion, an aspect that we will dwell upon later on.

An ethic of autonomy also dominated responses to the question regarding the values and beliefs to be passed on to future generations. High priority was given to: “[…] being good and tolerant. I think these are the fundamentals of our society. I think people tend to forget these values: to be tolerant, to accept every person as he is, to try and help others” (s6). The concept of independence is highlighted, whether it reflects a general approach: “[…] to be independent. I think this has the highest importance: not to depend on anyone.”, or it mirrors domains of independence: “to think independently” (s5).
Hence, in our sample we detect a predominance of the ethic of autonomy, followed by the ethic of community, and only limited references to an ethic of Divinity. For future studies, in order to increase the relevance and generalizability of these observations we plan to extend our research on a larger sample. This sample will be stratified on criteria of: age, gender, religious background, religiosity, socio-cultural, ethnic and economic factors, which can influence conceptualizations of morality. Nevertheless, the interviews we conducted point out that though methodologies proposed by cultural psychology models of morality are useful in particularizing morality, they do not capture the manner in which people differentiate between morality and religion.

We brought forward before that one of our respondents made a differentiation between moral and religious values. In order to develop an in-depth analysis of this aspect, we additionally asked participants the following question: “How do you see the relation between ethics and religion?”. Responses were extremely varied. They ranged from a bilateral relation “ethics and religion are somewhat complementary. Religion offers a good support for ethics” (s1), to relations of complete opposition. Most answers make reference to the fact that ethics and religion pursue the same objectives and that what religions teaches us is ethical. One participant stated that “I do not see big differences. It is only my point of view, but what religion teaches us is ethical. No one can say that it teaches us things that are not good.” (s8). Yet another respondent focused on the similarities of the two domains, declaring that “What is ethical is also religious, isn’t it? When you believe in God you know that you have to do some things that are pleasant in the eyes of God, which are automatically pleasant to humans too.” (s7).

The idea that what is religious is also ethical can also be found to a certain extent in the participants in Elliot Turiel’s studies, when they are questioned on the justification of an immoral act, in case this is supported by a divine commandment. According to the responses of these participants, God could not give such a commandment, “because we think of God as very good – absolutely perfect person”.

From the perspective on another participant in our study, ethics precedes religion, and religion is a cultural artifact, which cannot fundament ethics. In her opinion, this is due to the fact that “Ethics came before religion. Religion is based on ethics and not the opposite. When we look at each religion, it adapts to specific cultures.” (s10).

After the analysis of interviews in our current pilot study, with special reference to the relation between ethics and religion, we can assert that it is rather difficult to capture this relation at an abstract level. In our future studies we aim to focus on specific, experience-driven examples, which can contextualize references to both ethics and religion. Much work remains to be done in psychology to investigate the link between religion and moral behavior. The psychology of religion made some attempts to
analyze the influences of religion on morality. Its focus was mainly on self-control and on the fact that “offering a framework that supports self-control, religion promotes a trait that enables people to do what is morally and pragmatically best for society and that also helps them do what best serves their own long-term, enlightened self-interest.”

In order to reconstruct the relation between morality and religion from the perspective of a psychology of morality in a secular society, researchers must tap into the role that religion has now in the moral development of individuals. As secular societies draw multiple barriers between the religious and the moral, in-depth analyses of different discourses on what moral means, can provide a first key, for a micro-level understanding of the phenomenon. Psychological research has mainly focused on depicting the sequential advancement in moral reasoning, imposing a very strict interpretation grid. This was meant to offer predictability and clear-cut meanings to the moral human, but it might have shadowed ecological interpretations and reasoning upon moral thoughts, conducts and moral emotions. The psychology of religion can provide valuable input for the manner in which morality and religiousness or spirituality are connected at individual levels, but also at community and cultural levels.

The role of religion in social development today is critically analyzed by Jesse Graham and Jonathan Heidt, who debate the issue of religion in moral development from the perspective of survival and flourishing of the human species. The two authors take a social-functionalist approach on religious practices (beliefs, rituals) in the construction of a moral community. Dwelling on Durkheim’s conceptualizations of religion, they argue the role of religion as means of organizing and keeping people together in moral communities. They state that “religion should be studied as a complex system with many social functions, one of which is to bind people together into cooperative communities organized around deities.” Hence, moving from an individual level to a group level represents another manner of better charting the role of religion in contemporary morality.

References:


Notes:

12 For detailed accounts on the criticism upon Carol Gilligan’s work, the writings of Christina Sommers bring light on the „other side of the coin“ of gender differences in moral development. See Christina Sommers, *The War Against Boys*:...


