Dangers Of Morality And The Rationality Of The Desire For Perpetual Peace

This article tries to discuss the potential dangers of proposing a world order in the form of the morally based idea of perpetual peace as it is developed by Kant and further propagated by Habermas and Derrida. Drawing on a distinction between the Kantian idea of morality (Moralität) attributed to the internality of man via its theological connection with god and an idea of ethics akin to Aristotelian and/or Hegelian notions (ethos or ethical life – Sittlichkeit), the article posits the question of the role of morality in the formation of the idea of perpetual peace. While doing this, it will also discuss some of the dangers of imposing a moral law under the pretext of moral necessity onto a humanity who may not will to adhere to the same principles. Thus, even though it does not discuss human rights directly, all the argument revolves around the question of the status of universal human rights as the law of the cosmopolitan world and the institutions imposing that law on today’s nations.

What inspired this paper was the famous manifesto of Habermas, co-signed by Derrida, two of the most important thinkers of our time, declaring the characteristics of the Western identity that make the West worthy of the leadership of the world’s nations and calling for a ‘perpetual peace’ a-la Kant. The contrast between the title of the manifesto (“Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning at the Core of Europe”) and the demand it put before Europe at the end (to inspire “the Kantian hope for a global domestic policy”) was striking. They were proposing the establishment of a new world order that would bring people peace, security and justice under the leadership of the West. ‘The West’ meant in their terminology a form of ‘spirit’, an identity rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition that characterized the nations of Western Europe together with the United States, Austria and Canada. Since the publication of the article, despite her apparent hesitation Europe increased her support for the overseas operations of the United States under the pretext of protecting the human rights and democracy in some part of the world, and the so-called ‘right of international intervention’ began to be legitimised in a UN controlled by the West. The European objections to the Iraq war (in 2003, the same year, a few months earlier than the article was published) were lim-
aded to the ‘unilateral’ policies of the US, largely targeting her hastiness and not taking counsel with Europe. But, when the US acted with determination, the French and German foreign ministries began to claim a share in Iraq’s reaches (the British were already in Iraq together with the Americans). They learned a lesson, now preferring to act together, at least for the time being, as they act in co-ordination in Iran, Syria and some other countries. While the UN, not reformed yet, still cannot be totally controlled but the West, we are in a road now through which Europe and the US leading us toward perpetual peace.

Dreaming is good, day-dreaming is even better, but, alas, it shatters, at least, at those brief moments of awakenings (if one is apt to sleep too long) as soon as one takes a look at what is going on in the ‘real’ world among the ‘real’ people. More than that, it is the beautiful dream, arising from the goodwill of the intellectual that serves as the ideological, legitimizing tool for the adventures of the powerful. The more we talk about peace and desire it, the more wars, violent transgressions ensue in the world. Therefore, it is necessary to wake up and see whereto that dream leads us. But doing this requires more than just political analysis that assumes a calculative rationality which would see the immanent dangers of an eventual perpetual peace. For, the roots of the idea lie in the irrational desire originating from individual’s self-centered morality. To see how this self-centered morality operates and informs that irrational dream necessitates a return back to the original project as it has been formulated by Kant in his several writings.

From Universal Natural History to Universal Civil Society

Perpetual peace is a universal idea proposing to establish a universal peace that encompasses all humanity. But, as such, it cannot make itself more desirable than Hobbesian sovereign in the hearts of people, but it can only say, ‘you need protection, stability, etc., and for that reason you have to obey my authority!’ No, this is no longer ‘marketable’ and sounds like a statement more fitting to a Mafia member. To evade this inconvenience, it is necessary to ground it on something essential that can be claimed to be universally found in all individual human beings: ‘it lies in the nature of man!’ But, saying, ‘it is the human nature’, is not saying too much it that ‘nature’ does not imply a telos as well. However, the operations of inserting an essence and a telos in man’s existence requires a certain conception that Kant called as ‘natural history’ and made the basis of his thesis of perpetual peace.

At the beginning of his article entitled “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent”, written in 1784, Kant, says that the “appearances [of the freedom of the will], human actions, like all other natural events, are certainly determined [bestimmt] in conformity with universal natural laws”.3 According to this, the universal natural laws determine the human actions which are the appearances of the freedom of the will. In the same article Kant makes it clear that what is at stake is not the will of the individuals but that of the species and adds that despite the differences between the wills of the particular individuals or societies they all “unconsciously proceed toward an unknown natural end”. Thus Kant puts together the necessary pieces to form the scene of his history: an unknown natural end, particular wills of individuals that can contradict with this, and the will of the species (as different from the wills of the individuals) directed towards this natural but unknown end.

By this way Kant presents history as a process in which the individuals unconsciously strive to reach the end of their own species which is already predetermined by nature. For, according to Kant, considering the ‘senselessness of the course of human affairs’, “the philosopher cannot assume that in the great human drama mankind has a rational end of its own”, but can only try to “discover whether there is some natural objective” overwhelming and informing (in a mysterious way) even the course of a whole species.4 Where the philosopher cannot suppose any rational end or plan specific for mankind alone, but only sees a definite plan or objective of nature in accordance to which all the progresses of existing species should operate, history becomes the his-
tory of that definite natural plan or objective which can be written (understood as being written down, not authored) by man but not a history of man either as individual or as a species. At this point, Kant, comparing the role of the philosopher (himself) to a Kepler subjecting “the eccentric paths of the planets to definite laws”, and a Newton “explaining these laws by means of a universal natural cause”, undertakes the task of subjecting the senseless human affairs to definite laws and explaining them according to a universal natural cause. Kant accomplishes his universal history in nine theses the first five of which deserve special attention for they are directly related with the idea of natural end and its relation to man both as individual and species.

In the first thesis Kant says “All of a creature’s natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their end.” There are three points of importance in the statement. First, we understand that there is a definite end for each creature, and this end is given by nature. Second, each creature is moving toward that end. And third, this movement assumes the form developing certain natural capacities that are implied to be in conformity with that pre-given end. Thus, the thesis establishes history as a process of development, or progress with a definite end, a telos that ought to be fulfilled by each creature. The second thesis states what this end is in the special case of mankind which is assumed to be entirely and qualitatively different from the rest of creation due to man’s special capacity of having reason. Here, we learn that the natural capacities of mankind are “directed toward the use of his reason” and this capacity of using reason can only be developed “in the species, not in the individual”. That having the capacity of reason elevates mankind to a superior position over the rest of creation is clear enough needs no further discussion. Kant also subordinates the telos of inferior creation to the telos of mankind and adds that this telos, that is, bringing out the natural capacities destined to develop toward use of reason, means also a necessary distancing from man’s past (or present as well) situation mostly dominated by animal instinct. The more human beings use their reason the more they distance themselves from their animal instincts. History now becomes the process of negating the animal in man and affirming the reason as its anti-thesis. It divides human beings into two opposing parts one of which should be suppressed and annihilated (overcome) and the other should be pursued and developed. Yet, since reason does not depend on instinct, but requires long and tedious work of trial, practice and instruction, etc., the life of one individual cannot suffice to acquire enough insight. It is only the species that, by transmitting all acquired enlightenment from generation to generation, can proceed to the stage of development that fulfills nature’s objective. This move from individual to species attaches reason to the species rather than the living individuals and qualifies it as if it is something existing in nature that transcends the limited capacities of individuals. Being far above and beyond the powers of the individual that can have only a flawed, defective and weak will, natural reason now becomes an attribute of the abstract entity of ‘species’. Connecting the ‘natural end of reason’—that imposes itself as an unknowable necessity into the lives of individuals—to the species, elevates both reason and species above the daily existence and throws them into a transcendental existence. In other words, this constitutes a theoretical (and also magical) carrying over of reason and species from the finitude of individual human being to the infinitude of existence. Only after such a move it becomes possible for Kant to get out of the chaos-like world (‘senseless drama’) of happenings brought about by the particular wills of individuals and their eventual collusions, and enter into the wondrous world of infinite will, freedom, reason and morality (moralität) that transcends all these senselessness and has an indisputably determinative power over the wills and consciousness of the individuals.

Kant’s third thesis emphasizes this point: “Nature has willed that man, entirely by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical organization of his animal existence and partake in no other happiness or perfection than what he himself, independently of instinct, can secure through his own reason.” What is at stake here is hidden in the subject of the sentence performing the act of willing and the
power of the expressions like ‘man, entirely by himself’, etc., cannot save the day. It is clearly stated in the formula that the thing, the agent that wills is nature, a nature whose ends are specific to itself and cannot be known by man, and its act of willing is that which decidedly determines the proper act of man and dictates him that he should free himself from instinct, from the mechanical organization of his animal existence and direct himself toward the only happiness or perfection that ‘his own’ reason can offer.9 According to this, what informs history and gives it its progressive character is neither particular nor collective wills of the actual individuals, but a definite will of nature which is above and beyond the reach of individual and independent of him. Moreover, a few lines below Kant makes it clear that the nature he talks about is beyond the reach of humanity, just dictating his objectives and assessing his achievements in relation to her predetermined end for the mankind.10 It is possible that man may suffer hardships for generations, may live in subjection, etc., but as far as the ends of nature concerned neither sufferings nor achievements of this sort are important. What matters is mankind’s being worthy of it or not. Before the court of nature man has the burden of proof to show that he has directed himself towards humanity11 and thus deserves to exist and is worthy of well-being.

In the fourth thesis, Kant carries the issue over to the social and says that man, whose directionality is already predetermined by natural reason and will, will finally constitute the ‘law-governed order in society’ through the mechanism of antagonism.12 But, the Kantian antagonism should not be understood in the sense of a major determinant enabling the terms of conflict to involve in decisive struggles, negotiations, dealings to effect the course of events leading to a future which is not predetermined and given. In terms of the universal history of mankind, its telos, it is end is already here, informing the presence (as well as the past and future) as it is already predetermined by nature. Antagonism is not that mechanism that may have the power to re-write that end and change the course of events, but rather it functions in the way of correcting the errors that man may have been committing in the presence. Nature allows antagonism (‘man’s unsocial sociability’) in so far as it contributes (by correcting errors) to the end of establishing law-governed order in society. However, the very inclusion of the notion of antagonism as a means used by nature to (re-)turn the course of events to its ‘natural’ path, implies the high ‘possibility’ of a tendency in man to divert from the ‘natural’ path that he is compelled to follow by nature. And indeed, raising demands or developing attitudes that are contrary to the natural end are so dangerous that they may easily lead to the destruction of the natural end and take man back to the state of nature as it was told by Hobbes (chaos, anarchy). To be able to avoid this horrible error that might be committed by man despite all the reason, will and dictates of nature, as Kant clearly expressed in his sixth thesis, man needs a master who would protect mankind from the errors that would be committed due to those deviant, pathological tendencies of mankind.13

With the fifth thesis we arrive at our destination under Kant’s guidance. According to this, the dictate of nature on the human species as its most important problem is to “achieve a universal civil society administered in accord with the right.” This universal civil society is further described by Kant as a society in which man can approach the supreme task nature has set for the mankind in an environment of “the highest possible degree of freedom under external laws combined with irresistible power” which is none other than a “perfectly rightful civil constitution”.14 The point here is the establishment of a necessary and intrinsic connection between the universal civil society which is made possible by the enforcement of the external laws derived from a ‘perfectly rightful civil constitution’ and the requirement of a master who is going to enforce them with irresistible power. We are told that in such a universal civil society in which the highest possible freedom exists, the laws are perfectly rightful and in accordance with the natural end in whose determination man has no part to play. Why then should we still need a master capable of using irresistible force if nature will take us toward its own end? The mystery lies in the actuality (not possibility) of the human wills that do/can not identify themselves with
the authority of the master and feel themselves as ‘actually free’ wills (not determined by the necessity of an higher imperative dictated by a superior being or nature) expressing themselves as wills to deviate from that end of nature and transgress its laws. This is a situation which neither Kant who continues to inform us from the past nor ourcontemporary ‘tolerant’ (or should one say ‘hospitable’) democrats can suffer.

Indeed, Kant’s universal civil society and perpetual peace is too much merciless against those pathological wills willing contrary to the transcendental will of nature which is not and cannot be concerned with the present happiness of man. As he says in his article “Theory and Practice” written in 1793, the suffering inflicted by the external punishment (presumably in the hands of a powerful master) on those who do not abide with these laws is not enough alone. He asks for more, and in addition to external punishment, demands crushing of such too much free (freer than Kant wants them to be) individual wills from inside, under the pangs of their own consciences as a consequence of their ‘individual’ (thus pathological) failures of following the dictates of the inner moral duty. Even this cannot satisfy Kant to show tolerance/hospitality for he wants, as he clearly declares in “Perpetual Peace”, the complete destruction of such dissident wills. And he does in the name of a moral concept of justice which finds its origin in the ‘Superior Being’: Fiat justia, preat mundus —‘Let justice reign, even if all the rogues in the world should perish’. There is no need to remind the reader that Kant does not affirm the proverb unconditionally and was aware of the potential dangers of its application. The intricate nature of Kant’s affirmation involves several limitations on the usage of such an absolute power in the name of justice: that it does not mean to press one’s own right in utmost vigor, that those in power should not oppress others’ rights, and that such a procedure can only be permissible in a rule-governed social order. But, one has to admit that the demand (the will to crush the dissident) is there without losing anything from its original power even when all the necessary conditions for keeping it in check are fulfilled. A rather pale hope for perpetual peace as it seems.

Kant’s history is indeed the history of the natural end which is indifferent to the fate of man as particular individuals. It is the history of the extension of nature’s own freedom rather than the freedom of men. Such a conceptualization of history leads Kant to put aside what actually happens in the history of living men and contemplate more on an imaginary (out of Luftreise, fanciful journey) ‘universal history’ whose content is to be filled by the stories from the Bible which Kant seriously takes as an ‘historical document’. While in “Universal History” Kant assumes a more secular position (or at least, a not-so-much-markedly-Christian position), his markedly Christian position is revealed more in “Human History” and “The End of All Things” where he describes history as the process of the realization of the Divine Will and allows us to get a glimpse of what ‘really’ lurks behind the seemingly secular idea of ‘nature’: Surprise! It is the Christian God in person! By this way, the temporality of the play of the ‘universality of nature/god’ that will be enacted on the scene of a history thus speculatively conceived (that is, its reflection at the presence on here-and-now) turns out to be the history of the enforcement of this Christian divine will/end on men, who, as a species, are expected to realize an end other than the dictates of their here-and-now wills.

**Morality, Politics, and Cosmopolitanism**

Kant presents the process of ‘universal natural/divine history’ in three metaphysical moments determined by the selfsame morality. It is metaphysical and certainly not historical because it does not follow historical sequence of events—it is not a history of human beings— but rather an ‘abstract history of man’s (animal) becoming human (determined by reason and closer to ‘Superior Being’). The first moment is the ‘abstract man’ conceived as the internality of man in its isolation. Man is not somebody, but an eternal and universal man, being as god created it, without society. His existence has no reference to any spatio-temporal matrix. It is in this internality that ‘Moralität’ (in the form of an imperative) and reason (as a means given by god to understand the imperative) are in-
spired by god. Here, the major problematic revolves around the degree to which this abstract man can perfect his ‘faculty of reason’ given to him by ‘nature/god’, and understands and obeys the imperative at a certain moment of universal history. According to this degree of perfection in using reason men are divided into two major categories: men who are capable of using their reason and understand their moral duty and men who are not capable of doing so and, thus, in accordance with their own particular erroneous wills drifting contrary to the dictates of ‘natural/divine’ will. Since the idea of history has already been conceived in teleological and progressive terms, a hierarchical relationship automatically arises between these two.

In fact, in his famous article “What is Enlightenment?” Kant makes this distinction between ‘mature/enlightened’ and ‘immature/unenlightened’ men and inserts in-between the category of ‘men in the process of enlightenment’ and the hierarchical posing of these three is immediately established by the hope that “man will gradually arise themselves from barbarism”. After this Kant turns his gaze to the actual drama of human affairs, and concedes that only a few can have the courage and daring necessary for attaining enlightenment/maturity but not the great majority. However, Kant proves himself so courageous and daring that he does not hesitate to present Frederick II as the sovereign of the age of enlightenment and shouts aloud this enlightened monarch’s (the master that we need to keep us in line) slogan: “Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!” “Talk, talk, talk, but do nothing, some day, some uncertain day, I may— perhaps— hear you and consider your demands”.

Finally, we come to realize that the freedom that Kant talks about as the necessary condition of enlightenment is not a freedom that the actual people would desire and make a motivation for their own struggle, but a tailored freedom that is ready-made by the end of nature/god, a given freedom guaranteed by an enlightened (but of course powerful) master like Frederick. As for the struggles of the masses for their own enlightenment and freedom, these can only lead to reproducing unfreedom and darkness of barbarisms about which Kant complains from the beginning. Simply because, only new prejudices can arise out of such struggles of the masses who could not themselves attain full enlightenment.

Therefore, the answer Kant gives to the question ‘do we live in an enlightened age?’ is negative but optimistic for an undetermined future to-come (for the time being we can be content with our trust on our masters as the guardians of our own freedoms). For him, man as a species has not yet attained maturity/enlightenment, but is still in the process of enlightenment. At the moment we realize that man is not yet mature/enlightened, but in the process of becoming so and cannot attain it as masses struggling for it as well as for their freedom but only through obeying, we also realize the importance of the nature of the master and his work associates for our lives. He has to be an enlightened one. As for his work-associates, Kant is also ready to supply us with several hints pointing to the identity of these eventual supplementary guardians working in collaboration with our master. In the ‘Secret Article for Perpetual Peace’ as the famous second supplement to “Perpetual Peace”, we catch a glimpse (after all, it is the secret article of the perpetual peace whose contents should not be publicized) of the ‘critical role’ that Kant attributes to the philosopher (such as Kant himself) and to the moral philosophy (such as his). Owing to this privileged position, by discovering the history of reason and freedom determined by nature/god’s own end, that is, through making this history known, the philosopher can open a door from immaturity to maturity to enable mankind to pass from the first to the next—yes, a desire remains to be a desire however irrational it is and how much the desiring man claims to be rational. Once this door is set ajar and the philosopher makes the end of history known through moral philosophy, the immaturity which is conceived until now as a natural stage of human history will be transformed into a new, —no, not to an enlightened age yet, but to— self-imposed immaturity to which mankind condemns itself out of fear and for which there is no excuse. From now on, Kant can say that everybody, in conformity with the end of nature, must necessarily attain maturity and enlightenment. Otherwise, external law enforced by irre-
sustainable power and internal moral duty based on divine imperative, united, can put all the pervert, deviant, lazy, coward and lost wills straight in line.31

The second moment of natural history is civil society in which, since it is still determined by the same internal morality, men are incapable of communication without domination. For the moral message and its meaning are already given, what all one can do is first to discover the message and then convey it to the others. The task of prophecy is taken over by the philosopher to reveal the masses (who cannot discover it by themselves) the truth of their being. But the masses are not only incapable of discovering their own truth, but most of the time stubbornly resistant to the message since they prefer to follow their own animal instincts. So they have to be enforced to do so by the master. The philosopher discovers the moral imperative and freedom thereof, the master enforces them, and people obey. Thus, civil society emerges as a nation, informed by philosopher, and ruled by a master. This is the place where political life of the community takes place but the politics should not the power politics of actual life but a moral politics. It is described as a question of the well-being of nations and thought to be related to the efforts of an abstractly conceived man who is still conceived in its internality having the moral duty of establishing a civil society on the grounds of his ‘nonsocial sociability’.

As in the first stage, politics, too, is seen from a progressive perspective and differentiated as being forward and backward in its nature. In “Theory and Practice”, Kant identifies this forward-backward dichotomy in the categories of imperium paternale and imperium non paternale, sed patrieticum.32 Not much action takes place on this stage because the roles of the personages already been determined: the masses are obeying, the philosopher arguing, discovering and publicizing his findings, and the master guaranteeing just enough (but not too much) freedom. The only essential element in Kant’s discussion on this field is the ‘ought to be’ necessity of adjusting politics to the requirements of moral imperative. This is the exact field of life in which Kant feels himself most uncomfortable, perhaps since this is the field of here-and-now, or, of the living persons in contrast to the infinitude of universal natural history, and the sterility of the eternal postponement of a future-to-come. But the discussion of this field prepares the stage for a new actor in the person of nation who is to enact its role on the third moment presented as the arena of the so-called ‘international community’.

The third moment is the moment of the lawful unity of humanity as species, it is a ‘federation of nations’ united according to ‘cosmopolitan perspective’. Here the forward-backward dichotomy is established between what Kant describes as universal monarchy and soulless despotism33 and his idea of a federation of nations based on a cosmopolitan constitution. The latter, being last but not least, represents the final end put forward by the nature/god before man as a species.34 According to Kant, realizing perpetual peace through a cosmopolitan federation of nations, requires first men already mature, conscious of their moral duties and loyal to it, and second, nations having patriotic republican (but non-paternal) governments. At the first glance it seems as if there is no problem in Kant’s way of thinking. But, in reality, the passage from politics to cosmopolitanism is full of difficulties the most insurmountable of which is the problem of the simultaneous coexistence of all the categories of men and societies: mature, maturing and immature ones in the actual history.

Certainly, without a moral content, the simultaneity of the events and forms is not a problem by itself. But, in the course of the performance, when not all but only a few of men attain enlightenment, and when not all but only a few of nations form patriotic republican governments we can begin to assess the real dimensions of the problem. What will happen when only Kant and his likes attain enlightenment, and when only Kant’s nation (thanks to Frederick II) and similar nations achieve to form such desirable governments? Should these enlightened men and nations wait for the time of spontaneous enlightenment of other men and nations? Or should they compel the others to enlightenment under the ‘convincing’ power of an irresistible force? Should they prefer to establish their own ‘perfect order’, which is supposedly inscribed in the end of a Christian nature/god, and in which they will eas-
ily condemn the dissident and deprive them of any ‘rights’? At that moment it may be useful for everyone to remember once again the proverb that Kant used in the title of his article: “that may be true in theory, but is of no practical use”.

Kant tries to solve this difficulty of containing those immature dissidents both in society and in the commonwealth of nations—the first is connected with the passage from morality defined and revealed by the natural/divine will to socio-political practice of the real world filled with real individuals, and the second with the passage from politics to cosmopolitanism—by inserting the necessity of enforcing the laws (themselves derived from moral imperative) with irresistible power wielded by a master. We have already stated its clearest expression. To confirm that this is not just an innocent slip of tongue it suffices to look at the sixth thesis of “Universal History”. This thesis says that man is an animal that “has the need of a master”.

In “Theory and Practice”, too, obedience was shown as the appropriate lot of man even before the unjust and oppressive laws. But, as we leave the realm of internal politics and move to the domain of a cosmopolitan world order we see that Kant, despite his desire, cannot supply us with such a master as the solution of the same problem of containing dissident nations resisting to obey the universal law. There is no power to subjugate all nations and enforce Kant’s law. The case of ‘dissident nations’ offer a special problem since they are not already subjected to a law and their dissidence is actually in accord with their own laws. To overcome this difficulty, Kant uses the analogy of individual reason (mature-immature) and blames the savage of being in a state of mad freedom.

Supposing that (at least in theory) neither Kant nor anyone else is suggesting the establishment of a world state governed by one dominant power—or, don’t we really imply it in the guise of ‘cosmopolitan world order/new world order’?—one may rightfully ask what law we are talking about in the international community? For, in addition to the requirement of being in conformity with the moral imperative, the existence of a valid law demands a master who is elevated above the subjects and capable of backing this law with an irresistible force. In Kant’s case, in this field we certainly have the first but lack the second. In the international community—of course, apart from the universal moral imperative—there is no such law capable of regulating the conduct of nations (now considered to be real subjects of international action) that is already enforced by a master, but only supposedly voluntary conventions and agreements of states each seeking their own interests. This means that proposing a law that would be valid and enforced on the nations is directly connected with the desire to establish a superior power as the master of international community of nations. Confronted with such a desire one feels the need to ask a series of questions concerning the actual situation like ‘who is going to be the master?’ (Frederick? Germany? Europe?) In what capacity? (to the point of using force to enforce the other nations to enlightenment and civilization?) what form will he/it assume’ (a league of nations of course, but ruled by whom, by a monarch, a general assembly of all members with equal rights? or by a board of the representatives of some already enlightened nations?).

In “Theory and Practice”, Kant, after complaining about the chaotic nature of the relations of states, comes up with his heart’s desire and recommends as “the sole possible remedy” the establishment of a law governing inter-state relations backed by a powerful authority even in the international domain. In other words, Kant makes the thesis reign once again over the hypothesis. Since without erecting such an authority his system of morality will remain to be a theory of no practical use—and since ‘the balance of power in Europe (in Kant’s time) is not enough to carry out the task of enforcing moral theory onto the social practices of peoples—any idea of perpetual peace will be “a mere figment of imagination”, and the whole edifice of moral law ensuring peace would shatter down at the first challenge. We need something stronger than the delicate balance of power: ‘a rightful state of federation’. It should be an organization capable of enforcing the universal law which will be valid for all onto those irrational, stiff-necked dissidents. However, despite he does not mention it explicitly, what Kant seems having in his mind is a state of
nations exceeding the limitations of a mere ‘league of peace’, for he talks about it even though he does not push the idea to the point of an urgent demand. He is also careful enough to state that this organization should not assume the form of a ‘terrifying despotism’ of a ‘cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single head’. So what we are talking is not a ‘state’ headed by a tyrannical master —Kant seems to prefer a world republic but nevertheless gives up the idea considering the force of pressing reality—a, but rather a looser organization of a federation of nations without the authority of a state, yet, with its enforcing power. This means that at least at the present state of affairs we have a serious practical (not theoretical this time) problem for what is true in thesis is discarded by people in hypothesis, and the universal law that is expected to ensure perpetual peace among nations cannot be supported by the authority of a sovereign. By what then?

Kant’s answer to this question comes in “Perpetual Peace”, with the introduction of the ‘transcendental formula of public right’ which says “All actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with publicity.” According to this, all acts that cannot be publicized and defended in public are wrong. So far, so good. From the formula we get a hint that the actions and ideas which cannot be brought before the public and preferred to be kept hidden in secrecy are wrong. But the formula cannot guarantee by itself the truth or falsity of the actions that can be publicized and defended openly. Of course, Kant was well aware of this flaw since a few pages later he admits the relationship between being powerful and being capable of publicizing one’s acts: “For it cannot be conversely concluded that whatever maxims are compatible with publicity are also for that reason right, for he who has decisively supreme power, has no need to keep his maxims secret.” Indeed, this new formulation reduces the original formula to a mere instrument that can only be used in concluding that secrets must hide things that cannot be defended before the public and therefore this something should be wrong (and even this should not necessarily be true!). Therefore, Kant modifies the original formula and asserts the ought to be dependency of politics (with a propensity to err under the pressure of the powerful) on (his own ‘universal’) morality. “All maxims that require publicity (in order not to fail of their end) agree with both politics and morality”. But foreseeing the eventual capacity of power to present to the public what must indeed be kept hidden is not enough to alert one against the traps of the contemporary social life. One has to be aware that the same power which is not ashamed of presenting what must be kept hidden and can contain public disapproval, can also have the means to make the public approve it. Perhaps this last feature is much more important and disturbing than the first one, so that publicity (based on the approval of society of individuals or nations, whose members, as Kant states, have not attained moral and intellectual maturity yet) can be dis-informed, manipulated, and led astray by powers ‘unashamed’ of committing acts contrary to the principles of morality. This means that, at least in our age, if might is not right, it can still determine right, in such a way that publicity or public approval cannot only state the right determined according to morality but it may go contrary to it as well. This creates a dilemma which is difficult to overcome by staying within the confines of Kantian moral philosophy. For, if what the public says does not need to be right, but should still be pursued as one may expect from a true republic, then we do not need morality, but only ethics (in the sense of knowledge of the rules of ethical life including not only the motives and rules of good conduct but bad conduct as well such as engaging struggle, waging war, etc.). Contrary wise, in case of an error supported or committed by the public itself (for public approval cannot guarantee the rightfulness of an act according to morality) should the public be subdued and enforced to follow the path of enlightened reason of the powerful—for it is only the powerful that can subdue others—in the name of a morality whose principles are not internalized yet, or even known by the people? At the first glance, it seems as if such a conclusion is not acceptable to Kant for all we are going to have then is a tyranny of that morality (of Kant) which is not well understood and followed by the majority.
Therefore it is not surprising to see that Kant feels the need to include the fifth article to his ‘Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace among Nations’, stating the right of the internal sovereignty of nations: “No nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another”. But even this has its own exception which relates to the cases where a nation is divided into two hostile parties as a result of internal discord and each party claims the rights of a nation over the whole, such as in the cases of civil war. Since such a war will disturb the rest of the world and ultimately lead to anarchy—an intolerable state that should be avoided at all costs—, Kant concludes that “the aid of a foreign nation to one of the parties could not be regarded as interference by the other”. In other words, every foreign power which is able to find collaborators in a certain country, just like what the USA did in Afghanistan and Iraq, can use the right of intervention for the purpose of ‘helping’ the people of that country to proceed towards that end of nature/god. This effort of pushing the people of an ‘uncivilized’ country toward civilization cannot be called as interference. What if there is little violence (and not only physical) involved in it?

Despite all these problems and the undeniable facticity of the hypothesis in contrast to the inapplicability of the thesis as he himself admits, Kant was not able to take himself from dreaming a cosmopolitan world order based on perpetual peace. For one thing, history, understood in such a metaphysical way, is nothing but an infinite (never-coming-to-end) process of approaching to that final end of nature/god which represents the ‘perfect’.

**Conclusion**

We are well aware that desiring perpetual peace is not only a moral, or simply an intellectual affair. It is thorough and thorough politics, it is politics about power, about the balance of power, about domination and subordination. And the reason of our discussion of a philosopher, however profound and diligent he was, who died two centuries ago cannot be solely explained by an intellectual drive. What compels one to think deeper about the ideas of this philosopher of perpetual peace is the force of his project affecting nearly everyone in the contemporary world. The idea of perpetual peace had not experienced such a bright success at the time of its proposal. But now, it seems as if it has taken the world in its grasp and directing the human affairs as once its philosopher hoped for. Considering the developments in the UN, in the field of international law, the unification of Europe, the emergence of human rights discourse as the sole universal (and moral) principle of humanity without any ‘positive’ grounding, the defense of superior powers of the right of intervention to other countries in the name of protecting these ‘abstract-universal-moral’ principles, their increased capacity to find support even among the populace of the countries they subordinate one gets closer to admit that perpetual peace is the all-encompassing project underlying the events of the twenty-first century and making them meaningful. But is that really so? That we are really proceeding toward perpetual peace or we are just trying to erect another monument of power to the benefit of someone/something? We need to know this.
to be hard to claim that one is doing all these out of one’s own reason. When something else wills what one should do and predetermines the orientation of the human species emerging as an historical entity outside the consciousness. In other words, the end of nature determined by the natural will, thus, the journey toward that end is described as a distancing from man’s animal instincts to humanity in which reason predominates. The implication of this is the presupposed distinction between man (Mensch, Man) and humanity (Menschlichkeit) presented as the end of the first. The universal is this humanity which is the natural end, and not the particular presences of men in different epochs and societies which are intrinsically erroneous and imperfect. Since the truth of all particular presences are set by the end that will arrive at a future to come (heralding Derrida’s a venir) some inconveniences and suffering may be allowed (or at least, excused) in the present situation of man in the name of this natural end.

Here, the word ‘humanity’ has a special meaning. Kant defines the direction of man as the end determined by the natural will, thus, the journey toward that end is described as a distancing from man’s animal instincts to humanity in which reason predominates. The implication of this is the presupposed distinction between man (Mensch, Man) and humanity (Menschlichkeit) presented as the end of the first. The universal is this humanity which is the natural end, and not the particular presences of men in different epochs and societies which are intrinsically erroneous and imperfect. Since the truth of all particular presences are set by the end that will arrive at a future to come (heralding Derrida’s a venir) some inconveniences and suffering may be allowed (or at least, excused) in the present situation of man in the name of this natural end.

Notes:


2 Ibid., p. 294. The exact wording of the definition is as follows: The Western form of spirit, rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, certainly has its characteristic features. But the nations of Europe also share this mental habitus, characterized by individualism, rationalism, and activism, with the United States, Canada, and Australia. The “West” encompasses more than just Europe. As we will see later this unity of Europe and the United States has a very special role to play in the foundation of a perpetual peace/order.


4 Ibid., p. 30 (18).

5 Ibid., p. 30 (18).

6 Ibid., p. 30 (18). Kant’s italics.

7 Kant, individuals cannot grasp and become aware of the process of orientation of the human species emerging as an historical entity outside the consciousness. In other words, the end of nature determined by the historical progress of the human species cannot be readily grasped and known by the individual member of the human species. Therefore, the deviation of the particular wills of the individuals from the will of the species progressing toward the direction of natural reason —and, according to Kant, this is a highly frequent phenomenon in this human drama— constitutes the basic weakness, error and even —let’s push it little further— crime of the individuals against their own history and historicity.


9 The expression ‘his own’ stands problematic here, for we have seen, and will see later again reason belongs to nature, (or even to a higher, superior being) rather than being an attribute of human beings. Indeed, when something else wills what one should do and predetermines the end that one should proceed to without taking one’s counsel, it turns out to be hard to claim that one is doing all these out of one’s own reason.

10 Kant’s original formulation of the relationship of nature and man’s existence in “Universal History”, 1983, p. 31 (20) is worth to take it here to show its clarity and sharpness: It is as if she [nature] aimed more at his [man’s] rational self-esteem than at his well-being. For along this course of human affairs a whole host of hardships awaits man. But it appears that nature is utterly unconcerned that man live well, only that he bring himself to the point where his conduct makes him worthy of life and well-being.

11 Here, the word ‘humanity’ has a special meaning. Kant defines the direction of man as the end determined by the natural will, thus, the journey toward that end is described as a distancing from man’s animal instincts to humanity in which reason predominates. The implication of this is the presupposed distinction between man (Mensch, Man) and humanity (Menschlichkeit) presented as the end of the first. The universal is this humanity which is the natural end, and not the particular presences of men in different epochs and societies which are intrinsically erroneous and imperfect. Since the truth of all particular presences are set by the end that will arrive at a future to come (heralding Derrida’s a venir) some inconveniences and suffering may be allowed (or at least, excused) in the present situation of man in the name of this natural end.


13 Ibid., p. 33 (21).

14 Ibid., p. 33 (22).


18 It is important to remember Hegel’s distinction between Kantian notion of morality (Moralität) in the sense of a divine inspiration of the idea of duty in the form of a universal moral imperative in the internality of man, and Aristotelian usage of the ancient Greek term ethos referring more to ‘socially formed patterns of behavior’, habits, when put together forming the ‘character’ of an individual, group or a society. Out of this distinction, Hegel developed his idea of Sittlichkeit corresponding to the third moment of the will which is its unity in two moments: its external existence and internal reflection onto itself. Thus, ethics or ethical life as Hegelian Sittlichkeit is sometimes rendered in English develops in the
unity of internality and externality of the will in contrast to the Kantian Moralität which only considers the operations of divine reason in the internal solitude of man. However, our reason for mentioning Hegel’s distinction is not to pose one to the other but just to show the philosophical possibility of the difference and priority of ethics (understood here as the knowledge and or system of the rules arising from daily social contact—ethical life) in informing the actual conduct in the society. However, one should be warned that Hegelian way of thinking has also its own dangers. For Hegel’s discussion of the status of Kantian morality in relation to his ethics, see Hegel, G. W. F., 1996 (1820), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by Nisbet, H. B., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 62-64 (§ 33).

21 In “Human History”, especially between pp. 49-55 (109-118), Kant bases the process of history on the Divine Will. The progress of humanity toward reason, that is, natural history is depicted as the process of the realization of the moral imperative commanded on him by God. Of course, we don’t need to mention—or do we?— that what Kant presents us as universal ‘human history’ turns out to be the history written by Christianity as it was told by its own God in the Bible.
24 Ibid., p. 45 (41). As we will see later, this relationship between immature (closer to animal, maturing (present condition) and mature (closer to god) on the plane of morality is also reflected on society as savage, civilized (in the process of perfection), and perfect societies.
25 Ibid., p. 41 (36).
26 Ibid., p. 45 (41).
27 Ibid., p. 42 (36).
28 Ibid., p. 44 (40).
30 Kant says that the nations preparing for war should silently (secretly) seek counsel with the philosophers, attributing a special status to the moral philosopher. The reason for this privilege is simply stated as the group’s (philosophers’) “natural incapability of seduction and of forming cliques”. For this reason “it [the class of philosophers] cannot be suspected of being the formulator of propaganda”. But when this privileged role attributed to the philosopher is put together with the role of the moral philosophy explained in the immediately following ‘Appendix I’, these two acquire another, a more significant meaning.
33 Kant, Immanuel, “Perpetual Peace”, 1983, p. 125 (367). Kant qualifies the same thing in “Theory and Practice”, p. 88 (p. 311) as “the most terrifying despotism” because it is universal.
34 Kant, Immanuel, “Theory and Practice”, p. 87 (310).
36 Kant, Immanuel, “Theory and Practice”, 1983, p. 78 (297-8). On the issue of unjust laws and the unconditional requirement of obedience Kant says the following in the conclusion section of the article: “Thus, if a people should judge that a particular actual [piece of] legislation would in all probability cause them to forfeit their happiness, what should they do about it? Should they not resist it? There can be only one answer: nothing can be done about it, except to obey.”
38 Indeed we get the answers of all these questions in Habermas and Derrida’s manifesto, in which they describe that agent as ‘the West’ whose major component are ‘core European nations’ and the United States.
40 Ibid., p. 87-88 (310-11).
42 Ibid., p. 135 (381).
43 Ibid., p. 138 (384-5).
44 Ibid., p. 139 (p. 386). Note the naïve interpretation of politics as an activity whose singular task is to establish the universal public end which is happiness (of whom Kant does not state, but let’s conclude, of all!).