In 1962, after insisting upon the Vienna moment and comparing the points in the second Leopold Diploma, the author believed that the union was fulfilled in Vienna where the imperial authorities played an essential role. The Jesuits, who were considered the artisans of the union up to that moment, were reduced to the role of negotiators and forgers of the documents of 1697, 1698 and 1700. Because of the resentments against the “traitors” of the nation, S. Dragomir could not or did not want to understand the great change brought about in the history of Transylvanian Romanians by the political programme initiated by Inochentie. When we take into account the fact that Dragomir was one of the nationalists at the beginning of the 20th century in Transylvania, it is hard to understand his refusal to identify the birth of nationalism in Transylvania with the political action caused by the Greek-Catholic bishop. His historical writings were also influenced by the new political realities in Romania after 1944. The author hesitated to establish the causes of the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara because he was influenced by the Marxist philosophy. In his interwar studies he thought the movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara had religious determinations and aimed at reestablishing the Orthodox faith. After 1955 the historian changed his conclusions, considering them social and national movements against the Hapsburgs.

Historian and politician Silviu Dragomir (1888-1962) enjoyed researchers’ special attention after his death. As proof of this, see the many essays and articles about his work and life. In the current article, we attempt to study the level to which the communist ideology influenced Dragomir’s research of the religious union problem.

When released from imprisonment, Dragomir found that his wife had been evicted from their house at 40 Miko Street on the 1st of April, 1951, shortly after he had been arrested and moved to 16 Goethe Street in the outskirts of Cluj, in a room with an earthen floor and without indoor plumbing.¹ The house that was under construction, as well as a small

¹The house that was under construction, as well as a small
garden, was bought by the Dragomir family from Professor Iosif Popovici’s heirs in 1928.2

In 1955 Dragomir was making a somewhat timid comeback as a researcher when he was employed as a fellow researcher and then as a permanent researcher at the History and Archeology Institute in Cluj.3 At the same time he resumed his correspondence with his former fellow researchers from the inter-war period, trying to publish various studies some of which were written before his imprisonment and others written immediately after release. The historian, as many other intellectuals who survived communist prisons, was to discover that his suffering did not come to an end. Having no financial support (the Romanian government annulled his pension) and evicted from his house on Miko Street, Dragomir was not forgotten by some of his former students and younger fellow researchers from the inter-war period. Constantin Daicoviciu and Andrei Oţetea interceded for him to be employed by the Institute of History and Archeology in Cluj4 and helped him resolve some of his problems.5 Finally, with the help of Daicoviciu, the professor received a proper house with one room, a bathroom, and a kitchen inside the Institute of History.6

In turn, the historian Andrei Oţetea, who came into favor with the authorities, also helped Dragomir.7 From their correspondence one can notice the great care and special support offered to Dragomir by his younger fellow historian who was in a privileged position in the structure of the new regime. The letters point out the unconditional respect shown by academician Andrei Oţetea for what Dragomir did for Romanian historiography. Generally speaking, the colleagues from the Institute of History in Cluj gave much sympathy and affection to the historian after his return from imprisonment. Studying Dragomir's research after his release from the communist prisons, we discover interesting things. For example, the historian resumed research into subjects such as: the Romanians from the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula during the Middle Ages, the Revolution of 1848 in Transylvania, and the union of Romanians with the Roman Catholic Church, subjects that had been studied in the inter-war period, but which were forbidden by the Romanian government after 1948.8 However, after incredible efforts, in a continuous struggle with the censorship of the time, using arguments accepted by the communists, in 1959 Dragomir succeeded in publishing his first work published during the communist era. The work was dedicated to the Romanians living south of the Danube. The documents regarding the 1848 revolution in Transylvania as well as the monograph dedicated to Avram Iancu went through a similar process.9 The work, which was finalized in 1947 and retouched in 1958, was an innovation both in the way it approached the Romanian-Hungarian rapport and in the conclusions the author reached regarding the unfolding of the revolution. When presented to the Scientific Publishing House in order to be published, the manuscript was rejected because of its conclusions, which were not in accordance with the points of view of the
political regime. These are two research subjects that were resumed by the author in the context of the new political system in Romania. It might be possible for the historian to have followed the same way as in the above mentioned situations when he studied the religious union and the pro-orthodox movements during the mid-18th century in Transylvania.

Generally speaking, Dragomir had an active life after his release from prison. He resumed his scientific work and came into contact with younger historians and fellow historians from the inter-war period. From 1955 to 1962 the historian worked hard, studied the new historical bibliography, and tried to publish as much as he could. He did not always succeed in accomplishing his goals because of restraints coming from the political regime and from some of his colleagues. The monograph dedicated to Avram Iancu, the sixth volume of Studies and Documents Regarding the Romanians’ Revolution between 1848-1849 in Transylvania, Revolution, Heroes, and The Emperor and the Romanians were not accepted for publication. As pointed out by Alexandru Zub, Şerban Papacostea, and Stelian Tănase, the communist regime never really opened, but rather promoted a controlled liberalization in Romania during 1955-1971.

Soon after his release from prison, Dragomir responded favorably to the offer of to collaborate in research projects done by the Institute of History and Archeology in Cluj. As we have already seen, Constantin Daicoviciu and Andrei Oţetea made utmost efforts for his employment. Did Dragomir think that the attitude of the communist regime had changed? What were the reasons that made him work for a system that tried to destroy his family? We can only guess the answers. He might have thought that the system would change its attitude. He had colleagues in important positions in the socialist system, colleagues whom he appreciated and trusted. Some of them helped him during the difficult periods of his life. They really needed his knowledge and scientific experience for the future struggles forming between the groups inside the Communist Party. In other words, Dragomir trusted some intellectuals in the party, especially some of his colleagues, but not the system.

The system did not trust Dragomir either. Liviu Pleşa underlined the fact that Dragomir was put under surveillance soon after his release, which lasted up to his death. It was only on the 28th of July, 1960, that the Secret Police decided to stop the extended surveillance of Dragomir and to close his file, because the suspicions that he was spying for the English were not confirmed. Even after the closing of his surveillance file, Dragomir was still surveyed in the file opened under the name of Iuliu Moldova. It is interesting to note that the Secret Police used informers recruited from the historians employed by the Institute of History in Cluj in order to survey Dragomir. The historian involved himself in the scientific research as if there had been no change in Romania. This is the reason why he resumed old research projects from the inter-war period and promoted
them insistently. He succeeded in finishing and publishing some of the projects, while others did were not accepted by the regime.

Judging the facts, we come to the conclusion that Dragomir asked too much from a system that wanted to accept partial truths only when there was an interest from the party. Regarding his employment, had the historian any other opportunity after his release from prison than the Institute of History? It is clear that the answer is negative. He had lost his house, the government had annulled his pension, and so he needed a job to survive. He could consider himself happy because he was working in an institute of research knowing what was going on at that time. Many of his fellow prisoners were employed as unskilled workers.

1. Ideology and Politics in Researching the Religious Phenomenon

Dragomir, together with a group of specialists including Ioan Lupaş, Ştefan Meteş, Ştefan Luşpa and Pompiliu Teodor, resumed the research into the union of Romanians and the Roman Catholic Church, but in a different and unfavorable context. The topic had become a subject of research in the outline of the Institute of History and Archeology, Cluj. In order to fulfill this task in good conditions, money was designated for the payment of the researchers and for the acquisition of documents from foreign archives. We must note that the communist political regime and the census of the time accepted only certain subjects from our past for investigation, subjects that followed the line of dialectical and historical materialism. In contrast with the inter-war period, subjects such as history of religion and of religious feeling, those dedicated to the elite, and many others were forbidden by the new regime. However, when political interests required, as in 1948, it was the party who encouraged the research of some subjects that led to favorable conclusions from the official point of view. When the Greek-Catholic Church was dissolved, the whole political power of Romania set to work and, in cooperation with the hierarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church, supported the legitimacy and justice of the state intervening in a problem of theology, with the help of specialists in ecclesiastical history. Shortly after the reunification of the two churches, the subject was abandoned because the regime achieved its aim and everything went back to “normal.”

We emphasize that the approach was made under the patronage of the Institute of History and Archeology of Cluj. They had in view to realize exhaustive research projects on the religious movement led by Sofronie from Cioara and to publish the conclusions in 1960, “on the occasion of 300 years from the beginning of the religious unrest.” As seen from the documents of the era, they aimed at drawing up a synthesis regarding the consequences of the formation of the Greek Catholic Church following the outline of the inter-war synthesis drawn up by Dragomir. This and the
many other projects and plans of the historian make us think that he was the one who suggested the subject. The reports and notes drawn up at the Institute of History and Archeology show that the research on this subject started in 1958 and went on intensely until the winter of 1959, a period during which more than 555 pages were translated from documents brought from Hungary.21 The sources completed the information regarding the beginning of the union, the events of the years of 1740 to 1756, and the revolt led by Sofronie from Cioara. The report, drawn up after working out the synthesis the documents brought from the archives in Budapest, recommended “to complete the collections with documents regarding the beginnings of the union and the religious movement led by Sofronie, documents which were to be found in the Archives in Hungary, at the Academy subsidiary and the archives in Cluj.”22 The same report suggested drawing up “two printed sheets regarding the beginnings of the union.”23 This work was meant to be a critical study of the documents concerning the treaties that took place between 1697 and 1701 to conclude the union. For reasons unknown to us the synthesis Romanians from Transylvania and the Union with the Church of Rome was not finished. However, in 1959 Dragomir published a study, having the same title, which proved to be a true, critical analysis of the religious union acts. This was perhaps a chapter ordered by the members of the institute to be urgently written. As the project of publishing the synthesis of the religious union and Orthodox movements was abandoned, Dragomir decided to introduce the chapter he had just finished in the scientific world. The author described to the reason for the reopening of the union file as “the increasing of the documentary sources to such an extent that it was only natural to reopen the subject.”24 This reason seems credible in a democratic society free from political censorship. But in Stalinist Romania, there must have been other factors beside the reason presented that permitted the resumption of the subject and the presence of Dragomir, recently released from a political prison, on the research team. The Union with the Roman Catholic Church seemed to be an acceptable theme for the communist regime, more acceptable than the research into the history of Balkan Romanians and the Revolution of 1848.25 Although it is a subject from the history of the church, the union was perceived by the state authorities an ideological perspective; namely as a typical case of foreign interference in the Romanian community affairs, combined with treason existing at the level of the religious elite. The movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara, in their turn, reinforced the heroic image of the peasant community, the only social category that fought against the feudal exploitation and foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Romanian provinces. To these opportunities offered by this theme, the author added his sincere wish to resume his research into the union because of the existence of new documentary sources that had appeared and because his view in
interpreting some older problems had changed due to his maturity and experience.

In comparison with his previous works, the specialist enlarged his documentary basis. First-hand sources include those documents coming from the Archives of Strigoni Archdiocesan as well as those from the Archives of the Bishopric of Blaj. The documents from the main institutions of the Greek Catholic Church were happily completed with documents issued by the Court Office, the government, and the Diet. In addition to these, Dragomir completed the data on the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara with new data from the Commercial Archives of Zlatna. Most sources contain information about the anti-union protest movements of the peasants. In Dragomir's opinion, the files about Sofronie's movement, which came in seven big packages, were quite impressive. “They contain not only the correspondence of the authorities and special commissioner, general Buccow's acts (who was charged with the repression of the Romanian uprising), but also the papers kept by the leaders, manifestos, orders, decrees, and many ‘notes’ written in haste by the leader of the uprising or his assistants. It is only now, on the basis of these invaluable materials, that the event of this huge peasant uprising that shook the whole country can be reconstituted.”

The study *The Romanians from Transylvania and the Union with the Church of Rome* reveals the image of a mature historian, having a vast experience in researching the history of the religious life of the Transylvanian Romanians. It is remarkable here that Dragomir succeeded in overcoming the exclusively confessional point of view toward the union. Concerning the analysis of the protest movements of the mid 18th century, the author provided both a religious and a social explanation of the phenomena, offering a relatively exact image of their causes. In opposition to previous studies, the evaluation of the new documentary sources led him to say that, “at the basis of the Romanian movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara were social, economic, and religious causes. The motivation and energy behind the uprising came from the vast peasant masses and the humble country priests, categories at the periphery of society.” The historian described the peasants' growing dissatisfaction and spirit of resistance when they realized that they had been misled by the Hapsburg authorities and by their own clergy. As a consequence, the peasant uprising was, according to the author, “against the Austrian despotism and the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergy.” But the Romanian resistance movement had “a strong anti-monarchial content wrapped in the religious garb of the epoch.” In the works written after 1955, we can find new terms and historical formulas with casualties and effects more connected to the Marxist point of view: the peasants' anti-union risings were against Austrian despotism, particularly foreign
exploiters, but also against the churches that were foreign to the very essence of the nation. In spite of this fact, the author's vision of the Romanian protest movements is much more complex. There were added anti-Hapsburg and anti-monarchial determinants to the religious causes in order to be in accord with the official philosophy of the new regime. A characteristic of the Romanian movements of the mid-eighteenth century is their connection with the image of the exploiting foreigner, despot, and traitor, as was noticed by many inter-war historians and continued by the Marxist historiography because it served the communist regime.

In the previously published studies, Dragomir had completely excluded the social, anti-Hapsburg and anti-monarchial dimensions of the movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara. If in the works published in the inter-war period the author asserts that “many times the peasants declared their fidelity to the queen and their decision to pay their fiscal obligations to the state,”31 in his later writings he reconsidered his conclusions. The changes in interpretation must be connected with the deep political, social, and economic alterations that took place in Romania after 1947. It is possible that under the new circumstances, some of the previous theses have been modified under political pressure. Only recently released from the communist prison, the researcher was still under the surveillance of the state security. He was being watched, and his works were read in order to observe whether he had acquired the Marx-Leninist doctrine. From the point of view of the political and social context in which the union took place, Dragomir remained consistent to his previous conclusions: “the union took place by means of terror and force, by deceiving and lying, and as a consequence it didn't find roots inside the nation and was removed through the violent actions of the masses because it was a foreign element strongly connected with the invaders' interests.”32

In the author's opinion, the religious union was the creation of the Austrian regime, of the foreigner, and was done with the purpose of consolidating its domination. On the other hand, the historian concluded that the united clergy who identified themselves with the tyrant master found themselves deeply deceived in their expectations. This category was considered traitorous because it regarded their group interests above those of the others. The Greek Catholic priests' fate proved to be difficult for many decades. Denied by the traditional Romanian communities, the Uniate priests had been beaten and chased away from their former parishes because they changed their faith. Even worse was the fact that the ministers of the new church were despised by the Roman Catholic priests, too. According to Dragomir, those who gained from the Romanian turn to Catholicism were the Hapsburgs, “who saw in the Romanians nothing but an element to exploit and to be used for their own purposes. The greater number of Romanians passing to the Catholicism made it right to add to the Catholic status the political ruling of the country. Moreover, the
privileges and exemptions had been a mere lure used to attract the Romanians to the new Church. It became clearer and clearer that the whole scenario aimed at enhancing Hapsburg authority in Transylvania. In this scenario the Romanians were only a source of manipulative pressure, a means of pressure used by the Austrians until they fulfilled their aims. The proof sustaining this statement was the fact that the Romanians who remained faithful to the Orthodox Church and opposed the Austrian politics indirectly were considered traitors and rebels and were punished according to the laws of the country.”

Dragomir's conclusions, some of them stated in the inter-war studies, were in accordance with the spirit of the official historiography and were perfectly useful for the ideology of the communist regime: reproving the religious politics promoted by the Austrians among the Romanians, the duplicity of the clergy elite, disrespect of the points from the Leopold Diploma that favored Romanians, the peasant uprising against traitors and social oppression. The foreigners, in this case the Austrians and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, were considered to be the Transylvanians' enemies. The Romanian elite, priests and minor clerks who were the future bourgeoisie who played their hands in return for a better economic situation, joined them. Dragomir considered the only social class that rose to the occasion to be the peasant class. The Transylvanian villagers refused to leave the Orthodox faith, the traditions of their ancestors, resisting the authorities' persecutions. When they couldn't stand the offenses any more they revolted against the political regime. The fighters for faith from the inter-war studies had become opinion leaders, "who condemned the social oppression, despotism, and monarchy." The first among their complaints were the social and national problems, respectively the observing of identity and tradition. The Orthodox faith was not understood as a spiritual experience but as an attachment to the nation's traditions. In Dragomir's perspective the Romanians were not fighting for Orthodoxy as a means of religious experience, but as tradition, ethnicity, and heritage.

The historian's methodology underwent remarkable changes in comparison with his previous studies. We can notice his attention to the union documents that had been unnoticed before. Their importance is essential for the new Greek Catholic Church. The documents make up the judicial, theological foundation of the birth of the new church. The research of the union's documents was a gain as compared to the previous research and proved the historian's maturity. He started his analysis with the union act from the 7th of October, 1698, and he indirectly contested that the union took place during the time of Bishop Teofil.
Dragomir believed that the union file from the 7th of October, 1698, which was made by the Jesuits, had not been sent to the political authorities of the country. Neither the government of Transylvania, nor the Court of Vienna, nor the Primate Archbishop of Strigoniu had received it. Nor had personalities close to the Orthodox Church, such as the bishopric curator Pater Ianas and the nobleman Gavril Nagyszegy, who were watching the changes inside the church, been aware of the synod from October. After analyzing the documents the conclusion was that there was no synod of the Orthodox Church on the 7th of October and the union documents were written later, most probably by the Jesuits. Even if bishop Atanasie consented to the union with Catholics, he did it under extenuating circumstances, and his missing signature on the union acts made them null and void.  

The author's interest was to prove that, even if the union was finally fulfilled, it was based upon a false judicial founding. This conclusion greatly diminished the incrimination of the archpriests and Bishop Atanasie Anghel found in the previous studies. According to the historian, Atanasie Anghel's destiny was not a happy one. Being under pressure of the Jesuits and maybe of a part of the Orthodox elite to accept the union, tied by the vow made in Bucharest and by the destiny of thousands of parishioners, the Orthodox bishop attempted a formal union that would ensure economic advantages for Romanians. As Dragomir underlined, the politics that Atanasie Anghel promoted raised suspicion of authorities and Jesuits who were determined to fulfill the union at any cost. The pressure brought to bear by the Jesuits and indirectly by the Austrian authorities from Transylvania to make Atanasie Anghel accept his departure to Vienna caused the author to believe that the union was not accomplished at that time. In order to convince Atanasie Anghel, they needed a demonstration of force and a psychological pressure that few could resist.  

The insistence on the way in which the future bishop Inocentie Micu-Klein would be received in Vienna was meant to prove once again the fragility of the Romanian clergy and the harshness of the Hapsburgs to anyone who resisted them.  

In The History of Release, Dragomir described Bishop Atanasie Anghel as being undecided and full of doubts towards the union. In this context the archpriests took advantage of the growing importance of the Synod of the Orthodox Church under the Calvinists and initiated treaties with the Jesuits. But the later analysis of the union documents showed that Atanasie Anghel had the initiative of the treaties with the Jesuits, helped by two or three faithful archpriests. Thus, the bishop's role was essential in the negotiations for the union and the archpriests followed him closely without manifesting their option for the union at that moment.
historian also completed his initial point of view upon the religious
movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara: the movements
had deep economic, political, and religious causes; consequently the revolt
of the Romanians was not only against the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church, but also against the nobles and even the Court of Vienna.44

Beginning with the analysis of the documents issued in 1698,
Dragomir reconstructed the unrest of the Orthodox world in Transylvania.
The temptations and promises made by the Court of Vienna to the
Romanian clergy caused a great number of people to accept the proposal.
As the author had often underlined, the empire's interest was to find a
solution to consolidate its domination in Transylvania. Regarding the
economic situation of the Transylvanian Romanians, poverty dominated
both clergy and laymen. Thus an improvement of the Romanian economic
situation was desired both by clergy and laymen. But as long as the positive
changes had in view only the clergy, the peasants from Transylvania were
resistant to the change of faith. The measures ordered by the leading social
classes in Transylvania proved the massive attachment of peasantry to
Orthodoxy, while the priests were in for a formal union which would
ensure them economic advantages.

The union with the Romanians was easily fulfilled. It required political
pressure exercised by the Hapsburg authorities both upon the social
classes in Transylvania and upon Bishop Atanasie Anghel. Concerning the
Jesuits involvement, the author accused them of dishonesty in the union acts.45
The Orthodox reaction towards the union came late through
religious movements now considered to have a social and political
character. The two actions demonstrated the fragile religious construction
and the massive adhesion of the Romanians from south of the Mures River
and from the Apuseni Mountains to Orthodoxy. In the author's opinion
these were signs which announced great social and political unrest. The
religious character is doubled by the social and political one as a reaction
against the authority's taxation and the intolerance manifested by the
Court of Vienna in the changing socio-political context of post-war
Romania.

It was difficult for Dragomir to convince the communist census that
the Romanian uprisings of the mid-eighteenth century had only religious
causes. If in the inter-war period a pro-Orthodox could underline the
Romanian sacrifice for faith as opposed to the united Christians
materialistic interests, in the years of the so called “popular democracy,”
the causes of the uprisings was seen as much more complex.

In the study published in The Romanian Orthodox Church,46 Dragomir
makes a critical analysis of the union acts in order to have a general view
of the phenomenon. The work contains the results of the partial conscription done by the government of Transylvania in 1698, with the aim of studying the Romanian point of view on the union. In order to make a complete survey of the union, the historian analyzes the union documents from 1697. The historian had also studied the acts of the synod from 1698, led by the new Bishop Atanasie Anghel. The research was extended to the decisions of the synod of 1700, called by the bishop before leaving for Vienna.

Following Dragomir’s research dedicated to the religious union, we notice an approach of the fundamental union acts for the judicial construction of the new Greek Catholic Church. In the study published in 1962, the causes of the Romanians’ turn to the Roman Catholic Church are generally identical with those mentioned in the previous works, namely: the Hapsburgs’ desire to facilitate their rule of Transylvania and their intention of having a confessional majority in Transylvania, thus fulfilling one of the goals of the Counter Reformation. The unionist approach, coming from a foreign country, found a favorable situation among the Romanians. During the time of the Calvinist princes the Orthodox Church was forced to accept doctrinal changes without receiving any of the material advantages that had been promised to its clergy.

Dragomir understood that while doing research dedicated to the religious phenomenon it was not enough to present the reaction against the union, the authorities’ ability, and the Jesuits’ interest. It was necessary to start by specifying the conditions under which the union was realized by studying the acts of the religious union. While analyzing the aforementioned documents the author found serious deficiencies in form and content. Thus it is strange that no Romanian document was preserved and that nowhere was it specified that the text in Latin had been translated into Romanian. Not even the original union documents in Latin were preserved: only a copy of the manuscript was handed by Jesuit Baranyi to the Bishopric of Strigoniu. The author’s objections were based upon the great distance in time between the date of the synod and the moment when the documents were issued. The facts regarding the content are decisive.

Bishop Teofil was mentioned in the documents as “bishop of the Valahian church in Transylvania” and not as “archbishop of Bălgrad and all the country of Ardeal Bishopric,” as he signed himself in 1697. Then there was the counterfeit of Teofil’s signature on the act informing cardinal Kollonich of the decision regarding the union. The document is also doubtful because the signatures of the 12 clerics don’t follow immediately after the date on the document but after a blank page. The document lacks the seal of the secretary or the notary, which is inconceivable for
such an important act. These observations led Dragomir to conclude that the documents were forgeries issued by the Jesuits. The forgery of Atanasie Anghel's signature, the mistakes in the list of bishops, and the fact that the union text reproduced the imperial documents of Leopold I made Dragomir believe that the documents were issued after 1701, as Stefan Lupsa concluded in his research.48

Being impartial, the historian takes into consideration the counterarguments to his point of view. One of these is that there are other sources, contemporary to the event, that speak about the bishops’ union. Another one is that in Chancellor Nicolae Bethlen's memoirs he remembers refusing to discuss the Catholic Status Statement of Transylvania during a ministerial conference. The author said that in this case, too, the information comprised in the chancellor's memoirs was clear because he spoke about the Catholic Status Statement from Transylvania. Furthermore, when the statement was discussed in Vienna, Bishop Teofil was no longer among the living.49

Dragomir believes that the source of information concerning the union of the Romanians was the Jesuits who spread in Catholic and Protestant circles the idea that the union began under Teofil. No Romanian source close to the bishop confirmed the Jesuit point of view. Pater Ianăș, the curator of the bishopric, and thus close to the past Bishop Teofil, denied this fact in a letter addressed to Atanasie Anghel who was in Vienna at that time. The historian also analyzes the content of Bishop Teofil's testament, written a short time before his death. The testament is a remarkable source, from which the general characteristics of the hierarch's personality are clearly seen. The small wealth he acquired was of little concern for Teofil. His attention is toward the church books that he presents with a deep regret because he must leave them. Nothing from the testament makes reference to the union treaties.50

Following the analysis of the union documents, Dragomir amends the point of view according to which the union was fulfilled under Bishop Teofil. He becomes categorical and excludes any treaties carried on with the Jesuits in 1697, as he has already asserted in 1920,51 and as the greatest part of the researchers have demonstrated. The responsibility was only of the Jesuits, they being the authors of the forgeries and of the rumor spread that the union was done under Teofil. For Dragomir there were no union treaties under Teofil and the documents were forgeries done by the Jesuits.52

Teofil's death and the election of the new Romanian hierarch did not imply any idea of a change in the Orthodox Church. The historian insists upon the moment of Atanasie Anghel's election and upon the role played
by the Reformed superintendent. The Catholic status and the commandant general made no gesture that might lead to the conclusion that they were to supervise the installation of the hierarch that was to lead the Romanian Church. The author concluded that nobody had any knowledge of the decisions of the synod and about Teofil’s union declaration in Transylvania. The conclusions the historian reached after analyzing the acts that mentioned the union in 1697 are, with some exceptions, identical with the opinions expressed by Ioan Crișanu, George Popoviciu, and more recently Ștefan Lupșa. In contrast, Augustin Bune, Nicolae Iorga, David Prodan, and Mathis Bernath place the beginnings of the union in bishop Teofil’s time. Ioan Lupșa and especially George Popoviciu took into consideration the political and religious context of 1697. However, there are great differences in the aforementioned authors’ appreciations of the Romanian hierarchs’ participation in the union negotiations. Popoviciu’s opinion was that there had been secret, unofficial negotiations between the Jesuits and some of the Romanian clergy led by Atanasie Anghel, without reaching any result. Stefan Lupșa and Nicolae Iorga adhered to Popoviciu’s point of view. Augustin Bunea and Z. Pâclișanu argued that a legal synod was organized and the union acts were written after consulting the Orthodox clergy. Among recent historians who have investigated the phenomenon, David Prodan supports the conclusions stated by Bunea, Iorga and Pâclișanu, while Mathis Bernath is closer to the point of view expressed by Popoviciu at the beginning of the century. Bârlea’s opinion was that the union was fulfilled officially under Bishop Teofil.

Specialists have disagreed on another point of view connected to the type of gathering where the union was pronounced. Dragomir does not recognize the existence of secret, unofficial negotiations between the Orthodox clergy and Paul Baranyi. According to the Orthodox historian, the union acts were written by the Jesuits much later in order to be used during the negotiations with Atanasie Anghel.

The reality in Transylvania was greatly changed when Bishop Atanasie Anghel returned from Bucharest. It was not by chance that Dragomir insisted upon the act of April 14, 1698, which permitted the Jesuits to unfold their proselytizing activities. The impulse of the union came not from the Romanians; the offer was made by the country’s authorities on the background of the lowering of the economic situation of the Romanians. The advantages offered to the clergy by the officials were important; in exchange they were asked a mere declaration according to which they recognized the Pope as the leader of the Christian Church. Later on, the union formula was completed by Cardinal Kollonich, who asked the Romanians to accept the matters under litigation between the two churches. In the author’s opinion the union act of October 7, 1698, issued after the Synod of the Orthodox Church, is a forgery written by the
Jesuits after 1701 in order to demonstrate that the union was concluded by means of a legal decision and not under any pressure exerted by its leaders. Dragomir resumed the critical analysis of the union act of the October 7, 1698, reaching the conclusions that had already been published in study of 1959.

In the time of Bishop Atanasie Anghel another union synod was organized, on September 4th and 5th, 1700, where 54 archpriests from Transylvania and 3 from Maramures took part. The great number of participating archpriests demonstrates that the union was accepted by all the Romanians from Transylvania, including those from Brasov and Sibiu. The synod closed its works by issuing a new union act on the 7th of September, 1700. This document, in the form of a copy, is analyzed by Dragomir. Of great importance for those historians that recognize the union as a state of fact, the document was, in the researcher's opinion, full of irregularities that made it doubtful. This conclusion is based upon the fact that the document was preserved only in one copy, had an almost identical content with the one of 1698, and was missing the archpriests' signatures. Another fact that raised questions was the presence of Vasile from Brasov among those in favor of the union, since many historians have concluded that the people of Braşov never accepted the union.63

Dragomir's interests in the union acts grows as the documentary sources referring to this subject are discovered in archives, libraries, and private collections, but also as a consequence of the fact that the author became aware of the necessity of a thorough analysis beginning with these documents. We can find short commentaries and notices about the synods and the written acts in The History of Release. The author's interest in this monograph was mainly focused on the Orthodox population's resistance to the union and the methods used by the political authorities of the state. In his later research, the author resumed the subject and analyzed the religious union acts of 1698 written under Atanasie Anghel and considered forgery. He does not stop with the synod acts of 1698, but goes on to analyze the subsequent documents. A short time before his death, he resumed the search in an ample analysis comprising all the union acts issued during the legally convoked synods. Dragomir's conclusion was quite categorical: none of the preserved documents were from the Romanian clergy, but rather were forgeries issued by the Jesuits in order to bring legitimacy to the union of the Romanians with the Church of Rome.64 He is also very categorical regarding both the beginnings of the union and its initiators. The political authorities of the empire whose interest was to attract the Romanians joined the Jesuits who took part in the negotiations with the hierarchs. Bishop Atanasie Anghel, together with some archpriests, answered the offer of the authorities. The Romanian priests' turn to the Roman Catholic Church took place after the treaty of the 16th of
February, 1699, known as the First Diploma of the Union. The advantages offered to the Romanian, Greek, and Ruthenian priests created a favorable context among the Romanian elite. Considering the act in the context of the union negotiation and of the other documents, Dragomir discovered that it contained no reference to an already concluded union. On the contrary, the union movement appears in its initial stage in the Diploma.

Taking into consideration the absence of the Romanian sources about the union, it proved to be of great importance that the inquiries were ordered and realized by the government in the spring of 1699. Even if they received partial results, they moved the discussion of the union from the Jesuit sources towards the mass of Transylvanian peasantry, who were the aim of the Hapsburgs. We have here a change in the research methodology, a shifting of the investigation from the elite towards the peasants. This shifting in the interest of the historiography inquiry from the few towards the majority will have as a result the changing of the image of the Romanians. The results of the inquiries showed the peasants' decision not to accept the new doctrines. Not infrequently did whole Romanian villages offer answers in contradiction to those of the priests who were in favor of the union. But the priests' answers also showed indecision and ignorance of the union conditions. As Dragomir correctly observed, the Romanian clergy was visibly concerned about missing the opportunity to rise from serfdom, even if doing so required compromise. It was the first step made by the Romanian elite to welcome the promises made by the religious and political authorities of the Empire, a step that was to separate it from the mass of believers.

The answers given by the Romanian peasants, different and sometimes even contrary to those given by the priests, anticipated the unrest and the villagers' resistance to the union. The martyrs of the following century were announced by the answers given to the inquests ordered by the government of Transylvania. This is the context in which Bishop Atanasie Anghel acted. He was in the public’s eye because of the discussions taken place at his election as bishop, when he went to Bucharest to obtain the confirmation of the Bishop of the Romanian Principality. His incomplete theological education and his youthfulness were the main causes for his stay in the capital of Muntenia. On his return to Transylvania the new bishop observed that the political and confessional realities were in favor of the Catholics. Dragomir believed that the imperial authorities or the new bishop, according to the Greek Catholic historians, would take the necessary steps towards the union. There is one sure thing regarding the beginning, namely the terribly attractive promises made to the Romanians who would turn to the new church.
Accepting the conditions established by the Roman Catholic Church meant changes in the ancient church, while refusing was equal to preserving the precarious social and economic situation. Dragomir has the merit of proposing a new image of the relations between the Jesuits and the Romanian bishop. The historian even accepts the possibility of certain negotiations and of the fact that the Romanian hierarch might have given his verbal agreement for the fulfillment of the union. He remained convinced that the bishop did not actually sign anything concerning this agreement. Atanasie Anghel's verbal agreement in favor of union did not prevent him from maintaining normal relations with the bishop and the political power in Muntenia, and from presenting an image of a church where no changes happened. From the inquiries ordered in Transylvania one can observe the existence of a great confusion among the Romanians, priests and laymen, concerning the union. The one repeated finding the perception that the union was to follow the Calvinist model. The hopes the Romanian clergy had in such a union proved to be false. The Jesuits and the political authorities did not want a formal union.

The uncertainty and the confusion created by some of Bishop Atanasie Anghel's gestures and declarations concerning the union determined the Jesuits to hasten the fulfillment of their action. In time, the bishop's image became contradictory even among the Jesuits. Their worries were linked to the bishop's person, who could give up the union any time and take refuge in an Orthodox state, thus rendering futile all the efforts made up to that point. In the Jesuits' view, the union depended too much on Atanasie, who was proving to be quite ambiguous. There were significant motives for his being called to Vienna.

Some historians believe that the bishop was asked to go to Vienna only in order to obtain his confirmation. For Dragomir the real reason for his summons was to clarify the bishop's ambiguous attitude as well as the statute of the union, which he had only formally agreed to. As we are going to see, the Vienna moment meant the end of Atanasie Anghel's hesitant policy regarding the union. This whole scene is regarded by the historian through the tension of the moment. The very beginning coincides with the bishop being called to the capital of the empire. His attempts to avoid the summons resulted in pressure and threats from the imperial authorities in Transylvania. The bishop's reaction to all these was the organization of a synod on the 7th of January, 1701, before leaving for Vienna. The participants expressed their solidarity with their hierarch by asking the authorities to keep him as their leader and “no laymen or foreigners were to intervene in the problems of the clergy without the synod knowing about it.” During the Vienna moment the situation came to a head when Atanasie Anghel gave up the law of his ancestors and all the previous connections. “This last episode of the Romanian church leader's
worries gives us the most important argument for the interpretation of his conduct on the occasion of his union declaration in 1698 and the ambiguity he has persisted in for two years and a half that we have given in these pages.”

It is natural that the Vienna moment should raise some questions. Was Atanasie Anghel's surrender sufficiently rewarded by the imperial authorities? Did the Romanians want a union of the kind accomplished by their leader in Vienna? Were the Hapsburgs sincere when they introduced the third article in the Leopold Diploma? Dragomir believed that the real union Bishop Atanasie Anghel and the Romanian clergy wanted was a formal one, and that they were to preserve the situation of the Orthodox Church from the Calvinist period. The Romanians and their political elite probably wanted a formal union in order to take advantage of the Hapsburg's offers. The large mass of simple believers did not want to change the faith because they would not receive anything in return.

Dragomir succeeded in making a clear-cut distinction between the objectives of the orthodox clergy and the large mass of subjects by taking into consideration the fact that the union was fulfilled by Atanasie Anghel and the higher clergy. One should notice that in comparison to his previous studies, the author changed his conclusions: in spite of the fact that he was in favor of the union with the Catholic Church, Atanasie Anghel had only verbally agreed to a formal union. Being called to Vienna, he had to sign the union act under the pressure of the authorities without having the power to refuse the conditions imposed by the Hapsburgs, which were very different from those established in Transylvania. Thus the union as it was made in Vienna was not the one wanted either by the Romanian bishop or by his constituents. It was imposed by means of constraint by the political and religious authorities of the time. Atanasie Anghel's guilt was that he wanted a formal union, hoping that the Hapsburgs would improve the economic situation of the united Romanians. The real artisans of the union were the Hapsburgs, while the Jesuits, in the historian's opinion, had the role of issuing the union documents.

2. Conclusions

After analyzing Dragomir's work dedicated to the religious union, it is possible to draw some conclusions. The historian who was educated in the spirit of the positivist historiography showed a highly appreciated preference for the historical document. A passionate researcher of Romanian and foreign archives, he proved to be an equally adept critic of the documentary sources he discovered and investigated. As we have already observed, in his study The History of the Religious Release of the Romanians from Transylvania in the 18th Century, the core of his work was the
new information that was introduced in the scientific world. He was convinced that the best answers to certain problems are those based on archival research. He resumed certain subjects only when newly discovered documentary sources, such as those about the religious union, compelled him to. Although a remarkable controversialist, he tried to avoid confessional disputes in favor of arguments based on sources. In order to study the religious life of the Romanians from Transylvania he conducted research in the archives of political and religious institutions of the Hapsburg Empire and other neighboring states, as well as in many private collections. For Dragomir the notion of historical document was very large and included the official documents issued by state institutions, private correspondence of the Romanian leaders of Transylvania, memoirs submitted by the Orthodox Romanians to the public authorities and protectors of Orthodoxy in Transylvania, and also the notes, proclamations, and reports issued during the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie din Cioara. In other words, any official documentary source that, after having been analyzed, could contribute to the clarification of the subject was used by the historian.

In spite of the fact that official documents had the greatest conclusive power in the positivist historiography in comparison to other kinds of sources, we notice that Dragomir did not always observe this rule. When evaluating historical information, he took into account the objectivity of the person issuing the document. He tried to clarify to what extent an institution or a person was involved in the described phenomenon. For example, the historian showed great restraint with the union acts in Latin. He often wondered how the union documents in Latin were kept in the form of copies transmitted by the Jesuits while the Romanian documents were not preserved. Taking into consideration the Jesuits' interest in the union, it was natural that the historian should look at them with suspicion. When adding the essential difference between the union act of 1698 in its Latin version and in the Romanian version, we find that he had strong reasons to accuse the Jesuits of misrepresenting the significance of the union as promoted by the Romanian clergy and to doubt the truthfulness of the official document. The author had an attitude characterized by careful nuance when he studied the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara. Dragomir was aware that by using only official documents in which the uprising of the Orthodox Romanians was condemned by the authorities, he assumed the risk of presenting this uprising as the work of Romanian and Serbian agitators. By also using unofficial Romanian documents such as memoirs, protests, and notes issued during the revolts, he pointed out the existence of a Romanian anti-union movement.
Dragomir worshiped documents, seen as sources of history. But his attitude becomes nuanced the very moment he interprets and analyzes the historical information comprised in the document. As a positivist historian he raised the question of the veracity of the information in the documents. As a consequence, documents were carefully interpreted and related to other documentary sources. As was expected of research dedicated to the Romanian union with the Church of Rome, the historian concentrated his attention upon the fundamental documents of the union event. The research began during the inter-war period, but as new documentary sources appeared, the analysis was resumed and extended to all the union documents. The great number of irregularities that he discovered led the author to conclusions that surprised the scientific world. Most researchers conclude that the special relations Dragomir had with the leadership of the Orthodox Church made him unfair and subjective. Today nobody denies his being Orthodox and nationally partial in his works. The problem that must be clarified here is whether this subjectivity has fundamentally influenced the conclusions of his research.

There are situations wherein the historian does not accept the evidence in spite of all the proofs. While investigating the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara, Dragomir constantly refuses to accept the involvement of the Serbian bishops in starting them, even if there were things implicating such involvement. Even more, the interest shown by the Serbian bishops for the Romanians in Transylvania, only natural up to a point, was also masking economic interests which had never been recognized. The author's respect for the Orthodox Church and its leaders also made him partial to Bishop Atanasie Anghel. In most specialists' opinion, the hierarch was the artisan of the union. Dragomir had long doubted Atanasie Anghel's involvement in the union negotiations. At the beginning of his research into the union, the historian thought that only the Romanian archbishops were guilty of the approach to Catholicism. Later on, in 1959, when he resumed the research, the author expressed his opinion that although the Romanian bishop had negotiated with the Jesuits and finally accepted the union, “he didn't sign anything concerning it.”74 It was only in Vienna, when the authorities, taking advantage of the hierarch's weakness, imposed a different union from the one the Romanian clergy was expecting, that he signed it. It was then that Dragomir accepted that Atanasie Anghel was involved in the union negotiations.75 In the last study he published, the analyst diminished the hierarch's guilt by saying that the union was finalized under the pressure of the Hapsburg authorities and not because of the Romanian hierarch's will.76

As most historians confirmed, the union negotiations began in the time of Bishop Teofil.77 According to some historians, the union was
fulfilled at that moment; and according to others, it was done under the future Archbishop Atanasie Anghel. Even if there are many discrepancies in the union acts – which was well documented by Dragomir – no one can deny the desire of the Romanian elite to unite with the Church of Rome. It is true that the Romanians, excepting the clergy, did not accept the union immediately because they received no benefit from changing their faith. Only after the Vienna moment and the publication by the imperials of the Second Union Diploma, which included advantages for the laymen, did the Romanians become more open.

The author correctly observed the real meaning of the union promoted by the Hapsburgs, the Romanian hierarchs' interests, and the limits of the concessions they were willing to make. The Jesuits wanted the union no matter what the Romanians' options were. The Latin version of the union act of 1698, which was much different from the one in Romanian, is proof of it. The analysis of the union acts and the conclusions the author reached concerning the causes and the manner in which it was fulfilled had great influence among the specialists of the inter-war period and the communist regime.

The research conducted by Dragomir proves him to be a historian who mastered the instruments of criticism with a remarkable historic sense and openness to historical criticism. His intellectual education, the political realities of Transylvania, and the policy of denationalization forced upon the Romanians from Transylvania brought him close to the national movement. He militated through all means for the Romanians from Transylvania to unite with their brothers across the Carpathians. He had an aversion to all that meant tyranny and to foreigners who caused suffering for Romanians. Of course, the aforementioned resentments can be noticed in his historical writings. From his position in inter-war nationalism he condemned the foreign intervention and interference. He also condemned the Hapsburg propaganda because it was an attack on Romanian religious unity. As a consequence the image of the Austrian imperial authorities was a negative one. Up to his last study, Dragomir considered the Jesuits to be the artisans of the union. But in 1962, after insisting upon the Vienna moment and comparing the points in the Second Leopold Diploma, the author believed that the union was fulfilled in Vienna where the imperial authorities played an essential role. The Jesuits, who were considered the artisans of the union up to that moment, were reduced to the role of negotiators and forgers of the documents of 1697, 1698, and 1700. Because of the resentment of the “traitors” of the nation, Dragomir could not or did not want to understand the great change brought about in the history of the Transylvanian Romanians by the political program initiated by Inochentie.
When we take into account the fact that Dragomir was one of the nationalists at the beginning of the 20th century in Transylvania, it is hard to understand his refusal to identify the birth of nationalism in Transylvania with the political action caused by the Greek Catholic bishop.\(^8^3\) His historical writings were also influenced by the new political realities in Romania after 1944. The author hesitated to establish the causes of the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara because he was influenced by Marxist philosophy. In his inter-war studies he thought the movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara had religious determinations and aimed at reestablishing the Orthodox faith. After 1955 the historian changed his conclusions, considering them social and national movements against the Hapsburgs.\(^8^4\)

In the historiography dedicated to the religious union, the works of the historian Dragomir represent an important contribution owing to the large number of documents used, to the deep analysis of the union acts, to the modern approach, and especially to the observance of the mental contagiousness unleashed among the Romanians during the movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara. Sometimes Dragomir was influenced by the context of his research. His conclusions are balanced enough for us to say that such influences did not alter the very essence of his contributions.

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Notes:

1 Document from Enescu family’s archives: 1.
3 Arhivele Naționale-Direcția Județeană Deva, Fond Silviu Dragomir, dosar 92.
5 In a letter sent to Constantin Daicoviciu, maybe in 1956, S. Dragomir thanks him “for the interest he showed for his miserable cause. At the same time he asks him to intercede in order to win back his house lost after nationalization”(ibidem, file 3p 243) Andrei Oțetea helped Dragomir to come back in the scientific world as one can easily notice from their private correspondence. In this respect the academician made use of all his scientific and political authority being convinced that he was helping a great personality who served the interests of his country and a great friend too.
7 Piece of information given to us by professor Sabin Belu.
8 Silviu Dragomir, Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice în Evul Mediu (București: Editura Academiei RSR, 1959), 224.
9 Silviu Dragomir, Avram Iancu (București: Editura Științifică, 1965).
13 Ibidem: 46.
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23 Ibidem.
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55 G. Popoviciu, Uniunea românilor din Transilvania cu Biserica Greco-Catolică sub împăratul Leopold I (Lugoj, 1901), 61.
58 Augustin Bunea, Episcopii Petru Paul Aron și Dionisie Novacovici sau Din istoria românilor transilvăneni de la 1751 până la 1764 (Blaj, 1902), 42-43.
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Ibidem.

Ibidem: 80.

Ibidem: 82; David Prodan, Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1984), 143.


Ibidem, p. 90; David Prodan, Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1984), 142.


Ibidem: 336 “In the end we consider it is our duty to correct the opinions asserted in an old work which gave the archbishops the initiative of the union negotiations and which presented Atanasie as being doubtful. The newly discovered and critically analyzed documents do not sustain this point of view. The discussions concerning the fulfillment of the union were led by Atanasie who might have been helped by two or three trusted archbishops. According to Mihai of Calata the archbishops gave him the list with the signatures and the seals wherefrom no enthusiasm came out for changing the faith”.


Augustin Bunea, Episcopii Petru Paul Aron și Dionisie Novacovici sau Din istoria românilor transilvâneni de la 1751 până la 1764 (Blaj, 1902), 40; Nicolae Iorga, Istoria românilor din Ardeal și Ungaria (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1989), 225; David Prodan, Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1984),

79 N. Densușianu, *ÎnDEPENDENȚA bisericească a Mitropolei române de Alba Iulia* (Brașov, 1893) 46.

80 “As far as the Romanian clergy is concerned, they resorted to the Union in order to save themselves from social degradation. For centuries the clergy ceased to have the rights and privileges of the ruling class because their people, mostly peasants was not a natio as the Hungarian aristocracy was, or the Transylvanian Saxon bourgeoisie or the Szeckler elite” (Keith Hitchins, *Tradiție religioasă și conștiință națională la românii din Transilvania, 1730-1780*, in *Mit și realitate în istoriografia românească*, ed. Keith Hitchins (București: Editura Humanitas, 1997), 12); “The wish for economic improvement and not a through religious conviction, the world earnings and not the transformation of the soul, selfish considerations and not moral abnegation dictated the act of union which had as consequence the settlement of a new church” (E. Hurmuzaki, *Fragmente din istoria românilor II* (București: Din Stabilimentul pentru Arte Grafice Socec, 1900), 70; Nicolae Iorga, *Sate și preoți din Ardeal* (București: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1902), 168-171.

81 “Although there were no hierarchs, it lasted within the mass of believers in the villages. The way in which the Jesuits approached the union left the villages untouched. They concentrated their efforts upon the clergy leaving the conversion of the large masses for a later period in time” Keith Hitchins, *Tradiție religioasă și conștiință națională la românii din Transilvania, 1730-1780*, in *Mit și realitate în istoriografia românească*, ed. Keith Hitchins (București: Editura Humanitas, 1997), 13.


83 For the historian Ioan Moga, Inochentie Micu’s request that the Romanians become the fourth acknowledged nation is a revolutionary idea Aurel Răduțiu, “Ioan Moga despre luptele religioase la românii din Transilvania,” *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj*, 31(1992): 61, 65.