"Imagination", "imaginaire", "imaginal"
Three concepts for defining creative fantasy

Abstract:
This paper comparatively presents three notions related to the concept of creative fantasy. These three terms ("imagination", "imaginaire", "imaginal") have been developed by the French school of research on the imagination ("recherches sur l’imaginaire"), which is little known in the Anglo-Saxon academic field. As such, the terms don’t even have convenient translations and linguistic equivalents. Briefly, imagination is fantasy conceived as a combinatorial faculty of the psyche. French rationalistic "philosophes" saw it as a misleading and rather weakly creative ability. "L’imaginaire" is the resourceful and inventive aspect of fantasy, as conceived by the Romantics and then theorized by psychoanalysis and contemporary French philosophers. "L’imaginal", or "mundus imaginalis" is a concept defined by Henry Corbin in order to designate fantasies as self-sustained, ontological beings.

In this paper I wish to comparatively present three notions related to the concept of creative fantasy: "imagination", "imaginaire" and "imaginal" or "mundus imaginalis". The first term is a venerable one, it has its roots in the Latin words "imago" and "imaginatio", and is well established in the English language. The last two terms, "imaginaire" and "imaginal" have been developed by the French school of research on imagination ("recherches sur L’imaginaire"), which is little known in the Anglo-Saxon academic field. As such, they don’t even have convenient translations and linguistic equivalents in English. Possible translations for "L’imaginaire" could be imagining (suggesting that imagination is a dynamic process, as in Richard Kearney’s Poetics of Imagining, 1998) and the imaginary (trying to transform an adjective into a noun, as in Wolfgang Iser’s The Fictive and the Imaginary, 1993), but...
neither is sufficiently precise or specific. As for the last term, "l’imaginal", it has been coined by Henry Corbin in its Latin form "mundus imaginalis" (Corbin, 1958), and so it should be used in English too. Nowadays images and phantasms, fantasy and imagination, fiction and fictionality tend to become cognitive and investigative instruments meant to supplement reason and logics, not only in the field of arts and culture, but also in the hard sciences. This is why an analysis of the three terms would significantly enrich the concept of creative work.

1. Imagination is the traditional term that designates the function of the spirit the Greeks called phantasia and eikasia. Phantasia or eikasia is the ability to produce mental images, phantasmata, eikones, eidola. The problem with these representations is that, however useful they might be for human cognition, they are not the real thing itself, they are only a copy of it. Investigating the foundations of non-existing things, Plato, in his dialogue The Sophist, made a seminal distinction between two species of the art of images: the technique of creating correct and adequate images of things, that is eikones, and the technique of creating invented images of things that may even not exist, that is phantasmata (The Sophist, 236a-c). In the first instance, this distinction would seem to solve the problem, by assigning eikones to being and phantasmata to non-being. Eikones would be reliable images, able to tell the truth, and phantasmata false images, producing errors.

However, the questioning of the Stranger from Elea, Plato’s character in the Sophist, about the nature of sophistic allegations raises new troubles. In order to reproduce the real dimensions of things, images must sometimes lie (as in the case of the craftsman willingly distorting the dimensions of the higher parts of huge statues, so that people from the ground could perceive them adequately and harmoniously). So the problem is not that images can be at some times correct and at other times incorrect, but that images can generally represent non-existing things. In Plato’s terms, this would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that non-being exists. Images would then be something real representing something unreal, and phantasia the capacity of creating non-existing illusions (The Sophist, 240b).

Things are even worse if we place images in the context of Plato’s ontology and metaphysics. In book X of the Republic, the philosopher develops the famous metaphor of the two degrees of mimesis. Any thing, a bed for example, can be conceived in three ways: as the paradigm of the bed, that is an idea, an ontological essence representing the “ultimate nature of things”; as a material bed, made of wood, that is an immanent copy of the transcendent model; and as a bed painted by a painter, that is an illusory copy of the material copy of the spiritual model (The Republic, 597a-598b). Stating that human images are copies of copies, or mimetic in the second degree, led Plato to the famous expulsion of the artists from his utopian polis.

Aristotle took over Plato’s reflections. In his treatise De anima, he established a hierarchy of the functions of the soul, such as sensation, memory, imagination, opinion, intellection, science, etc. Aristotle defines imagination as the ability of producing internal images and places it between sensation (aesthesis) and thinking (dianoia). Images derive from sensations, they cannot exist in inanimate or insensitive beings, and they are specific to sentient beings. More precisely, fantasy is a movement of the soul generated by the sensations in act (De anima, 428a-428b). However, fantasy itself is not a sensation. An image can appear in the absence of a sensation, as it happens in dreams.
Now, the problem is that fantasy, although it depends genetically on sensation, splits itself away from sensation. Or, in Aristotle’s system, sensations are the warrants of truth. Senses are always reliable, because they are in immediate relationship with external things, while images have stepped away from this contact. As Aristotle puts it, “sensations are always true, while images are most often fallacious (pseudeis)” (De anima, 428a). On the other hand, the intellect (nous) and science (episteme), situated at the other end of the scale of psychic abilities, are also secured as reliable operations, able to produce truth by their internal functioning and instrumental logic (organon). This means that imagination, partially in alliance with opinion (doxa), constitutes an intermediate level between the two secured and reliable levels of the psychic apparatus, i.e. senses and reason. Imagination is situated in a no-man’s-land, where illusion and error are most probable to appear. Images deform sensations, creating delusions and false impressions, while reason has the obligation to assess and to correct them.

In the main, Greek philosophers were averse to the idea that imagination had the capacity of construing truth and guiding the human psyche. The Judeo-Christian tradition was also defiant of the imagination, because it considered it the source of original sin and of evil in general. Although created in the image and resemblance of God, Adam transgressed the divine law because he was endowed with a faculty that distinguished him from the animals but also prevented him from remaining in the abode of God: yetser (imagination). In other words, Adam was attracted to the forbidden fruit because he had imagination. Each time they felt tempted to exercise their fantasy, Adam’s descendants strayed off the path of the just and fell into idolatry and heresy (Kearney, 1988).

This view was adopted by medieval theologians and doctors, who added to Greek philosophical skepticism a religious aversion towards fantasy. All activities correlated to imagination, such as oniromancy and all kinds of divination, were considered to be diabolical. Dreams, for example, were divided by fathers like Tertullian into three categories: dreams sent by God, dreams sent by demons and dreams sent by the individual’s own psyche. As the first kind of dreams are obviously rare, the general advice is to avoid dreams as delusional or misleading, as an instrument of corruption. After the Council of Trent, the Counter-Reformation intensified the attacks against overflowing fantasy of the Renaissance, producing what Ioan Petru Couliano termed the “great censorship of the imagination” (Couliano, 1984).

Religious censorship of fantasy was relayed by the new philosophies of early modernity, rationalism and empiricism. Starting with Descartes, imagination was considered “la folle du logis”, the madwomen of the house. In his short treatise, published only after his death, Regulae utiles et clares ad ingenii directionem in veritatis inquisitione, Descartes made a clear-cut distinction between imagination and intellect. He argued that ingenium, the cognitive faculty of man, consisted of four functions: perception, memory, imagination, and intellect. Within the frame of a dualist vision, which separated matter (res extensa) from spirit (res cogitans), Descartes considered that the intellect was able to express the abstract and non-figurative ideas of the spiritual substance, while imagination offered images of the visible corporeal substances. Even more, imagination itself was a “genuine real object, extended and figurative”. The main cognitive function, the only one that had access to the truth, was intellection, while imagination was doomed to roam between false and real images, without the capacity of discriminating between them. What imagination could do at best was to provide the ideas of the spiritual substance with individual and figurative examples from the corporeal substance (Descartes, 1977).
But while Descartes continued to sponsor the concept of some harmony and cooperation between intellect and imagination, Spinoza and other rationalists denied even the capacity of fantasy to support reason. In a treatise that also remained unpublished until the death of the author, *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione et de via qua optime in veram rerum cognitione digitur*, Spinoza excluded imagination from the “method” of finding the truth. The only criteria for veracity are provided by the cogito. Reason is the only psychic function able to assess the correct relationship between the essence (or the nature) of external objects and the existence (or empirical presence) of these objects. Depending on the mode of correlating the essence and the existence, there are three types of objects of cognition: impossible objects (whose nature contradicts their existence), necessary objects (whose nature contradicts their inexistence), and possible objects (whose nature admits both their existence and their inexistence). Necessary objects are the clear ideas of the intellect, which reflect the real external things. Impossible objects are fictions created by imagination, which don’t have a real essence and existence. Possible objects are false conjectures and interpretations, which attribute to a given existence a nature incompatible with it. So the intellect is the only generator of necessary objects, while imagination is the source of fictions and errors. Ancient mythologies, folk superstitions, magic techniques, and Christianity itself are all relegated by Spinoza to the category of impossible objects created by fantasy (Spinoza, 1992).

Seen as a “disease of the soul”, imagination was successively depreciated by the rationalists, the empiricists, and the materialists of the 17th and 18th centuries, by the “philosophes” of the Enlightenment, by the positivist thinkers of the 19th century, and by the scientists of the 20th century. One of the last in this line is the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who re-elaborated the category of imagination within the framework of phenomenology and existentialism. Taking up an old Aristotelian distinction, Sartre defines perception as producing images *in praesentia* of the external objects, and fantasy as presenting images *in absentia* of these objects. This means that fantastic images are, accurately speaking, made out of nothing. They don’t have a real ontological support, and as such they are representative for the nature of the human consciousness. We have to remember that Sartre identified, in *L’être et le néant*, two modes of being: *être-en-soi*, the being which is its own source of being, and encompasses all that exists, and *être-pour-soi*, the being that tries to contemplate itself and, in doing so, has to get out of the *être-en-soi*, that is out of all existence, into nothingness. Human consciousness is an *être-pour-soi*, and as such it is a de-creator of what it contemplates. Human consciousness is the source of the *néant*. Imagination participates in this process of *néantisation*, as a modality of producing insubstantial images of real things (Sartre, 1940, 1943).

2. The French term “imaginaire”, the imaginary, the imaging or the imagining function of the psyche, is a concept coined in the 20th century, in order to re-ennoble and to re-enhance the suffering and discredited term “imagination”. “L’imaginaire” (treated grammatically as a noun) has two overlapped meanings (Wunenburger, 2003). In the first instance, it designates the products of the imagination, the passive body of images and representations created by an individual or collective fantasy. As H. Védrine puts it, “L’imaginaire” is “the whole world of beliefs, ideas, myths, ideologies that pervade each individual and each civilization” (Védrine, 1990). In the second instance, “L’imaginaire” is seen, on a larger scale, as the dynamic human faculty of creating this complex system of images. For Claude-Gilbert Dubois, it is “the visible outcome of a psychic energy, which has its formal structures both at the level of individuals and of collectivities”. 

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For Joël Thomas, it is “a system, a dynamic function of organizing images, that gives them soundness and correlates them” (Thomas, 1998). For Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, it designates the “inner creative force of imagination” (Wunenburger, 2003).

In the history of ideas, the rehabilitation implied by the term “imaginaire” compared to the term “imagination” began with Immanuel Kant and the idealistic philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, etc. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tried to go beyond the “querelle” between the rationalist and the empiricist philosophers. He showed that neither Descartes’ nor Hume’s theses on the absolute priority in human cognition of reason, respectively of the senses, is acceptable. Real comprehension takes place through the collaboration between sensibility, which supplies the “contents” of the mind, and understanding, which offers the “forms” for organizing this material.

The meeting point between the senses and reason is represented by the transcendental imagination, a psychic function in which Kant sees the precondition (an a priori) for all knowledge. In the absence of the transcendental imagination, we would have either sensation without understanding, or understanding without sensation. While the first is blind, the second is empty. In order to highlight the new meaning he is giving to the concept, Kant distinguished reproductive imagination from productive or active imagination. Reproductive imagination refers to the mimetic model of representation, that is, to the old term of imagination as a combinatorial function. Productive imagination relates to a transcendental model of formation or creation (Kant, 2004). The French term “L’imaginaire” will apply to Kantian productive or transcendental imagination.

The post-Kantian thinkers took over the concept of imagination as an aprioristic form of the mind. Ernst Cassirer, for example, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, considers that human culture is molded by a set of a priori categories that he calls “symbolic forms”. The perception of the external things is organized and guided by an internal structure that has self-evidence and expressiveness. This striking and conspicuous character of symbols (“prégnance symbolique” in French) adds to perceptive experiences a certain non-intuitive meaning and construes them into larger and profoundly human representations of the world (Cassirer, 1972). The concept of symbolic imagination was further developed by other thinkers of the 20th century, such as the Romanian philosopher and poet Lucian Blaga, who made the distinction between revelatory, transcendental metaphors, and plastic, reproductive metaphors (Blaga, 1985), or the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, who spoke of “live metaphors” (“métaphore vive”) (Ricoeur, 1975).

Another major trend of thought that massively contributed to the rehabilitation of imagination was psychoanalysis. In his Interpretation of Dreams, Sigmund Freud rooted the oneiric fantasy in what he defined as the human subconscious or unconscious. Depth psychology postulates that imagination is a highly creative and expressive function of the brain independent and often more significant than perceptions and conscious notions and ideas. Phantasms rising from the unconscious have the same inner power and self-evidence as instincts and drives (Freud, 1900).

Carl Gustav Jung, the great dissident from the psychoanalytic movement, achieved the harmonization of neo-Kantianism and psychoanalysis. While Freud stated that the unconscious level of the psyche from which phantasms arise has an individual unique character, Jung amplified the concept of unconscious from the personal to a collective dimension. He determined that the collective unconscious is structured by a set of molds or patterns that he called archetypes. He further stated that the archetypes have the same role within the psychic life of the individuals as instincts have within their psycho-somat-
ic life. Myths and symbols constitutive of human culture are particular expressions of the collective archetypes (Jung, 1969).

On these theoretical bases the modern science of the imaginary was founded at the middle of the 20th century, through the works of Gaston Bachelard, Mircea Eliade, Charles Mauron, Gilbert Durand, and other prominent scholars. Carl Kerényi, a Hungarian historian of religions and a collaborator of Jung’s, wrote a series of studies dedicated to the gods of ancient Greece, who are seen as archetypal images of father and mother (Zeus and Hera), mother and daughter (Demeter and Persephone), humanity (Prometheus) or life (Dionysus) (Kerényi, 1963). The Romanian Mircea Eliade, another historian of religions invited by Jung to participate in his circle Eranos, wrote an important Treatise of History of Religions in which he organized the religious symbols of humanity on a vertical scale, from the sky and the stars to the earth and the underground (Eliade, 1964).

The French Gaston Bachelard began as a philosopher of the sciences and finished by writing a series of “psychoanalyses” of the four elements of antiquity, earth, air, fire, and water, seen as the matrix of human fantasy (Bachelard, 1938, 1942, 1943, 1948).

Perhaps the most important thinker in this lineage is Gilbert Durand. In 1969, he published a most influential treatise, The Anthropological Structures of Human Imaginary (Les structures anthropologiques de l’imaginaire), in which he laid the basis for a paradigmatic system of cultural symbols. Starting from the main anthropological schemes and reflexes (vertical posture, digestion, and sexual function), he defined three “régimes” of the imaginary: the diurnal, the nocturnal, and the mystical (G. Durand, 1969). Latter on, in the ’90s, he added to this structuralist morphology a diachronic and historical approach, in which he studied the evolution of cultural constellations of images and symbols through the concept of “semantic basins” (bassins sémantiques). He called his hermeneutics myth-odology (G. Durand, 1996). Recently, one of his disciples, Yves Durand, published a book of practical psychology in which he tries to demonstrate the existence of Durand’s “régimes” of the imaginary through a set of tests called the AT.9 (Y. Durand, 2005).

Also in the ’60s, Gilbert Durand founded the Centre de recherche sur l’imaginaire, in Grenoble, France, which gave the impulse for the creation of a series of similar research groups, first in France, then in other countries, primarily countries with Latin languages. Currently there are more than 50 such Centers for the Study of the Imaginary worldwide, in France, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Poland, Czech Republic, Greece, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, Korea, etc. Among the most important contemporary scholars in this movement can be counted Claude-Gilbert Dubois, Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, Philippe Walter, Joël Thomas, Michel Maffesoli, Gerard Peylet, Allain Pessin, Lucian Boia, and others.

3. The third term describing fantasy, “l’imaginal”, or “mundus imaginalis” (written in Latin), has its roots in an alternative tradition of the concept of imagination. Most surprisingly, Plato’s philosophy, which depreciated images as copies of copies, also gave birth to another tradition, forged by his late disciple Plotinus in the 3rd century A.C.E. As is well known, Plotinus reorganized Plato’s metaphysics in an emanation system, in which from the first principle, the One, derive, through successive emanations, the cosmic Intellect, the cosmic soul, and the material world. In this triadic system, the cosmic soul (Anima mundi) corresponds to the human psyche, and so to the human sentiments, passions, impulses and fantasy. Because of its consubstantiality to the Anima mundi, human imagination is no longer deprived, in Neo-Platonism, of ontological reality.
During the Middle Ages, while classical philosophy was “forgotten” in Europe, the Muslims inherited, among other classical concepts, the Neo-Platonic emanation system. In Sufi mysticism, there are three levels of reality: the intelligible world of the One, an intermediary world, in which intelligible beings appear as individual figures, and the sensible world of the body and matter. The intellectual reality is accessible to pure intellect, the intermediary reality to visionary imagination, and the material reality to the senses. Contrary to physiological imagination, which produces unreal fictions, the visionary imagination has access to a transcendent reality. Angels, heavens, cities of God, etc., described in mystical visions, are ontological manifestations of the One. In order to describe these meta-psychological representations, the French philosopher Henry Corbin, who studied extensively the mystic experiences of Persian Zoroastrians and of Shiite Muslims, called them *imaginales*, ontologically real, in opposition to *imaginares*, fictitious. He also called the intermediary level of reality *mundus imaginalis* (Corbin, 1958).

Some of the Neo-Platonic and Sufi concepts also passed to Europe during the 12th-13th centuries. For example, in Miguel Asin Palacios demonstration, Dante’s cosmology appears to have many parallelisms with Ibn Arabi’s and other Muslim philosophers’ systems. Still, the real rediscovery of Neo-Platonism took place during the Renaissance. The Platonic school in Florence, led by Marsilio Ficino, rediscovered Plato, Plotinus, and the Hermetic treatises and created an alternative philosophy to the Christian one. In this esoteric system, which structured the kabalistic, astrological, alchemical, and magical doctrines of the Renaissance, the second emanation, or the intermediary world (*Pneuma* or *Animas Mundis*), is the vehicle for all magical influences and operations. Exploiting the homogeneity between the individual soul and the Soul of the world, the magus was able to use his imagination in order to produce real events and phenomena in the world. Through his fantasy, called *vis imaginativa* (imaginative virtue) and *phantastikon pneuma* (fantastic soul), he could project and materialize his inner images (Couliano, 1984). In the Renaissance Neo-Platonism and hermetism, imagination had an ontological efficacy.

The Romantics revisited all the occult and mystical philosophies of the Renaissance. They attributed to fantasy the same demiurgic power. The human poet, the genius, was considered to have a demiurgic capacity of creation, and to be a competitor of God. He is a creator of micro-universes that are as real and as dense as the material one. The major differences between Neo-Platonic mystic and Romantic fantasy is that for the Romantics the movement of transcendence is not ascendant but descendant, not diurnal but nocturnal, not oriented toward the exterior but toward the interiority, not angelic but demonic. As the German philosopher Hamann puts it, “Only the knowledge of the self, a real descent to the inferno, can lead us to divinization” (Béguin, 1939). The change of the direction of these imaginary vectors was due to assigning the imagination to the “magical I” (or the “nocturnal I”) glorified by the Romantics, which was to be called, a century latter, the unconscious.

Neoplatonic, Muslim, Renaissance, or Romantic fantasy has an *imaginal* quality: it can give material form and presence to incorporeal ideas and essences. *Mundus imaginalis* is a world of metaphysical images, having the same consistency and reality as the world of Platonic ideas. However, this definition is subject to some objections, especially now, after the “postmodern turn”. In the context of contemporary attacks of relativism and skepticism on the metaphysical narratives and explanations, it is difficult to concede the value of Truth and Being to any concept and system proposed by speculative philosophy. The concepts of a transcendental *mundus imaginalis* and of an ontolog-
ical fantasy are difficult to prove and to sustain. In this circumstance, what could be the signification of the imaginal faculty?

Updating Neoplatonism to postmodern times, I would say that mundus imaginalis can be equated with what we call the icono-sphere or the imago-sphere. Contemporary society is evolving into a “global village” in which people from all over the world are provided, via media channels, with information on potentially every single event that takes place on Earth. Nevertheless, unlike in the traditional village, where the transmission of this information was direct, non-mediated, and interpersonal, in the global village the information is indirect, mediated, and transformed. The global advertising system, the worldwide movie distribution network, the newspapers and magazines, cable and satellite television, the Internet, all these media no longer supply “perceptive” images of remote people and events, but only “imaginary” images, processed in offices and studios. These inter-subjective or even objective images, which are produced collectively, form a kind of visual ecosystem. We live in an imago-sphere, as we also live in the biosphere, or in the noo-sphere. So we could safely assimilate the iconosphere, the world of the images produced by the contemporary visual civilization, to a sort of “mundus imaginalis”. This is why I would propose to down-grade and re-attrib-ute Henry Corbin’s metaphysical and mystical concept to the field of the global culture of images.

In order to conclude this brief survey of the main avatars of the concept of fantasy, I would like to focus on its relationship with religion. After the great disenchantment of modern thought, religious phenomena were customarily identified with products of fantasy. However, the question arises, with which of the three species of fantasy previously defined here ought religious phenomena to be identified? In this context, the distinction between these three species may prove beneficent not only for the definition and the historiography of the concept, but also for a better understanding of collective opinions about religious experience.

When related to imagination (in the restrictive sense defined at point 1), religion was consequently relegated to illusion and non-being. The systematic attack on imagination began in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the rationalist philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, and also Thomas Browne, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes, did not plainly identify imagination with religion. They would rather associate the “divine light” (i.e. divine revelation) to reason, and distinguish between divine miracles (direct interventions of God in history) and false miracles and illusions perpetrated by charlatans and false prophets. Theology was secured by placing it together with science, in the field of reason.

This maneuver no longer seemed defensible once empirical philosophy emerged. With the introduction of the criterion of practical verification, religion could no longer be paired with science and truth. David Hume revisited Tillotson’s argument that the evidence we have of Christian religion, as presented by the apostles, is less evident and immediate than the opposite evidence, offered by the experience of the senses. By disassociating religion from reason, John Locke and David Hume opened the way of associating it with false opinions, superstitions, marvels, and other errors of human understanding. This pairing of religion with the imagination was fatal for its credibility.

When related to “l’imaginaire”, religion appears as a function of the human brain. It is no more a mere non-being, a “néant”, although neither does it receive an ontological status. Imaginary phantasms are real as mental or psychic phenomena, but not as exter-
nal beings. Through the concept of “imaginaire”, religion is to be explained as a constellation of mental patterns (or archetypes) generating a series of religious experiences and images. Jung would say that, as a psychiatrist, he is not qualified to say anything about the reality of God. What he can professionally say is that his patients do show and document the existence of an “imago Dei”, an image of God present in the human psyche. And although Jungian psychology is somewhat out of fashion nowadays, the brand new discipline of neurotheology seems to demonstrate, with the aid of sophisticated brain-scanners, that certain areas of the brain are specific only to religious experiences.

Finally, when related to “l’imaginal”, religion would claim its full ontological reality. “Mundus imaginalis”, the transcendent world shown in mystical revelations, is no longer seen as an illusion, as a non-being, or as a mental phenomenon, but as a world out of our reach. Still, empirical evidence apparently cannot be brought in support of the theory of the actual existence of the supernatural. This is why the acceptance or the rejection of the “mundus imaginalis” remains mainly an act of faith. “L’imaginal” does not bring a theoretical testimony or proof for the subsistence of the sacred. Nonetheless, it linguistically evaluates it as ontologically real.

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