Abstract: The article analyzes the relationship between the dominant Churches from Hungary, Poland and Romania and the opposition to Communist regimes. The Churches – seen as institutional actors of civil society – are analyzed in terms of their material and symbolic resources which may act as prerequisites for the initiation or support of oppositional activities. The relation of accommodation between the Church and the Communist regimes installed in the three countries are also analysed comparatively. The analysis follows the politically significant behaviour of the three Churches and the corresponding attitudes and measures developed by the Communist authorities. The article discusses Poland as the only case where the Church has been actively involved, on multiple levels, in oppositional activities. The distinctive feature in the Polish case is given by the complex ties developed by the Church with the remaining actors of the anti-Communist opposition, as well as by the enduring presence of religious imagery within the Polish society. Hungary and Romania displayed only a modest activity in the direction of religion-based opposition, being marked by isolated acts of defiance from individual members of the clergy in the context of an overall passivity of the Churches.

Key Words: Church, religion, civil society, communism, opposition, nationalism, Orthodoxy, Catholicism
Introduction

This paper analyzes comparatively the involvement of Church in generating and supporting opposition to Communist regimes in Hungary, Poland and Romania. The Church is assumed to belong to the civil sphere, along with an interpretation that sees religious authority as separate from the political power. The possible participation of Church in political matters does not disprove its civic status, as it would not disqualify any civic organization dealing with political issues, for as long as attaining governing positions does not become its explicit objective. Church is treated as essentially belonging to civil society, yet as an actor which may choose, at various moments, to interfere in matters that exceed the exclusive sphere of spiritual life. Such matters may be general social and political issues.¹

The question of the link between religion and politics has always had tremendous relevance, both at the level of practice, and that of the discourse. Such debates also make sense in the context of re-discussing religion’s role in enhancing and supporting the democratic practices reinstalled in the formerly Communist bloc. Moreover, as Ungureanu showed, the status of religion in its connection to the political enterprise is ever more present in the debates over a European Union’s constitution where Christianity would be granted recognition.² This is a very actual and complex debate which, as the aforementioned author observed, entails many nuances, going beyond a secular-Christian argument to including normative and practical concerns like religion’s potential to support pluralism and the necessity to ensure the avoidance of discrimination.

Civil society is a disputed term and as such it supports a variety of definitions and interpretations.³ The literature abounds in competing approaches and definitional innovations around the idea of civil society. It is useful to identify within the existing body of literature the various levels at which civil society can be conceptualized.⁴ A first level is that of social reality: in this sense, civil society represents a social sphere that entails a certain degree of articulation, has an institutional expression (well established or in the process of gaining substance), is composed of identifiable actors, and it is guided by and promotes its own set of values. At this level, one may look for patterns of behavior and interconnectedness. Creation of and memberships in associations, what we tend to call “civic participation” are observable, measurable and relevant facets of civil society. This analytical aspect connects with a more empirically grounded approach, where the focus is on the actors of the civil society, the relation between them, and their rapport with the political society.
Alternatively, civil society may be considered a normative ideal. Along these lines, civil society stands for a political or ideological project, it depicts a state of affairs that is desirable and looked for. Civil society thus understood may be the project of elites (political and cultural) or of other segments of society, outside the realm of power. Accordingly, civil society may be a project of the dominant groups in society or it can develop as a counter-reaction to an existing state of affairs.

Lastly, and in strong connection with the above meaning, civil society is a matter of discourse. In this last sense, the idea of civil society has the potential to mobilize segments of society to take an active stance in the name of values it promotes or defends. As an actor of civil society, Church stands out through other connected features: its association with a community’s cultural patrimony, and its strong relation with tradition and history. The last of these features may also be read as Church’s connection to nationalism (understood either as patriotism or as ethnicity-based national feeling).

Church is an institutionalized actor, and as such it implies on the one hand a formal and legally prescribed relationship with the state authorities, and on the other hand a hierarchical bureaucratic structure specific to any large organization. Correspondingly, there is a difference between Church as an institution and the individual members of the clergy. This difference is important for avoiding incorrect assessments of the activities that may be classified as opposing the regime, in the sense of deciding whether a given attitude / action reflects the position of the Church or represents an isolated position of individuals from the clergy. The illustration of this duality is better explained when discussing the Romanian case, characterized by a submissive attitude of the Church as institution, yet having witnessed some isolated dissent of the clergy.

Turning to the instances discussed in this study, in comparative terms it will be argued that the only case in which the Church has been involved in oppositional actions has been that of Poland. In the Hungarian and Romanian cases, the religious realm did not emanate an organized opposition to the Communist regime or leadership, being limited to isolated acts of dissidence among clergymen. The differences between the three cases are interpreted from the point of view of the interplay between Church’s resources coupled with the regime’s input in the relation with the institutionalized religion.5

On the whole, religious dissidence and opposition may originate in: Church as institutional establishment6, religious organizations (sometimes an emanation of the Church, other times related to churches of the minorities, or to other religious movements), and individuals related to the religious field.

The idea behind approaching the Church from the point of view of its resources is to examine the foundations of Church’s “power” (meaning both its authority and its concrete potential of action) or, conversely, the
reasons of its weakness, which based its behavior during the communist period. Correspondingly, I elaborate on: symbolic, organizational and networking resources. The symbolic resources refer to the Church’s status in a given society (which is a cumulative characteristic, meaning a sum of historical experiences), its association with elements of national tradition and celebration of the past, to its ability to nourish popular attachment to traditional values and to mobilize the believers in acting in accordance to those values. Organizational resources refer to the institutional bases of the Church and to involvement in various areas of the society (education, media, health). Such involvement has been certainly conditioned by the properties that the Churches managed to keep after the nationalization waves, but also depended on internal characteristics. The networking capital refers to the Church’s ability to create and maintain bonds with other Churches (from inside or outside the country), other social groups or organizations (out of which of particular interest are organizations or groups that are involved in dissent/opposition activities). Therefore, we could argue that symbolic resources count for what we may call Church’s authority (the legitimate status granting the Church’s involvement in public matters), while the organizational and networking resources based the potential of action (Church’s real possibilities of getting involved in actions that could significantly induce changes in a given state of things).

The question is not reduced to the presence or absence of a certain kind of resource, but it also concerns the ways in which the Church made use of its assets during the communist decades, as this was consequential for its effectiveness as an actor of civil society. At the same time, the Church’s resources have to be considered as temporally and spatially framed by the general context described by one or another type of Communist leadership. Whether the Church produced / encouraged or not opposition is not solely the result of its resources; it is also the result of how much space the regime created for the Church to maintain at least part of its attributes, hence the need to look at the degree of regime’s readiness to make compromises and to tolerate certain autonomy for the Church. From this latter point of view, the regime’s positioning towards the Church may range from the latter’s complete suppression (or absorption) by the state to the recognition of Church as a significant social actor and the reaction to the religious resistance through negotiations and concessions.

On the foundations of Churches’ positions in Hungary, Poland and Romania

When speaking about symbolic resources, I refer to the aspects related to the Church’s history and tradition, its relationship with national values and nation-building as well as its historically developed position towards the secular power. A starting point is the belonging of each
country to a specific religious denomination, which is relevant from the point of view of the relationship of power between the church and the political authority. The different backgrounds of the three cases under scrutiny are considered as departing points for the subsequent attitudes of the Church towards the regime. Historically speaking, “Church-state relations in the world of Eastern Orthodoxy are collectively quite distinctive relative to both Catholic and Protestant patterns, and can therefore be expected to have direct implications and consequences for patterns of political conflict in the successor states of the former empires of Eastern and Central Europe.”

From this point of view, Orthodoxy stands out through a long tradition of “strong links and close ties between state and Church” which may be a starting point in explaining the underrepresented acts of defiance of communist authorities in the Romanian case. “Orthodoxy preached submission to the secular order”, underlined Gilberg (1990) in his study on Romanian nationalism during the communist period. This is an important feature, as historically the Romanian Orthodox Church played a central role “in the process of nation - and state - building”, yet it was placed under the domination of the state authority.

From a different angle, the post factum explanation of church collaboration, given by Orthodox theologians is based on “the Byzantine concept of symphonia, cooperation between Church and state in the fulfillment of their goals, each supporting the other and neither being subordinated to the other.” A de facto subordination of the Romanian Orthodox Church to the state was enforced by the Constitution of 1923, which alongside proclaiming it as “the dominant Church”, it granted the Church with “special privileges”, among which “the payment by the state of the clergy salaries.” The material dependence to the state may also be noted as a factor explaining the Church’s submissive attitude.

However, the explanation based on the belonging to different religious traditions, has to be amended as the common Catholic background of Poland and Hungary did not trigger the same response of Church to the communist repression and atheistic measures. This in turn means that additional aspects have to be looked at, concerning the particular histories of Hungary and Poland respectively. Yet before that, what is precisely about Catholicism that can set off the conflict with totalitarianism or with communism as a subspecies? This is not the place for a very sophisticated and elaborated historical account, yet one has to remind the moment when Pope Pius XI condemned - in a document from 1937 addressed to leaders of Catholic churches - the atheism and the “perversity” of Communism which is “hiding its real designs behind ideas that in themselves are good and attractive.”

Decades later, after de-Stalinization took place and the religious repression ceased to be as tough as in the previous years, the space for social participation became comparatively wider. In the 60s an important
moment occurred for the world Catholicism. The Second Vatican Council from 1962–1963 is credited with having induced “much of the contemporary Catholic participation in political life.”\(^{16}\) In addition, the same authors underline, “at this time, the church reconsidered its traditional pastoral rule and turned its attention to social concerns.”\(^{17}\) An additional element is related to the respect for the human being postulated by European Catholic intellectuals, who, “for a long time [...] have developed the theme of dignity of individuals.”\(^{18}\) Communism, in turn, through its repressive practices, denial of private property and homogenizing tendencies acted against the respect for individuals subjected to its rule. Even if Catholicism - as religious background - can be granted a superior potential to fuel the anti-totalitarian struggle, as compared to Orthodoxy, it has to be its adoption by national communities that gave it much of its strength. I am saying this in relation to the differences between the Hungarian and Polish Churches, both belonging to Catholicism, but having behaved very differently during the Communist age.

In this line, the body of literature on Poland allows us to refer to the existence of a “Polish Catholicism”, the product of Poland’s long Catholic tradition doubled by a very intense adoption of religion as part of the national being.\(^{19}\) Underlining the strong connection between Catholicism and Polishness, “strengthened by historical circumstances”, Borowik argues, in agreement with Ewa Morawska, that the “specific connection between Catholicism and the national Church can be seen in categories of civil religion.”\(^{20}\) Up to that time, Morawska developed the argument of the Polish civil religion, seen as “a set of religious-political symbols and rituals regarding a nation’s history and destiny.”\(^{21}\) This civil religion has been “constituted and reconstituted through sustained conflict between the civil society and the imposed alien rule.”\(^{22}\) These interpretations are important for understanding the association of Catholicism with the Polish nationalism and the resulting means through which religious attachment acted as a source of patriotism targeted against the Communist invasion (perceived as foreign and as a threat for the Polish national character).

Further, an important aspect concerns the historical trajectory of the Church, which was generally speaking a powerful institution, and - given the troubled past of Poland - sometimes “the only institution that had a Polish character.”\(^{23}\) Prior to the installation of the communist regime – during the interwar and post-war periods – the Church enjoyed significant influence, even as a political actor.\(^{24}\) The association between the Church and the national identity was far less evident in the case of Hungary, despite the long tradition of Catholic faith.\(^{25}\) Here, the weak association between Catholic Church and national identity is explained - historically - by the fact that “Hungarian church has been [...] traditionally identified more with Habsburg dynastic interests
than with national aspirations.”

From this point of view, “Protestant churches were the most outspoken advocates of Hungary’s political and cultural independence [...]”

The effect, at the level of symbolic identification is that “Hungarians considered the Protestant Churches – particularly the Calvinist church - as their own.”

Catholic Church has been, however, dominant, in terms of coverage within the Hungarian population and in terms of its privileges that stemmed from its status of “state church.”

In Romania, the association between national identity and Orthodoxy gained substance at the end of 19th century - as Romanian nationalism was being articulated - and has been reinforced during the interwar period. At that time, an entire generation of intellectuals imagined a “Romanian identity founded on autochthonous Orthodox spirituality.” With Orthodoxy placed at the core of nationalism, the effects of exclusion – in a country where other religious confessions were present – were imminent. The definition of Romanian-ness “did not include the Roman and Greek Catholics of Romanian ethnicity on the grounds that they were not Orthodox Christians.”

The communist regime speculated this exclusivist imagery, and the persecutions of the Catholic (Roman and Greek) Churches have largely relied on the idea that practicing these confessions was a sign of belonging to another ethnicity, inimical to the true Romanians.

Summing up the ideas developed so far, from the point of church’s symbolic resources I have underlined the belonging of Romanian church to Orthodoxy (with its tradition of submissiveness to the state authority), in contrast to the Catholic background of Hungary and Poland. Regarding the extent of permeation of religious identity within the national identity, the positive association between the dominant Church and national identification in the cases of Poland and Romania has been contrasted with the low connection between Catholicism and the national identity of Hungarians.

What should be added to these historically achieved characteristics is an element that temporally overlaps over the last decade of communism - Karol Wojtyła becoming Pope John Paul II, which gave a massive boost to the Polish Church in terms of authority and strength. The ascension on the papal chair of a Polish prelate added a unique symbolic support and inspiration to the Polish Church and its believers. This event hardly supports an inter-country assessment, being strongly connected to the recent history of Poland and to its population for which John Paul was not only the Pope; he was “our Pope”.

The luggage of traditions, historical experiences and - no less important - properties with which the Churches have stepped under the post War leadership did not guarantee for the maintenance of their institutional strength under communism. From this point of view, “by the mid 60s”, Poland recorded a surprising “institutional expansion”, a
development which came in contradiction with the etatist tendencies of the “totalitarian system.”

Besides its development of infrastructure, the Church was present in the field of higher education through the Catholic University of Lublin. According to a document from 1979, the Church owned 132 libraries throughout Poland, and the Party statistics for 1972 showed the circulation of 57 Catholic periodicals, besides the well-known weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. The institutional development of the Church is assessed by Osa, in terms of numbers of church buildings, diocesan priests, nuns, seminarians. Lastly, but very importantly, the Catholic thought (and not necessarily the Church as institution) was actively present in the Polish society through groups of lay intellectuals whose activities were linked to the publishing group Znak and The Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK).

The Hungarian Catholic Church went through an opposite trend of diminution of its infrastructure and political influence. The installation and development of socialism meant for Hungarian churches the loss of “majority of their former social and political functions.” The “considerable power” enjoyed by the Catholic Church before 1945 gradually weakened as the state reduced the latter’s influence during the process of normalization of Church-state relations. Between 1951 and 1989, the State Office for Church Affairs acted as “an instrument for silencing outspoken clerics controlling the Church hierarchy, and containing the social influence of the Churches.” This can be considered in connection with a major difference relative to the Polish case, concerning the organizational features of the Church. Hungarian Church was closer to a top-down hierarchical structure, specific to state-Churches. By contrast Poland stood out through an “activist church”, organizationally “two tiered”, with “the episcopate on one tier, and an activist base of a lower clergy and religious laity on the other”, these layers being “interconnected, but operationally autonomous.” The top-down organization of the Hungarian church triggered the obedient attitude of individual parishes towards the top officials, whereas in Poland the organization of the church left some room for autonomous decisions at the base, an issue on which I will come back later in this section.

As far as the Romanian Orthodox Church is concerned, in spite of having enriched its infrastructure after 1948 through the absorption of the Greek Catholic Church’s parishes, its submission to the state, alongside the top-down chain of authority virtually annihilated its otherwise substantial presence in the Romanian communities.

From the point of view of what I have earlier called “networking resources” of the Church, the Polish Church had the advantage of “Catholicism’s transnational status”, relative to Orthodoxy and Protestantism. The trans-borders character of Catholic Church and its belonging to a “community of faith” coordinated from Vatican have been supplemented by the uniquely Polish asset of having Pope John Paul as an
authoritative voice and moral source of hope. To this, the role of Church in creating bonds between other social groups involved in opposition will be developed in a later subsection.

In the case of Hungary, the “domestication” of Church - state relations, alongside the weakened influence of the Church have counterbalanced to some extent the belonging to the international Catholic community. Lastly, Romanian Orthodox Church had minimal connections with similar churches from the Eastern bloc. This has to do on the one hand with the general fact that Orthodox Churches are characterized by weak linkages between churches from different countries, and on the one hand it is connected with the nationalism promoted by the Romanian Communist regime, under Ceaușescu’s leadership. The stubborn affirmation of independence from Moscow that Ceaușescu reiterated throughout his leadership assumed the isolation not only at political and economic level, but also at the level of cultural and social spheres. This state of things resulted in the comfortable situation in which the Romanian state’s abuses on religious freedom or property could be - at best - questioned by the Romanian Church only, without being challenged by an external authority.

An outline of accommodation between the Church and the State

The discussion above revealed that Poland stood out through a historically influential Church, rather familiarized with the political matters, and strongly connected to nationhood and the popular imagery of Poland’s independence. Hungarian Catholic Church (as dominant church) was characterized by a decreasing social and political influence, and a deficit in forging an association with the national sentiment. Romanian Church was historically always “there”, when something important happened on the social and political scene, as a mere instrument of the state, and in strong communion with the national identity. Organizationally, Romania and Hungary shared the top-down model of Church hierarchical relations, in contrast to the double-layered Polish Church, which allowed a degree of freedom for the foundation level clergy.

Despite these different prerequisites, the three countries did share a common phenomenon: that of the accommodation (to different degrees) between the church and the communist authorities. In a simplified way, this accommodation stipulated benefits for both parts. The Church would be granted a minimal freedom (to continue the pastoral work, to perform the routine sermons, to continue the teaching of religion in schools), while the regime would obtain in exchange the Church’s self-restraint from actions that might undermine the system, or, by case, the Church’s support for the authority of the regime.
All three countries under study went initially through the tensions resulted from the clash between their historical and cultural heritage and the Marxist-Leninist ideology that discredited religion and all forms of organized religious life. The installation of communist governments initiated the struggle between the “new order”, atheistic in nature, and the “old order’, whose “bourgeois” symbols included the religiosity and their materialization - the Church - as institution and as religious establishments.

The atheism embedded in the communist ideology resulted from Marx, Engels and Lenin’s writings in which “religion was interpreted as an ideology that [...] masks the interests of the ruling class.” In line with the mainstream interpretations, Tomka explained the logical and ideological grounds of the religious persecution that followed the installation of communism: “first, Communist states intended to accelerate the prophesied process of de-Christianization. Second, the political system adopted as its obligation the fight against habits and institutional arrangements which could have hindered the quick realization of the ‘historic necessity’ of a religionless modern society.” Wherever the Communist governments took over the power, important changes have been induced in the social arenas. Religious persecution has been solely one of the assaults of the new leadership on the traditional values and practices of the societies they came to govern.

The vast body of literature on the evolution of Communist regimes agrees on the Stalinist period being the roughest time for all areas of social and cultural life, which still bared the marks of the bourgeois heritage. A great part of repression in the religious field occurred in the late forties and during the fifties, which was also the period when the state attempted to neutralize the potentially harmful influence of the Church, be it through overt repression (arrests of clergy for instance), be it through strategies of wining the Church’s support for the new regime. In this context, the attempts of accommodation between the Church - which could not anywhere be completely dissolved as an institution - and the state can be interpreted as normal. The cautious concessions reflect, in the end, each side’s attempt to preserve or consolidate its power: the Church had at stake the rights, traditions and moral authority obtained before the War, while for the communist government the endangered resource was the newly achieved political power.

A first thought is that the communist states targeted primarily - for creating an agreement - the dominant churches. In the Polish case, it goes without saying that Catholic Church has been the dialogue partner. In Hungary, the Catholic Church was proportionally superior to the Protestant churches, although - as already underlined - Catholicism failed to inspire Hungarians’ sense of national identification. In Romania, the composition of the religious landscape pursued the ethnical lines: Orthodoxy was the dominant religious denomination, followed by the
Daniela Angi

Three instances of Church and anti-communist opposition

Greek-Catholic Church (The Uniate Church) from Transylvania, the Roman Catholic Church, and other denominations less represented numerically but quite vivid in their activity: Protestant, Evangelic and Baptist.

All three countries witnessed considerable variability of Church-state relations in time, due to the trends that have been general to the communist bloc (e.g. repressive episodes of the fifties, de-Stalinization, periods of liberalization, aftermaths of the Helsinki Act) and also due to the internal evolutions of particular countries. As for the differences in terms of outcomes and relations of power that resulted from this accommodation, they can be attributed on the one hand to Church’s authority as institution (earlier called symbolic resources) and on the other hand to communist leadership’s approach of the Church question.

I start with the Romanian case, where, one of the first steps in the submission of the Church by the state was the appointment of Justinian Marina as the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Patriarch’s pro socialist attitude - which gained him the epithet “the Red Patriarch” - smoothed the progress of amalgamating Christian dogma with Marxist materialism. Below, Patriarch Justinian’s thoughts on the newly installed order are reproduced, as expressed in 1948, in a New Year public address:

“This New Year finds Romania in new social conditions - the People’s Republic of Romania [...] some consider materialism hostile to Christianity. We, however, judge men according to their deeds and achievements. We judge doctrine according to the order of society it produces. [...] Is not the sharing of goods, thus excluding them from the use of exploiters, better? [...] Let us therefore be loyal and recognize that the state leadership has brought peace to men by assuring them of an existence and by allowing them to live off the first fruits of their own honorable lessons.”

Justinian supported the “concept of <social apostolate> which blended Marxist-Leninist social analysis and Orthodox Christian theology.” One of the most important effects of the hasty surrender of Orthodox Church in front of the communist government was also one of the deeds that most powerfully discredited the public image of the Romanian Orthodox Church. In 1948, the Greek Catholic Church has been forcibly absorbed - with the state’s assistance - by the Orthodox Church, which also meant a transfer of property to the latter. This way, the Orthodox Church increased and secured its dominant position, already granted by the interwar laws, a position which it enjoyed due to the prevailing Orthodox population from Romania.
Despite the generally unproblematic attitude of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the regime did not compensate the Church in accordance with its cooperation. By contrary, it persisted in measures meant to “cut down the church attendance and slowly strange religion and its anti-regime influence.”\(^57\) Such measures included the “isolation of outspoken religious leaders”, the prohibition of “religious education for the young” and the introduction of “<voluntary labor> on significant religious holidays.”\(^58\) At the same time, the regime was aware that the population was attached to the Church and therefore tried to present the Orthodox Church “as the official church of Romania”, while emphasizing the Church’s role in maintaining “national unity over centuries of foreign rule.”\(^59\) Therefore, the regime combined a practice of silencing of religion, based on the atheism embedded in its ideology, with speculating the connection between Orthodoxy and nationalist feeling, for winning the support of the clergy, and not lastly, that of the population.

Moving to the Hungarian case, the installment of communism debuted with the clash between the state and the religious establishments. The best known in this regard is the episode connected to Cardinal Mindszenty’s opposition to the communist government, which resulted in a controversial trial and life imprisonment conviction in 1949.\(^60\) Following the initial conflict between the Communist government and the institutionalized religion, in which “church schools were brought under state control and convents were shut down [...] 225 Catholic priests and monks were arrested and sentenced”, in 1950, “the Churches [...] signed a concordat and various agreements with the state, securing around fifteen gymnasia”.\(^61\) Later on, according to Tökés, “informal arrangements between the regime and the Catholic Church were subsequently firmed up by Kádár’s “private concordat”\(^62\) with the Pope during his visit in Italy in 1977.”\(^63\)

György Aczél, the deputy prime minister and responsible with supervising the cultural affairs, published in 1976 an article in “Világosság”, regarding the creation of a peaceful co-habitation between socialism and Church (though the reference was particularly to the Catholic Church). In that view, Aczél argued that “the state respects the internal rules of the Churches, while they in turn value and recognize the socialist society and state on the basis of their dogma.”\(^64\) Moreover, Aczél drew the attention to the necessity of arriving to a diplomatic cohabitation of religious dogma and the Marxist ideology.

“Two things seem to be certain: one is that the Marxist and the Christian have to answer the same question in the same world, and if they are to remove the same threat of war they have to give their opinions in their own way. The other is that Marx and religion will have to live next to each other for a long time to come [...] Our experience
has shown that this is not only essential, but possible, not only possible but essential.”

The Hungarian illustration has to be understood in view of the accommodation that the Hungarian regime developed in its last decades with the society. This accommodation is seen by Schöpflin as a result of “a mixture of blandishments and threatened coercion.” The concessions made by the regime with the groups of society allowed the arrival to a certain equilibrium, which the Church considered too valuable to alter through overt resistance.

The Polish case is by far the most complex. I solely refer to several moments from the long record of negotiations between the Church and the various communist governments that held the power in Poland. As in Hungary and Romania, the fifties marked the history of the Church with episodes of repression, arrests and religious persecution. Estimates record about 900 priests having been arrested after 1948. During the arrests wave, an important personality - and authoritative figure of the Polish clerical hierarchy - Cardinal Wyszyński, was imprisoned. The necessity called in the Polish case too for various agreements to come into effect between the two parts, in which the Church was partially withdrawing from being a disturbing voice in political matters, reserving its right to be heard in issues that concern religious affairs.

In the early years of Communism, the Polish episcopate signed an agreement with the state in which it “committed itself to support of the government’s economic policies including the collectivization of agriculture.” The agreement also stated that “the Church in accordance with its principle, condemning all anti state activity will in particular oppose the misuse of religious feelings for anti-state purposes” The attitude of the Polish Catholic Church has been marked throughout the communist regime by moments of affirmation of strictly religious grievances, as well as by instances of more evident political engagement. Its alertness towards socio-political matters (more evident after 1976) made the Catholic Church a dialogue partner that could not be neglected by the regime, otherwise aware of Church’s immense capital of trust from the part of the society.

In 1968, the Catholic Church was expressing its position towards state matters, through the authoritative voice of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński:

“The Episcopate takes a public stand only in the indispensable defense of religious life, Catholic education, Catholic culture and the right of Catholic institutions to develop to meet the demands of the believers.”

The Church continued to be assertive in claiming its rights. In 1971, Primate Wyszyński had a meeting with representatives of Politburo, during which the Church’s proposals have been advanced. According to
Zaremba, “the most important proposal concerned the State recognizing the role of Church and Christianity in daily life of the nation and acknowledging the Church’s public and legal status.” However, the Church in Poland managed to preserve enough authority and political influence as to remain a concern for the regime, which further meant a careful “renewal” of negotiations between the two parts, especially occasioned by crisis situations, as in the early 70s (Gierek’s leadership) and early 80s (Jaruzelski’s martial law). At the same time, the relatively secure cohabitation granted by the agreements between the two parts has been doubled by a cautious attitude of Church, which remained “on guard against state repression.”

Pointed above are solely several moments from the record of Church-state negotiations. However, they prepared three different patterns of mutual positioning of state and Church, which will be better explained in the following subsection. Alongside the common episodes of religious repression from the late forties and during fifties, the three countries followed different paths in terms of interaction between institutionalized religion and communist ideology, as well as in terms of Church-supported dissent and opposition.

Religion as source of opposition

I begin with Hungary and Romania, which experienced modest anti-regime activity in the religious real - coming closer to a dissent model - and leave for the end the discussion of the more complex Polish case, which may be included in a different category, with Church evolving into an overt oppositional actor.

The most general remark on the Hungarian case concerns the lack of effectiveness of religion in mobilizing anti-regime opposition. This can be partially explained through the developments depicted in the previous sections regarding the low profile maintained by the Catholic Church throughout the communist period, coupled with the high degree of accommodation that the Church managed to establish with the regime. The status quo attained in Hungary resulted in a situation which “ensured that bishops and clergy were able to maintain their clerical circles and their lives largely within a private religious sphere.” In addition, the Church failed to create bonds with oppositional movements born outside the religious realm, such as the fractions of the Hungarian opposition emerged in the late 70s and during the 80s. In this respect, Enyedi and O’Mahony emphasized the modest cohesion between the Hungarian clergy and the “wave of dissent” from the late 70s. According to the aforementioned authors, “most clergymen saw a threat in these new initiatives. They were concerned that the relative tolerance developed under the Kádár regime would be shaken and that social peace would give way to renewed conflict.” In spite of having been a strong opponent of
communism after the 2nd World War\textsuperscript{76}, in the later decades, the Catholic Church came to value too much the status quo established through the agreement of cohabitation, as to risk the return to an unfavorable situation. This has to be seen in strong connection to the domestic developments from Hungary, where “the state established a policy of <Church within Socialism>.”\textsuperscript{77} The specificity of the context was enforced by the non-interference of Soviet Union in “the development of the Hungarian Communist Party’s policy towards the Church.”\textsuperscript{78} Along these lines, Enyedi and O’Mahony point to the somehow paradoxical situation of the Hungarian leaders of the Catholic Church: “the clergymen could feel they were the victims, even the martyrs of the atheist regime, while at the same time sitting in parliament, praising the socialist progress, and cooperating with the authorities against troublemaker democrats.”\textsuperscript{79} With all that in mind, isolated episodes of initiatives within the Catholic community are however, recorded in the literature, as for example the formation in 1982 of the “Committee for Human Dignity”, around the teachings of a Franciscan priest, who “voiced their support for peace movements.”\textsuperscript{80} Similar episodes are recorded in the case of “small sects”, which, in Tökés’s opinion managed to host some “anomic dissent.”\textsuperscript{81} From this point of view, despite its Catholic background, Hungary comes closer to the Orthodox Romania, also characterized by a submissive attitude of the Church and through little activity in the sense of publicly voiced disagreement to the regime. In Romania, religious dissent was reduced to several moments of visible contestation of the atheistic and abusive nature of the regime. From the prevailing Orthodox community, the best known personality who publicly criticized the regime was Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa. What incriminated him have been the sermons “Seven words to the youth” delivered during the Easter Fast of 1978, with a special message for the young generations. During the sermon, the priest urged the youth to react against the atheism propagated by the regime:

“Freedom means, at a social level, the contest of ideas, while in Christ it means liberation from sin and death. In our country, atheism has a course which is imposed and is more and more limited. It rests on the authority of the state. Faith is in full flight, for it is a fact of life. Authoritarianism enslaves, life liberates.”\textsuperscript{82}

The sermons circulated in samizdat form.\textsuperscript{83} In the aftermath of the sermons, father Calciu has been arrested with a 10 years conviction out of which 5 years have been spent in prison. During his entire life and activity, the priest has been detained for approximately 21 years in several communist prisons.\textsuperscript{84} The series of imprisonments has been followed by exile, as ultimate solution of the regime to reduce him to silence. Several
of Father Calciu’s texts managed to reach the West before him going to exile. One of these texts was “An Appeal to the Christian conscience”, in which, on the basis of his own experiences in the communist prisons and on that of other fellows, the priest drew the attention to the fact that “Securitate’s power is unlimited. It makes its own laws, has a completely free hand and there is no lawlessness from which it would not recoil.” The text also includes notes about the mistreatment during his imprisonment from Aiud and Jilava (between 1979 and 1984).\(^85\)

The priest Calciu-Dumitreasa had also an involvement in the formation of the Free Union of Romanian Workers (SLOMR). Although the priest did not sign the founding declaration of the union, he did support the ideas defended by the union, as his concern regarded:

“all violation of liberties, the way the Catholic Church in Poland was concerned, and the way that the Catholic Conference in Puebla established that the Church can no longer remain indifferent in front of injustice [...]”\(^86\)

The legacy of Father Calciu’s activity materialized in the eighties, when Romania went through a certain revitalization of the religious life, resulting in a greater visibility of critical voices among the clergy. Some of these voices belonged to Orthodox priests from Transylvania, followers of Father Calciu.\(^87\) The priests have asked for the restoration of “basic rights of churches”, for the “cessation of atheistic indoctrination”, “discrimination against believers”, “persecution of the clergymen”, “the lifting of restrictions that prevent the Church from exercising some of its essential pastoral and evangelizing functions”, “non-interference by the state in the affairs of the Church.”\(^88\) Another element concerns the critique brought by the priests for the “hierarchy’s subservience to the atheistic state as an abandonment of Romanian Orthodoxy’s historical traditions, calling in the name of <authentic Orthodoxy> for the restoration of the Church’s role in society.”\(^89\)

The other religious area which recorded episodes of dissent was represented by the Baptist communities. In 1978 the Christian Committee for the Defense of Religious Freedom and Conscience (orig. ALRC - Apărarea Libertății Religioase și de Conștiință), has been created, aiming at “informing the world public about the lack of religious rights in Romania.”\(^90\) The Baptist organization elaborated a “semi-political program”, in which they pleaded for the freeing of individuals from the “obligatory indoctrination into official atheism.”\(^91\) The important thing about ALRC is its concern for the status of religious denominations other than the Baptist community, which based the creation of the organization. Thus, in their list of demands, they included: “the right of religious associations to exist undisturbed and to be recognized by the law. In this connection we demand the right of the Roman Catholic Church to have a
recognized juridical statute, the re-establishment of the Greek Catholic Church.” In 1979, one of the founders of ALRC, Pavel Nicolescu, expressed his support and encouragement for the newly and short-lived Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers. He contacted the union through the intermediation of the Orthodox priest Calciu, whose activity was discussed above.

I close the discussion on the Hungarian and Romanian case with a brief remark concerning the representativeness of the above depicted facts for the general picture of religious dissent in the two countries. The facts here presented have been selected on the inevitable criteria of their visibility and of their public character. In doing so, one does not deny the existence of other acts of disagreement to the regime at a micro level, occurrences that may have been truly significant for the local communities, yet with a low public visibility that prevented them from being recorded as such. The above limitation keeps its validity for the case of Poland too, discussed below.

In contrast to the relatively stable configuration of Church - state relations in Hungary and Romania, in the Polish case, there has been a dynamic rapport between the two entities. The Polish Church has not always displayed an encouraging attitude towards political dissent / opposition and it has not itself been throughout the communist period an overt actor of the opposition. The shifts in the Church’s attitude may be attributed to a number of factors: the changes from the socio-political context, the dynamics of the lay opposition groups, Karol Wojtyła’s ascension to the Papal chair, and changes in the Church’s leadership. Another peculiarity of the Polish case, underlined in this section, concerns the Church’s wide presence in various areas of social, cultural and even political life through adjacent organizations and branches like the Catholic press, the Catholic University of Lublin. This multifaceted presence of the Church (and Church’s discourse) in the Polish society ensured the perpetuation of Church’s influence as a counterweight to the atheism promoted by the communist regime.

One needs to recall a defining feature of Polish Church’s institutional behavior during Communism - its ambivalent attitude towards dissidence and major socio-political changes in the Polish society. Despite the openness to democratic ideas and diversity that the Church displayed in the last decades of the communist regime, Church as institution “has not been a champion of pluralist attitudes and practices”. This oscillating attitude, very prudent and carefully orchestrated by the Church’s leadership, can be understood through the prism of Church’s efforts to maintain its independence and to avoid repression from the state.

The Church’s restraint from political dissent was best illustrated by the period between 50s to mid 70s, when the main concern of the Church was oriented towards “safeguarding its own position vis a vis the...
government.” This strategy of the Church has already been discussed in a previous section, where I looked at the accommodation between churches and the communist regimes.

At this point one should recall a distinction drawn early in this section between Church as institution, religion as such and lay groups that are related to Church’s teachings and thought but do not per se belong to its hierarchy. I refer in this sense to the groups, clubs and publications created by lay Catholic intellectuals. While not necessarily expressing the opinions of the Church as an institution, they did however cultivate the Catholic ethos and were concerned with the preservation of this ethos in the Polish society. For example KIK (The Club of Catholic Intelligentsia) acted as a bridging element that brought together in an “ideological dialogue” the lay intellectuals and the Catholic intellectuals thus enforcing the cohesion between groups with different ideological backgrounds, yet involved in a common endeavor. Lastly, the activity of the Catholic intelligentsia ensured, alongside the media of the Church a “wide broadcasting” of the Church’s discourse, thus contributing to the growth of the Church’s voice among the public.

With this, I arrive to the status of the Church in the 1970s, a period which brought a significant change in the relationship between the lay and the religious camps of the Polish semi-autonomous groups through a “rapprochement between the intelligentsia and the Church.” Within a wider picture, this evolution can be seen as part of the development started in the mid 70s when alliances between different groups emerged. At that time, intellectuals turned their attention to workers’ grievances, and several organizations have been created, among which Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników - KOR) and Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela - ROPCiO).

Jan Kubik observed how during the 1970s the Church consolidated its power also because its “discourse has been reinvigorated” and “its influence among the predominantly Roman Catholic populace increased.”

To make a longer parenthesis to this discussion, I would link the growing influence of Church among populace to the Church’s attribute of being a repository of the national tradition and popular patriotic attachment. From this point of view, the Church acted as “an institutional framework within which clerical and lay opponents to regime remind churchgoers of the antagonism between state and nation.” In an earlier section I have discussed the association between Catholicism and the national identity of Poles, as a feature that particularizes the Polish Church’s relation to the population and state. The connection between the Catholic faith and ethic and the nation has also been present in the Pope’s speeches or in the statements of Solidarity. Yet for now I should like to provide a brief illustration of Church -state dispute over the Polish
symbols, occurred in 1966, when, according to Zaremba, “both sides fought for the soul of the nation.” At that time, “the party celebrated the Millennium of the Polish state, while the Church celebrated the Millennium of the Baptism of Poland.” This occurrence is illustrative for the contest between the Church and the state over symbols the commemoration of which produced for the Polish society competing interpretations: one religious (with strong emotional connotations) and one laic (with political - atheistic core). To a large extent, the Church’s power relied precisely on this ability to produce for the Polish people an alternative sense of identification with nationally significant values, events, dates. This confrontation - at the level of symbols - provided a cultural background that framed the evolution of groups and organizations socially active in the realm of opposition. The multilayered character of the presence of Church and of Catholicism in the Polish opposition serves as the backbone for the analysis of developments from the mid-1970s onwards.

In this sense, one may distinguish between several strata or layers that involve different actors, levels of popular mobilization and impact: (a) clergy: the Church hierarchy (including its top leaders and the Primate), the parish priests and - however geographically remote but with strong symbolic attachments - Pope John Paul II; (b) the organizations protected and supported by the Church; (c) the organizations the Church came to collaborate with (KOR as most significant); (d) Solidarity as national movement that cultivated strong links with the Church. The activity of all these actors has been backed and given substance by the deep permeation in the Polish society of the Catholic religion intertwined with strong national identification.

Although is not easy to cover in several pages the whole complexity of Church and religion / Church - related activity of regime contestation, in the following I seek to capture the most significant activities of the above mentioned actors in several categories. I have to recall here the waves of workers’ protests (followed by repression) born from the increasing dissatisfaction with the worsening quality of life. Unlike the events from 1970-1971, the 1976 workers’ revolts marked the emergence of active support for the workers’ cause by the previously unresponsive intellectuals. This support materialized in the creation of KOR and other organizations (meant to support the victims of repression and their families) many of which functioned under the umbrella of the Catholic Church. The societal mobilization climaxed in 1980 with the creation of Solidarity, which continued to function underground after being outlawed in 1982. In this context characterized by the creation of bridges between different groups in the society, a number of aspects of Church involvement in the opposition (and in the creation and maintenance of a public sphere) can be underlined:
1. Church taking a public stance in matters that concern the condemnation of the repression and the observance of human and civil rights. From this point of view, a shift in the Church’s attitude could be observed in the sense of a more visible positioning towards the increasingly tensioned rapport between the communist authorities and the rebellious groups in society - the workers. After the 1976 strikes, the Church hierarchy reacted to the waves of repression, through the authoritative voice of the Polish primate: “the workers who partook in the protests should have their rights and their social and professional positions restored; the injuries they suffered should be compensated, and those who have been sentenced should be amnestied.” Wyszyński also underlined that “all human beings, irrespective of their contribution to society merit full human and civil rights.”

In general, the Church’s discourse became impregnated with the idea of human and civil rights observance, which paralleled the concern on rights from intellectual circles. However, the Church avoided voicing overt encouragements of opposition, which is in fact a very important feature of Church’s behavior towards the regime: “these statements were always made in the language of respect for ethical principles and never invited the public against the party-state or directly called for support of the opposition.”

2. Church acting as a moderator between oppositional groups and the authorities. Besides its own waves of negotiation with the authorities, the Church became a moderator in the confrontations between the regime and the oppositional groups. After the imposition of the Martial Law, the Church’s role as “mediator between the people and those in power” became more manifest, while “the Church hierarchy made itself less of a visible presence in opposition to the state” Pleading, on the one hand for a moderate behavior of the groups in society, and on the other hand condemning the repression coordinated by the authorities, the Church assumed the position of the arbitrator that seeks for social peace. As an illustration, in 1980, the Polish Synod of Bishops issued a statement which underlined the “tribute” paid “to both the striking workers and their committees, as well as to the authorities, for not allowing the situation to escalate to public disorder.” Two years later, when the crisis degenerated in the imposition of the Martial Law, the Episcopate issued the Theses on a Social Agreement, demanding “the restoration of union pluralism, including a Solidarity limited to its trade unionist dimension, the broadening of self-management, and allowing the suspended intellectuals and artists associations to function freely.” Yet again, the Church’s position is interesting in the Polish case through its ability to be at the same time a partner of dialogue with the communist authority (which reaffirms the Church’s political role), an actor of the opposition, and a mediator between what seemed to be the radical part of the opposition and the communist regime. The mediating role of the Church climaxed through the presence of its representatives to the round table...
negotiations, where it acted as a “facilitator of dialogue between regime and opposition.”

3. Church collaborating with KOR and engaged in social activism, education, charity. Church’s input in the series of actions initiated after 1976 materialized also in the involvement together with KOR in activities oriented toward providing help to the victims of repression, and supported, in 1977, the protest action against the imprisonment of a number of KOR members, by allowing a week long hunger strike to take place in the St. Martin Church in Warsaw. The Church intervened to the authorities in favor of the arrested and organized sermons, with the participation of Primate Wyszyński and the Archbishop Wojtyła. The installation of the Martial Law and the outlawing of Solidarity deepened the crisis and the gap between the society and the authorities, while the same time increasing the mobilization of people, who found in Church a protective environment for self-organization. During this period, “a multitude of organizations, undertakings, and actions of lay Catholics are being created under around the hierarchical Church.”

4. Church nourishing a public sphere free from communist ideology. This was a very valuable contribution of the Church - “the only independent source of moral authority” - for the maintenance of a space that was free from the Marxist ideology of the regime, to which the people could turn, however ritually, during the sermons. Therefore, “pastoral letters and sermons constituted the only free ideological thus, like it or not, also political public life.” This was a space for everybody: strongly convinced believers or regular people all together. Religiosity as expressed, ritualistic manifestations of faith and internalization of biblical teachings was not an exclusive prerequisite, as Poles’ “devotion to the Church is a question of national identity.” A large audience was listening to Father Popieluszko’s monthly “Masses for the Homeland.” These sermons “turned into patriotic religious demonstrations with thousands of participants.” On the other hand, the pastoral letters read during the sermons - conveying the Church’s teachings and positions on various matters related not only to the religious sphere, but also to “social and political issues” - served in “shaping public opinion.”

To some extent, it can be argued that these sermons blended together a public sphere (where people were exposed to information and could form an opinion on matters of public interest) with people’s private lives (people’s personal beliefs, convictions, regardless of the strength of their religious devotion). This made possible for the partaking in sermons to be, however symbolically, an act of defiance of the official regime.

5. Church and Catholicism as support and inspiration for Solidarity. In this category, we can identify at least three aspects: a first aspect with an emphasis on the Church as Solidarity’s supporter, a second aspect that sees Solidarity adopting religious values and symbols and a third involving the lay Catholics as advisers of the movement. Regarding the first aspect,
an important remark concerns the unsteadiness of Church’s overt support for the Solidarity, which prompted the image of an “ambiguous attitude” of Church vis-à-vis the most complex actor from the opposition scene. In this regard, we may speak of an oscillation between explicit support, Church acting as “mediator” and “co-negotiator” in the talks between Solidarity and the party and Church diminishing its unconcealed support and distancing itself - at least at the level of the top hierarchy. This last position holds true particularly for the period after the declaration of Martial Law, when Solidarity was struggling to survive as an underground movement. For a better understanding of this evolution one has to also consider the inner dynamic of the Polish Catholic Church, characterized by ideological variance with respect to how to act in its socio-political mission. Important from this point of view is the change from the top hierarchy through the death of Stefan Wyszyński and the arrival of Józef Glemp as his successor, who did not enjoy the authority of the former Primate.

A decisive factor in the change of Church’s attitude towards Solidarity was beyond doubt related to the imposition of Martial Law, which reconfigured the power relations in the Polish society. If in 1980 the Solidarity had the full support of the Church leadership, after 1982, the Church leaned towards a moderate position, seeking to make concessions for arriving to a state of social peace. As an illustration, in 1980, Cardinal Wyszyński received a delegation of Solidarity leaders in Warsaw and assured them of his personal support for their organization and its work. After December 1981, the Church hierarchy - more conservative and loyal to its mainstream moderate position - had to deal with the more active young generation of priests who continued to support the underground Solidarity. Thus, the context evolved into “a clear split between a moderate episcopate and the militant local clergy”, in which “priests across Poland bring up Solidarity and its traditions in their sermons [...]”. Regarding the clergy’s support for Solidarity, a compulsory reference is that to Father Jerzy Popiełuszko who - after his disappearance in 1984 - became a true symbol of martyrdom for the Polish believers. Popiełuszko is one of the best known Church figures associated with Solidarity’s struggle for democratization. Solidarity and Popiełuszko shared a strong emphasis on nation.

Another well known personality, often referred to as the “the chaplain of Solidarity” was Józef Tischner, priest and philosopher, active also in the years that followed the change of regime. From Tischner’s work, one could pick at least three issues of interest that are relevant in connection to Solidarity’s struggle for democratization: the individual, the solidarity, the work. It is important to underline Tischner’s proximity to liberal ideas as far as his conception of democracy and individual freedom is concerned. In his opinion, “the task of political democracy is to guarantee the defense of human rights against threats of other citizens.
and the state apparatus.” While concerned with individual freedom and rights and, in connection to that with the issue of “human dignity,” Tischner insisted on the necessity of individual's integration in the community: “The freedom of individual has to be attained within the civic and national community.” The community is also the place for an important social phenomenon - solidarity. Blending Christian precepts in his social philosophy, Tischner portrays solidarity metaphorically through people carrying the burden of their fellow men. Alongside the “solidarity of consciences”, which bonds people at spiritual, moral level, there is the “solidarity of work”, and the two “complement one another, are integral to one another as both are aspects of human dignity.”

Work was an important theme in Tischner. Work is presented as a defining feature of the human being. Work brings people together, in a way “similar to the process of communication, between individuals, who are involved in the common act of creation.” However, in certain circumstances (“If the work is wasted, either through low quality products, through unfair payment, or more generally through unfair distribution of obligations and benefits”) the work process is altered and the “moral exploitation of work” intervenes. In response to the devaluation of their work, people mobilize themselves in protest actions, such as strikes.

“People who want to do something good become members of a spontaneously formed communion of people of goodwill. They have love in their hearts for those for whom they work ...In growing to the point of striking, they grow to their full humanity. Participation in such a strike becomes a moral act that is act dictated by the order of the ethics of work. Humanity rises from the fall and regains a human horizon and human dignity.”

However, Tischner encouraged only those protest actions that respect the principle of non-violence and that help the people to grow morally and to improve their condition.

The second aspect is centered on Solidarity using religious symbols and relying on the Church's influence and teachings. Religion was widely present in the program and symbolic arsenal of Solidarity, which throughout its existence “maintained an important relationship with the Church.” In the program of Solidarity it was mentioned that they “draw from the values of Christian ethics, from our national traditions.” Besides, Wałęsa is recorded having argued that Church can act as an inspiration and strength for workers, offering a model of “moral justice and honesty.” In Wałęsa’s opinion, Church meant the key to exiting from the difficult situation, the “foundation upon which the crisis could be solved.” Borowski cites the Solidarity leadership’s statements in which
the importance of Church is clearly underlined: “There would be no Solidarity Movement without held and moral support of the Church, especially the late primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński.”

However, as Kennedy rightly observed, “Solidarity sought to remain institutionally distinct from the Church, even if it drew heavily on religious symbolism.” In any case, religion was an important ally during the troubled days of August 1980, at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk. Wałęsa was recalling that: “During their memorable strike in 1980, the first things in Gdańsk workers did was to affix a cross, an image of the Virgin Mary, and a portrait of John Paul II to the gates of the shipyards. They became the symbols of victory.”

From a different angle, the religious variable acted also in favor of Solidarity’s growth as a movement, as it strongly appealed to people’s religious attachment. The explicit connections of Solidarity with the Catholic faith and its relation with the Church, (strengthened during 1981) counted for many members as one of “their reasons for joining” the movement. Kubik collected several slogans used during the 1980 strikes that led to Solidarity’s formation. Among these were: “God with us”, “Radio and TV for the Church”, “Suffering Queen of Poland in Lichen” (“an icon of Mary with the inscription”). Lastly, the intertwining between Solidarity and religious elements concerns the active involvement of lay Catholic intellectuals as advisers for Solidarity. Apparently, the role of Solidarity advisers created, if not an “open rivalry”, some sort of tensions between the Catholic advisers and KOR members, who considered themselves “as well equipped to help the strikers as their Catholic counterparts.”

Ana Maria Cirtautas summarized very eloquently the influential Catholic component from the Solidarity’s project of the democratic society: “based on a fusion of Catholic and socialist humanism, representatives of Solidarity’s core elite articulated a new vision of public life that elevated man, as the ultimate bearer of rights and dignities to the highest position in the political community.”

6. Pope John Paul II and the reinforcement of Church’s discourse. The ascension of Karol Wojtyła as the new Pope in 1978 represented an unprecedented catalyst for the Polish opposition in general and for the reconsideration of Polish Catholic Church’s social mission in particular. The Pope made three visits to Poland after his enthronement: in 1979, 1983 and 1987. Each of these visits had a strong resonance among the Poles and occasioned the mobilization of great numbers of people. Very significant in this regard was the first visit which was possible through the self-mobilization of believers, outside the structures of the state. Also due to his “simple religious vocabulary” Pope John Paul II’s message became accessible to the masses and turned him in a truly “charismatic figure.” The Pope provided the Poles with an ideal to look up to and with a much needed hope for a better life. As he brought hope for the
Polish believers, he also caused much anxiety for the communist authorities, suspicious and careful about the possible effects of a Papal visit in Poland.\textsuperscript{153} Besides the commitment of the population to his teachings, the Pope also increased the Church’s capital of trust, the later coming to be seen more and more as a crucial actor in solving the country’s crisis. In this sense, Morawska cites an opinion poll from 1983, which showed that “more than 60% of the respondents perceived the Roman Catholic Church or the Pope as the\textit{best representatives of the interests of Polish society}.”\textsuperscript{154}

7. Church reinforcing the idea of nation and opposition as defense of the nation. The categories of actions discussed above are framed by a unifying context in which the \textit{nation} and the national attachment played an important role. The discourse of nation was largely present in the Church’s public statements, reprised by Solidarity and assumed as inextricably linked to opposing the communist regime. From this point of view, a recurring idea is that of \textit{sovereignty} of the Polish nation, a freeing from the (communist) domination perceived as foreign. Such a discourse necessarily evoked the historical episodes of partitions, calling for the emotional strings attached to the moments of the past that were perceived as painful for the integrity of Poland. One could find such references in the statements of Church officials made public in key moments (such as during August 1980), and also in the speeches of the Pope, occasioned by his visits to Poland. For example, during his 1979 arrival to Poland, the Pope addressed to the crowds:

“I never stop praying for the efforts [...] to improve social life, particularly in the spirit of good justice, in respect for human rights, the human family [...] for the well-being of our beloved fatherland, whose independence and sovereignty have required many sufferings by so many generations.”\textsuperscript{155}

During the same visit, the Pope underlined that:

“The traditional faith is the soul of the nation. Without faith as living presence, the nation would die, together with Poland.”\textsuperscript{156}

The above statement has to be read in the spirit of the Polish Catholicism’s doctrine on nation, which “stresses that a nation is a community of specific ethical and cultural values”, an essential component of which is the “specific historical consciousness.”\textsuperscript{157} One year later, during the tormented days of August 1980, the Pope sent a proclamation to the Primate, published in the “Solidarność Strike Information Bulletin”, in which the Pope was arguing:
“I pray that the Polish Episcopy, led by its Primate, and helped by Her who is given to be the defender of our Nation, can once again help the Nation in its hard fight for its daily bread, for social justice and for guarantees of its natural rights to its own life and development.”

Three things are important in the above statement: the affirmation of the Nation’s state of crisis, which has to come to an end with the help of the Church, the evocation of an appeal to Virgin Mary, the patron and queen of Poland (reinforcement of the connection Catholicism - Polishness), and the idea of “natural rights” that have to be restored. I would venture to argue that Solidarity came to be seen as a fight to regain the “independence” of the nation also helped by the backing discourse of the Church officials, together with the Pope. In this sense, it is relevant to look at some of the statements of the high officials of the Church during the August 1980 events. During a homily, in Jasna Góra Monastery, Cardinal Wyszyński underlined that:

“[…] the sovereignty of the nation, of society, culture and of the economy are essential […] And although today complete sovereignty of nations forming various alliances and blocks is lacking, nevertheless, such alliances must have boundaries, the boundary of responsibility for one’s own nation, for its laws and thereby its rights to sovereignty.”

Wyszyński’s weighty message conveys the important idea that the “various alliances and blocks” (which are to be read as the Communist block or the countries with Communist regimes) are artificial constructs that cannot and should not eradicate the authenticity of the natural communities - the nations. The hyperbolization of nation was in the Polish case - in very strong contrast with the Romanian one - the asset of the opposition, who built an entire imagery of their struggle around the idea of sovereignty. The nation was one of its pillars. The second was Catholicism with its unifying function. Kubik rightly observed in this sense that “all oppositional groups were united by a common recognition of the ultimate authority of Catholicism as a source of moral values. They differed on the role of the Catholic doctrine played in their programs.”

Conclusions

The analysis of the three situations revealed common aspects as well as country-specific elements in the behavior of the Church. Hungary and Romania shared a common feature in that the dominant Churches did not engage - institutionally - in activities that were overtly opposed to the communist regimes. There have been isolated initiatives of individuals
belonging to the clergy, and additionally, several actions initiated by representatives of religious minorities. However, on the whole, the Church (Orthodox Church in Romania and the Catholic Church in Hungary) did not become itself an actor of the opposition. In contrast, the Polish Catholic Church, assisted by its enduring institutional independence, played an important role in the Polish opposition, both directly - through its own initiatives - and indirectly, through supporting other participants in the opposition (Solidarity).

I remind that all along the discussion concerned the dominant Churches from the three countries. In the table below I summarize, comparatively, the most important ideas concerning the status and the evolution of these churches in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

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<td><strong>Regime’s attitude towards religion and church</strong></td>
<td><strong>The regime develops a double faceted strategy: encourages non-religiosity and practices atheism, while at the same time speculating Romanians’ attachment to Church (part of the national identification) for its own purposes; this doubled faceted relation is developed in the context of high repression and social control</strong></td>
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<td><strong>No involvement at the level of Church as institution</strong></td>
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Three instances of Church and anti-communist opposition

Involvement of Church in opposition

| Isolated initiatives of clergy members |
| Best known figure of Orthodox Church involved in dissent: Father Calciu, with a brief input in the creation of the independent trade union SLOMR |

POLAND

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One of the main features that triggered a different response of the Church to the communist regime was the traditional relation between the religious and the secular powers. This relation has been further assumed to be connected to the confessional background of each country, provided that Orthodoxy and Catholicism postulate a different positioning of Church towards the state. While accepting that, it has also been revealed that Hungarian Catholic Church was almost completely absent from the opposition scene compared to the Catholic Church in Poland. Therefore, the mere belonging to Catholic tradition did not automatically lead to an assertive attitude of Church towards the communist authorities. For that reason, though it still holds true that Romania’s Church submission to the state is a continuation and an exercise of the Orthodox (Byzantine) dogma, the confessional background alone is not a satisfactory explanatory factor for the different behaviors of Church in the three countries. The explanation was amended by additional country-specific features, related
both to Church’s resources and to the input of the regime in the relation with institutionalized religion.

A further aspect regards the Church’s connection to nationalism and national identity. Hungarian nationalism, unlike its Polish and Romanian counterparts did not rely on the idea of Hungary’s independence as nation. Nationalism was not among the powerful tools of the opposition and the regime resorted solely in marginal ways to national ideas. The Catholic Church itself was not related to Hungarian national identity because traditionally it was linked to the Habsburg domination (during the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). In contrast to Hungary, both Romanian and Polish Churches had strong connections with national identity. In the Polish case, this link is historically more enduring, stronger in the merge of national and religious symbolism (e.g. associations such as the cult of Virgin Mary as the Queen of Poland) and based on the maintenance through Catholicism of the spirit of Polishness in front of Poland’s territorial losses. In Romania, the link between Church and nationalism is a product of the 19th century, reinforced during the interwar period, including also elements of exclusion - inherent in a country whose confessional and ethnic landscapes are heterogeneous. Further differences are given by the use of nationalism to the legitimization of either the regime or of the groups in opposition. In Poland, nationalism became effective as employed by the opposition, including by the Church, which placed a strong emphasis on the nation and on the need to make all efforts to ensure the nation’s sovereignty and endurance through faith. The regime’s appeal to nationalism was far less successful, although there have been attempts from the part of political leaders to base their claims to legitimacy on social patriotism or Poland’s national interest.

In Romania, the discourse of nationalism has been monopolized by the communist regime. The association of Church with national identity has not been a gain for society’s mobilization against the communist regime; it resulted in the inclusion of nationalism (and its link with Orthodoxy) in the legitimizing discourse of the regime, which could not have been possible without the cooperation of Church.

I underline the different outcomes of the Church’s resources (in terms of likelihood to engage in opposition) in the three countries in order to support the argument according to which the specific historical context of each country has to base any interpretation of Church’s institutional assets, be it symbolic or material. The features of the regime are part of that historical context. Moreover, none of the Church’s features listed in the table above, taken alone, can provide a satisfactory prediction for the Church’s involvement in opposition. It is the interplay of these features (which I called resources of the Church), coupled with the response of the regime, that can offer an accurate picture. The idea above is supported by similar observations. Taking for example the Romanian and the Hungarian...
cases – both characterized by lack of involvement of Church in the opposition – we see that a similar outcome has been produced by different features of the Church and of the regime (see the table). The Romanian regime relied on repression to annihilate collective forms of action, and its entire strength can be said to have consisted of coercion and intimidation. In Hungary, the regime relied, alongside co-optation, on accommodation and absorption of social tensions in the creation of compromise. In a similar manner, looking at the Polish case – the only one in which the Church has been actively involved in anti-communist opposition – we cannot argue with certainty that the Polish Church’s resources would have triggered an identical outcome had the communist regime been of a different type. In other words, Polish Church’s sum of resources is not a guaranteed recipe of success when taken out of its historical context. A different political culture (one that did not rely on patriotism and relatively strong associative behavior) and a state that was stronger (for example through having more legitimacy) would have probably led to a different behavior of the Church.

Therefore, how to interpret Church’s behavior in the three countries from the point of view of civil society? I recall the distinction between the analytical understanding of civil society and its normative sense. I remind that the analytical definition sees civil society as a social sphere composed of individual and collective actors, with affiliations other than kinship or primary groups, with defined interest and identities. In a wide understanding of it, a public sphere is included, where people and groups can advance and deliberate on issue of their interest or of general interest. From the normative point of view, civil society is a sought for configuration of the social order, desirable for a given society at a certain historical time.

For Hungary and Romania, a first observation concerns the migration of the Church from the civil to the political society, by virtue of the *modus vivendi* reached in the accommodation with the regime. While it can be replied that Polish Church too was highly politicized, and in much more obvious ways, the crucial difference lies in the intentionality and outcomes of this politicization. In Hungary and Romania, the Church’s alliance with the political power was meant to and resulted in the maintenance of a status quo, i.e. the endurance of the regime and the lack of societal changes oriented towards democratization. In Poland, besides the obvious interests of the Church in maintaining its influential position in the society, its politicization was also part of its struggle to counteract the authoritarian character of the communist regime. In Hungary and Romania the politicization of Church worked in the following way: the Church remained a civil actor in as much as it kept performing its basic role of uniting people voluntarily in a community of faith, yet its focus was largely moved towards ensuring its own permanence and rights as institution, through becoming an ally of the regime. This way, its role in
affecting changes in the society in the sense of its liberalization or democratization has been minimized.

Notes

1 To some extent, the very status of the Church as a defender of a certain social ethos, based on traditional values prompts its involvement in social matters. This is related to what is frequently called Church’s social mission, which includes the promotion and defence of human dignity and the encouragement of individuals to act altruistically and to strive for the common good.


5 Instead of providing a lengthy description of the Church evolution and religious organizations in their development, the discussion from this section will be guided by several focal points for comparison. Taking the Polish case only, we would need an impressive amount of pages to cover the evolution of the religious realm during the communist period. Fortunately, the availability of literature on the Polish Catholic Church is exceptional; therefore I chose not to re-present descriptions available in much more detail, elsewhere. Instead, I will insist on specific dimensions which are relevant for the approach of religion / Church-rooted dissent and opposition.

6 Later, a distinction is made between the dominant Churches and the other established Churches. This delimitation is grounded by the idea that the Churches which represented the majority had priority in the bargaining process with the regimes.


8 Enyedi agrees that “confessional background is one of the most powerful predictors of church and state relations.” Zsolt Enyedi, “Conclusion: Emerging Issues in the Study of Church-State Relations” in *Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality*, ed. Zsolt Enyedi and John T.S. Madeley (London: Routledge, 2003), 222.

13 Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, “The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratisation”, *Europe - Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 8 (2000): 1470. This is an appropriate moment to contrast some of the principles of Byzantine (Orthodox) and Roman (Catholic) paradigm; according to Madeley (2003), who uses the approach of Hans Kung, in the Orthodox paradigm: “Church law incorporated into imperial state law under the authority of the imperial authorities”, in contrast with Catholic paradigm where “Own church law totally oriented on Pope as absolute ruler, lawgiver and judge - even over secular rulers.” Orthodox: “Church incorporated into imperial system in which secular power dominated spiritual” in contrast to Catholic: “Church presented itself as a completely independent ruling institution, which at times succeeded in getting almost complete control over secular power.” (Madeley, 40).
14 Dennis Deletant, *România sub regimul communist (Romania under the communist regime)* (București: Fundația Academia Civică, 1997), 70.
17 Hank Johnston and Jozef Figa; For specific references to the Polish case see also Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: the Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Communism* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).
19 Among the Polish national myths, one can find several strongly connected to religion and Catholicism. Such illustrations are the myth of Poland as “ante murale Christianitatis” (The Bulwark of Christianity), “the Catholic Pole” (relying on strong symbols like Jasna Gora and Czestochowa, the Polish cult of Virgin Mary), as well as the Messianic Myth of Poland seen as “the Christ of the Nations” (originating in the romantic period, in the writings of Adam Mickiewicz). From PhD seminar discussion notes, 07.03.2003, Seminar “National Ideologies and Cultures”, conducted by Prof. Joanna Kurczewska, GSSR, Warszawa.
22 Ewa Morawska, 29.
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25 Hungary adopted Catholicism in the year 1000, under the leadership of King Stephen (István).
31 Korkut, 131.
34 Osa, “Resistance, Persistence and Change...,” 271.


For religious persecution under Communism see for example Miklos Molnar, A Concise History of Hungary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Tomka, “Coping with Persecution...”.

For meanings associated with the dominant churches see also Zrinscak, “Generations and Atheism...”.

The Romanian Orthodox Church has been granted its autonomy (autocephaly) in 1885. Romanian Orthodoxy is a religious denomination of a Byzantine rite. The language of sermons is Romanian. The proportion of Orthodox population in Romania was estimated in 1979 at 80%. cf. RFE RAD Background Report / 123, 1979.


In the literature one finds the idea that the Patriarch was a relatively close friend of the Party First Secretary, Gheorghiu-Dej. See also Korkut.

Patriarch Justinian, quoted in Deletant, “Ceausescu and the Securitate...” 213.

Korkut, 147.


The significance of this merge goes beyond a political calculation of the state of winning the Orthodox Church’s support by offering it the chance to grow through the absorption of the less influential and numerically weaker Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. It can also be looked at from the point of view of homogenization based on ethnic grounds, as the Greek Catholic believers were located mostly in Transylvania, a fact that associated them in the “collective imaginary” with the Hungarian ethnicity.


Emil Freund, "Nascent Dissent in Romania", 65.

Korkut, 147.

For Mindszenty’s episode, see the holdings of Open Society Archives: “Cardinal Mindszenty removed as Primate of Hungary”, Radio Free Europe Research, Hungary, 13 February 1974
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62 See also “Kádár’s visit to Vatican. Private Audience with Pope Paul VI”, 10 June 1977, RAD / Hungarian Unit.


64 RAD Background Report / 256 (Hungary), 1976.

65 RAD Background Report / 256 (Hungary), 1976.


68 Johnston and Figa, 42.

69 Johnston and Figa, 43; The authors are quoting Adam Michnik, from Michnik, 1977: Kocsiol, Lewica, Dialog, Instytut Literacki, Paris.


71 Zaremba, 319. Zaremba also notes the Episcopate’s requests for the “restoration of religious holydays and Sundays as holy days”, a matter not agreed upon, by the Gierek’s administration. The meeting had however a significant consequence as the authorities agreed to the Church’s claim to a number of its properties.


73 Schöpflin, 105.


75 Zsolt Enyedi and Joan O’ Mahony, 180.

76 Kenez, 287.


78 Kenez, 287.

79 Enyedi and O’Mahony, 180.


81 Tökés, 175.

82 In Deletant, “Ceausescu and the Securitate…”, 231.

83 Stan and Turcescu, “The Romanian Orthodox Church…”.


85 RAD Background Report/95 (Romania), 1985. Other texts sent to the West include: “Concerning my Freedom”, “On the Death of Father Jerzy”, in which he pays a last homage to Father Jerzy Popieluszko: “[…] you have risen again in the
consciousness of all of us which is the locus of your spiritual resurrection ...” See RAD Background Report / 95 (Romania), 1985.

94 Ewa Morawska, “On barriers to Pluralism in Poland”, Slavic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1988): 637; In the same article, Morawska notes several features of the Polish Roman Catholic Church that acted as inhibitors for openness to changes: its traditional “conservatism”, a “highly hierarchical structure”, a “dogmatic set of beliefs”, and “a traditional resistance to dissent”.
95 Korbonski, 32.
96 Michnik, as referred to in Falk, 21.
97 In particular, see Adam Michnik’s “The Church and the Left” for a discussion on the relationship between the revisionist Marxists and the Church’s stances. Ekiert (1997) noted the significance of 1968 March events for the reconciliation between the leftist revisionists and the “independent Catholic circles”, two groups which came to see each other as “natural allies.” See Grzegorz Ekiert, “Rebellious Poles: Political Crises and Popular Protest under Socialism, 1945-1989”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1997): 319-320.
98 David-Blais and Sokolowski, 553.
101 David-Blais and Sokolowski, 553.
103 Zaremba, 318.
104 Zaremba, 318.
105 See also Kubik, “The Power of Symbols...”, Chapter 4, the section “The Celebrations of the Great Novena of the Polish Nation and the Millennium”.
106 As far as the maintenance of Poles’ identification with Catholicism, Johnston (1989) looks at the reproduction of religiosity in the circles of family / friends and the creation of “religious-oppositional subcultures”, which in his opinion “provide a fundamental grounding for the initial emergence of opposition.” In
doing so, Johnston borrows the approach of Borowski ("The Sociology of Religion in Modern Poland."), who spoke of Catholicism in Poland as a "way of life", perpetuated through family, friends, social networks, and which "propounds" social and political values distinct from those of the regime. (Hank Johnston, "Toward an Explanation of Church Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: religo-oppositional subcultures in Poland and Catalonia", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 28 (1989): 493-508).

107 Wyszyński quoted in Bernhard, 77.
108 Wyszyński quoted in Bernhard, 80.
109 In Bernhard, 138.
112 Zbigniew Gluza, The Days of Solidarity (Warszawa: Karta Centre Foundation, 2000), 76.
113 Curry, 200.
115 Johnston and Figa, 36; see also Michael Bernhard, “The Origins of Democratization...”.
120 Bernhard, 136.
124 Curry, 190;
126 Johnston and Figa, 44.
130 Wesołowski and Gawrowska, 272.
132 Wesołowski and Gawrowska, 272.
134 Tischner, as quoted by Cirtautas, 176.
135 See Ana Maria Cirtautas, “The Polish Solidarity...”.
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137 Ibid.
138 Lech Wałęsa frequently used religious symbols during his public appearances and during the Solidarity meetings.
139 RAD Background Report /262 (Poland, 1980).
140 RAD Background Report /262 (Poland, 1980).
141 In Borowski, 390.
142 Kennedy, “Professionals, Power and Solidarity”, 65.
145 Mason, 54.
147 Brown, 184.
148 Cirtautas, 166.
149 A very good analysis of John Paul II’s 1979 visit to Poland is available in Kubik, “The Power of Symbols...”.
150 Curry, 169; Kennedy, 1991: 45.
151 See Kennedy, “Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland” and Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies...”.
152 One of the most memorable words of encouragement that became a hymn was addressed by the Pope in 1978: “Nie lękajcie się!” (Do not be afraid!).
153 Zaremba, 326.
158 Pope John Paul II, referred to in Gluza, 64.
159 Cardinal Wyszyński, quoted in Gluza, 76.

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- RAD Background Report / 95 (Romania), 30. 08. 1985: “Mounting Religious Repression in Romania”, by V. Socor.


