Religious Fundamentalism and the Globalization of Intolerance

After the fall of communism, there emerged the idea that ideology was extinguished, and that ideological conflict has been reduced to silence. The increasing importance of the new “spiritual rebirth” movements raises the question of the global phenomenon of the resurrection of ideologies on a religious basis. The experience of secularization involves a secularization of identity. We have chosen as an example the case of Marxism, with its attempt at a reconstruction of identity with the help of the “disenchanting” of religion and the theorizing of the *praxis*. As a consequence of the crisis caused by the secularization of identity, today we are facing new religious movements. These are no longer important from the point of view of their tradition or past, but rather are important as religious ideologies that announce the possibility of the emergence of an ideological global conflict.

To many thinkers, the end of the Cold War seemed to open a new era, one in which the world either should have been under the monopoly of a great power and there should have been no more room for ideological conflicts, or the world should have become a multiplicity of powers, without an ideological pattern.

Far from the anticipated “end” of ideologies, we are today facing new ideological patterns, seeking to take part in this vast game of globalization. The end of ideologies is only a myth, lying alongside other myths: the death of art, the death of philosophy, the death of religion, etc.

It is true that modernity determines a deep change in these fields, but the announcing of an “end” is nothing other then a mythical-eschatological scenario for the embellishment of the postmodern man’s cultural experience. The effects of modernization upon the individual and his community seem to have a real strong
influence upon the existence of an individual identity in a global world. One of the most interesting points of view on the reconstruction of identity in the XX\textsuperscript{th} century reveals the crucial role of the relationship between religion and modernity in the dynamics of identity. According to Gilles Kepel, the causes that brought the view about the “end” of religion at the beginning of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century are the same causes which, in the 70’s, initiated a turning point in the relationship between religion and politics, determining, in this context, a new religious discourse\textsuperscript{1}. In the context of secularization as an ideal to the Modern Age, Kepel perceives the birth of a movement that claims the founding of a new society upon the solid ground of the sacred. Due to the collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe, we can see that the reaction to the globalization of the Western World in the ex-communist countries and in the world’s global relationships involves the rising of a large variety of religious movements of “rebirth”. This is the basis for the rebirth of an ideological global conflict.

The secularization of identity

Modernity brings a certain change of view which determines a transfer of symbols and mechanisms, of signification and power, from the structures connected to religion to those connected to social life, and especially, to those connected to politics. We can find here a continuous transfer from religious imagery to political imagery, from religious behaviors to ritualizing of everyday life, and especially, to ritualizing of the social and political behaviors.

This phenomenon is the result of a long process, in which the substitution of religious principles by modern ideologies gives credit, for a while, to the secularized shaping of the world. The need for myth and religion is compensated by a series of mythologies created by European modernity.

Perhaps the most significant and the most influential of all these mythologies, even if reduced today to a lower level of activity, is the mythology of communism. Daniel Bell perceives the fact that, as early as the XIX\textsuperscript{th} century, there has been an endeavor for the “disenchanting” of religion. The “disenchanting” theme finds some remarkable references for itself in Feuerbach’s anthropological critique of religion or in Marx’s materialist critique. This “disenchanting” theme has the mission to remove the interest from man’s spiritual metamorphosis towards the social change and the transformation of reality\textsuperscript{2}.

Following this line of argument, we mention the fact that, for Feuerbach, “Religion, at least the Christian religion, is the approach of man towards himself or, more exactly, towards his being, but an approach towards his being as towards another being. The divine being is nothing else but the human being, or more precisely: man’s being separated from the enclosures of the individual man, that is truly, bodily objectified, that is perceived and worshiped as another being different from him; consequently, all the determinations of the
divine being are determinations of the human being. Therefore, the essence of religion is not a theological essence, but an anthropological one. This conclusion determines the need for a new kind of being-in-the-world and a new construction of identity. The human being is no longer a creature analogous to the Divine, following God’s values or God’s commands; the world no longer has this transcendent impulse, which determines its dynamics. The man and his world shape and actualize the personalized transcendent and the world made by the model of the archetype-world. Thus, the anthropological critique of religion reveals the fact that “religion is man’s spiritual dream. But even our dreams have a trace of reality, except that we cannot see anything real or necessary, but delightful, imaginary and accidental. Thus, I do not constrain religion – neither the speculative philosophy or theology – to anything else but to the opening of its eyes, or, more precisely, to the opening to the outside its insight-oriented eyes, that is, by transforming the object of the representation into an object of reality.”

Marx follows the same path when he denounces the fantastical reality of the Heavens. Just as Feuerbach, Marx also considers that the Heavens are nothing more but the reflection of the image of man, that religion is nothing but an alienation of human realities. Religion inspires a delusion-world, which gives birth to the need for the illusion. The Marxist critique of religion has the mission of unmasking the alienating dynamics of religion, the mission of setting us free. This critique is very important for Marx, but only as a first step in the unmasking of many alienation processes. The historical task of Marxism is to unmask, as a first step, the alienation caused by religion; than, as a second step, the unmasking of the secularized forms of alienation.

To Marx, religion is the ideological form par excellence. The crisis of religion offers the pattern for the generalized critique of every idealism, and especially, of every ideology. In The German Ideology – which says that Marx and F. Engels tried “to settle accounts to our own previous philosophical conscience” – ideology is said to propose an upside-down image of the world, a distorted reality.

Trying to outrun any ideological dissimulation of reality, Marx shows the fact that the imaginary explanation of the world and of man must be forgotten, that any view of the world must begin with the real man and with “the production of material life in itself”. The way in which individuals “make” production is considered to be determining not only for their understanding of the way they are, but also for their social and political relationships, for the way in which the new spirit of Marxism can function as an option and as a scientific view of the world.

At least two elements, I think, might be helpful for the understanding of man and the deconstruction of ideology theorized by Marx. These elements are included in the well-known Theses on Feuerbach. In the second thesis we are told that the truth is not a theoretical problem, but rather a practical problem. In the eleventh thesis it is stated that the problem consists not in the terms of the philosophical interpretation of the world,
but in the practical action of its change. Therefore, the
dismantling of the mechanisms of ideological thinking
can be made with a magic key of Marxism contained in
the formula “It is not the conscience that determines
life, but it is life that determines the conscience”\textsuperscript{8}.

Gradually, there comes out in the evolution of
 Marx’s thinking the fact that this negative concept of
ideology permits a positive view about ideology. In the
Preface to the work Contributions to the Critique of Political
Economy, Marx presents to us the well-known thesis
concerning the relationships between the real economi-
cal basis and the super-structure to which correspond
the determined forms of the social conscience. In this
framework, there is a real opening towards the Marxist
integration of ideology as a revolutionizing science of
material production. “We ought to make a distinc-
tion between the material revolutionizing of the economic
conditions of production, which can be established sci-
entifically, and political, legal, religious, artistic or phi-
osophical forms, in one word ideological, forms in which
people become aware of this conflict, solving it by
struggle.”\textsuperscript{9} Marx strictly relates the changing of ide-
ological forms to the revolutionizing of the economic
basis. Once the bourgeois forms of structuring of mate-
rial production are annihilated, Marx thought that he
could radically change “the entire huge superstructure”.
Once the antagonistic forms of the “social production
process” are eliminated, the “pre-historical age of hu-
man society”\textsuperscript{10} should end, and man should find a new
identity for himself.

The revolutionizing of the economical structure by
the practical development of Marx’s and Engels’s ideas
is accomplished by Lenin. Lenin fights against exploita-
tion and oppression, using intolerant and rebellious
methods found in the previous tradition of Marxism, to
which he gives a new meaning, by announcing the ne-
cessity of a proletarian dictatorship. Lenin considers
that economical oppression inevitably determines vari-
ous political and social forms of oppression, as well as
the decay of the spiritual and moral order. In Socialism
and Religion, Lenin writes, “religion is one of the forms
of spiritual exploitation, which oppresses people”\textsuperscript{11}.
Following Marx, he affirms “Religion is opium for
people”. He also understands this expression, most fa-
vorite of Marx, in the way that “Marxism always sees
religion and contemporary churches, all the religious
organizations, as instruments of the bourgeois reaction,
which serve the defending of exploitation and the narc-
otizing of the working class”\textsuperscript{12}.

Lenin agrees with the contemporary thinking that
proposes a separation of religion from the State; thus,
religious institutions must be separated from the State,
the State must not recognize any official religion, it
must be atheistic; the citizens must not beneficiate from
rights depending on some religious affiliation. Though,
Lenin asserts, “on no account can we consider religion
as a private problem concerning our own party”\textsuperscript{13}. He
achieves an ideological paradox in considering that reli-
gion is a private problem for the State, but that it is not
a private problem for the Proletarian Party. The party
must struggle “with the help of the ideological weapon”
for the elimination of “religious obscurantism” and for the “advancement of atheism”. To Lenin, the problem of religion must not be rationally treated, but rather it should be integrated into the class struggle. Despite all this, Lenin does not mitigate for the permanent interdiction of religion, nor for a total war against religious beliefs. He adopts an ideological struggle that should lead to the recovery of the primary elements of religion and faith, and that should also follow “the removal of the social roots of religion”. Integrating the struggle for the enlightenment of masses into the general struggle of the Communist Party, Lenin shows that “the Party pursues the annihilation of the relationship between the exploiting classes and the organizing of religious propaganda, as well as the real liberation of the working class from religious prejudices, by organizing to the greatest extent possible a scientific, educational, and anti-religious propaganda with this view. At the same time, one should carefully avoid any offending of the religious beliefs, which would only result in the reinforcement of religious fanaticism”. We should not imagine that this care for the religious emotions of the people endowed with religious beliefs is a concern of Marxism. These cautions are taken only to avoid a new separation, that between the believers and the non-believers, in a theory which idealizes the accomplishment of the unity. This is not an act of social tolerance towards religious beliefs. The course of the events, especially in the Soviet Union, as well as in other countries influenced by Marxism, shows that the relationship of political structures to religion took the form of a virulent propaganda and radical attitude towards religion. A climate of generalized intolerance was specific to all Marxist totalitarian regimes.

The whole effort of the opposition of the Party doctrine against religion is the logical result of the will of Marxism to change the world with the use of non-transcendent principles. The narcotizing of religion, Lenin argues, is nothing but a imaginary remedy, which produces alienation (as Marx explains). The escape from religion is an opening to the praxis and to the creation of a world made by the principles of the working class. This aspect involves a secularization process generated by the transformation of the economic basis, with all the consequences implied in the changing of the superstructure.

According to Engels, Marx discovered the general law of historical development. In the name of this law, Marxism justifies any revolutionary changing of the world. This is that which is supposed to help us return to what is fundamental: the praxis and the real man; to the certainty that nobody can elude the unique law, which Marxism establishes as an absolute law. Any exception from the strict rule of Marxist ideology means banishment from the system. In the ideological field, conversion is a strict necessity. It is a form of recognizing yourself as a human being, capable of adapting to an implacable historical destiny. The Entmythologisierung (disenchanting) of religion leads to the establishment of a new ideological eschatology. Exploited by the ideologies in his struggle against religion, the modern man has to look for another source of “sense” or “reason”.
One must find a new basis for the definition of identity. Marxist ideology replaces religion, assuring a strong basis for the construction of identity. The human model of the working class is no longer religious; it is ideological. The Marxist thinkers show that the ideological forms, which correspond to the various forms of social conscience, do not exhaust that which is considered to be the Marxist ideology. Although it is the view of a single social class, Marxist ideology would best correspond to a global understanding of society, because, as a result of the Marxists’ opinion, the ideals of the working class would better correspond to the ideals of man in general. Such a belief could justify any action of the proletarian “conquest” of the world. The classical Marxist thinking and all its theoretical deviation can be viewed as a whole. This thinking could be described, as Hannah Arendt said, as the logic of an idea. This basic idea is Marx’s work. This idea develops itself in theoretical and practical structures, as the unique dynamic of a coherent system (Marxism). This said, we do not want to diminish the importance of theoretical and practical Marxism. We merely want to sustain that Marxism is a global conceptualization of modernity, which can be understood as the development of a modern myth, with multiple sequences and rituals, integrated into a unique story. It is the story of the human being, shaped by a particular ideological model.

The case of Marxism is an example of what modernity brings to identity reconstruction, using the deconstruction of religion for the structuring of the human universe. We could choose here Nietzsche and his “God is dead”, with all his impact on the XXth century, with all the prestige of his work in the academic communities. We could choose psychoanalysis and its revolution of the interior and spiritual world of man. We preferred Marxism as an example, because the ideological aspect is much more consistent and clear. More than that, we can say that the political separation between the “socialist” and the “capitalist” world not only determined a separation of the world, but it also initiated an ideological conflict.

The persuasive force of Marxism can be explained in many ways. Concerning the central ideological model of the world, it might seem important that Marxism developed under the influence of a total ideology, which made it a “secularized religion”17, employing all the energies of religion in a political transformation of the world. Concerning the relationship between ideology and religion, we take Rene Girard’s opinion as highly important: “The tendency to completely eliminate the sacred prepares the tacit return of the sacred, in a form not transcendent but rather immanent.”18 Actually, despite all the secularization, the political imaginary penetrates the transparent tissue of ideology and accomplishes the mediation role, analogous to ‘mystery’ in case of the sacred. It is not an accident that ideology seeks to regain the totality of the real for the human being, acting as do theological systems, in the founding of the cosmic, human being. In this context of secularization of the human being and of identity, a conflict appears between religious groups and modernity. The
consequences of the influence of modernity involve a crisis of identity and a global rebirth of religious movements.

The “spiritual rebirth” movements and the new ideological conflict

Today we are facing a unitary phenomenon, which, in a variety of forms, seems to implicate the democracies of the West, the Eastern European countries and, more evidently, the Middle East and Arab countries. We are talking about the rebirth of interest in religion and the appearance of politically religious movements in the new world order.

One of the most famous analyses on this subject, despite all the generalizations and errors, is S. Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations”. According to this theory, if in the time of the Cold War, the world was bipolarized and divided is a sum of states engaged in an ideological, economic, and military competition, after the Cold War, the world has become multi-polarized and multi-civilized. The new separations in international relationships do not involve ideological features so much as cultural aspects. The clash determined by political ideas is replaced by a clash of civilizations, of culture and religion. In these global reconfigurations, a central place is occupied by the problem of identity. The new division of the world no longer cares for political interests, but rather for solidarities of identity, especially solidarities that rely on common or related religious identities. Another important finding of Huntington is that, while the great religions are a creation of cultures outside of the Western World, all the great ideologies are products of our civilized world. Huntington even considers that non-civilized people are incapable of producing ideologies. But “the ideologies that have embodied the late Western civilization are in decay, and their place is taken by religions and by other basic cultural forms of identity”.

We agree with the increase of importance of the cultural aspect, and especially the religious aspect, in the new dynamics of the international relationships. It is evident that the problem of identity is a stringent problem, in the context of a deepening internal crisis of modernity and its dynamics. But we have strong reservation regarding Huntington’s thesis on the decline of ideologies.

My view is that Huntington, following Kepel, gives a good explanation of the movements of spiritual rebirth both in the Western field and in the spaces that, indistinctly, without a negative shadow, we name the Orient. Modernization involves both the individual and the society. This process involves an increase of economic and political power, but also the alienation and crisis of the individual. The social and the individual consequences have an important role in the process of cultural and religious rebirth.

This is the phenomenon that can be observed in the case of the Western spiritual “rebirth” movements of the 70’s, or in the ex-communist countries after 1989.
The identity crisis generated by the secularized religions, like ideologies, has created a response that seeks for a rebirth of a model that came from revelation or traditional religions. The clash of civilizations, the inter-religious conflict, prophesied by Huntington, is far from being separated from the ideological field. The new movements that arise on the structure of the great religions are more like religious ideologies than they are like spiritual “rebirth” movements. That’s why it is necessary to distinguish between Islam and Islamism (political Islam); we have to distinguish between the various forms of Christianity and the nationalist or religious ideologies growing in this field; between Judaism and political extremism; the list is always opened. To distinguish more clearly between religion and ideological religion claiming the name of a particular religion, we will speak about the notion of **fundamentalism**.

A strict separation between religion and religious fundamentalism is not an easy task. Lawrence J. Silberstein sees fundamentalism as an ideal model, as a mental construct. In this case it would be necessary to show more clearly what characteristics we have in mind when we talk about fundamentalism. But the majority of authors show the difficulty of defining the essence of fundamentalism. It is almost impossible to reveal a series of intrinsic characteristics that could be detected repeatedly at the level of the various movements or views that we put under the sign of fundamentalism. A definition of the essence of fundamentalism would make the concept itself impossible; thus, we would see fundamentalist acts without fundamentalism.

We are obliged to shape the frame of a possible separation between real religious tradition and ideological forms, that is, the political movements guised as religious tradition. From this motive, we will here attempt to present the eleven “family traits of fundamentalism”, exposed by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby.

1) Fundamentalism is a form of religious idealism. In this context, the transcendent is the only immutable force; it offers a strong and irreducible basis for the personal and communal identity; beneath this identity lays Divine revelation seen as the whole, undifferentiated Truth.

2) The shaping of identity on the basis of revelation makes the fundamentalists refuse secularized reality or any trace of relativism.

3) The identity is shaped by a series of dramatic events of Divine origin. In this sense, fundamentalists give credit to some particular moments of history, which they relate to their tradition or their sacred texts and interpret according to an esoteric reckoning of time and space.

4) Based on the dynamics of opposition, fundamentalists mythologize their enemies. They see their enemies in a mythical or eschatological scenario, with the help of the rhetoric of negation. Thus, without even searching for the real identity of their enemy, fundamentalists trace limits which protect and purify the group.

5) Another characteristic is the aggressiveness of fundamentalist missionary activity. Often, the moderate
parties, which try to live in peace with the other, are excluded from the group.

6) The ingredient that moves fundamentalist activism is the idea of an imminent danger. Fundamentalisms appear and develop in periods of crisis. This crisis can be real or imaginary, but it always appears as a threat. The crisis is a crisis of identity.

7) The rhetoric of the crisis justifies any extreme measures. Fundamentalism contains a totalitarian impulse. In many cases, fundamentalism desires a total transformation of society, with the help of the replacement of existing structures with a system emanating from religious principles.

8) In developing this kind of system, which includes society, politics, and economy, fundamentalism proves to be selective towards the tradition and modernity. Fundamentalists carefully select from the original doctrine only these elements that serve their ideological purposes. The fundamentalists extract the ancient doctrines out of their original context, institutionalize them, and use them as ideological weapons against all those elements that seem hostile to them.

9) The charismatic leadership plays a central role in the interpreting of tradition, in evaluating modernity, and in the selective extraction of elements from both of these spheres.

10) Fundamentalists prove that their strategies are more closely related to modernism than to tradition. With all the resentments towards modernity, they use its weapons to fight against secularization.

11) Fundamentalists appeal to the masses. The appeal to the masses could be successful because of the use of mass communication systems (radio, television, etc.). Marty and Appleby illustrate very convincingly the fact that the centers of the new identities are not synagogues, churches, nor mosques, but rather radio and television. These elements are significant to the cultivation of the intolerance which can be seen to be a global phenomenon.

We could probably see aspects of fundamentalism in religious activities that do not seem quite ideological. What is characteristic to the religious ideologies is their totalitarian instinct. As was in the case of secularized religion (Marxism), the totalitarian impulse generated violence and intolerance.

Marty and Appleby also mention the fact that the constant component of fundamentalism is the idea of fighting. This struggle is intrinsic to all family traits of the spiritual “rebirth” movements, under the sign of fundamentalism. Although it is usually known as violence, the idea of fight has many meanings: 1) Fighting back – by which we see that fundamentalists are militant and retaliate because they see their identity threatened. 2) Fight for – a view of the world adopted or inherited, which they want to strengthen or impose as a universal view; 3) Fight with – implies a use of “weapons“ These include elements that are considered fundamental and are transformed in fetishes; 4) Fight against – the others. The others are real or imaginary enemies, but also can be moderate elements which try to adapt their personal beliefs to the conditions of modernity; 5) Fight under
God – more visible in the case of the theistic religions, referring to personalized transcendence. All the traits explained by these two authors have a strong ideological characteristic.

Michael von Bruck shows that when we talk about fundamentalism, we must be conscious of two aspects of this movement: on one side, the negation of every relativity of the knowledge specific to the fundamentalist movement; and on the other side, its refusal to accept any integration or assimilation in the name of relativism. Western relativism created a large variety of negations and refusals. The tendency of the Western world to expand its forms outside the Western world makes inevitable an increase of the crisis of identity and the expanding of relativism in the territories outside the Western world. Von Bruck emphasizes two sources of negation and refusal: an individual source, based on the fear of the individual of losing his or her identity or the identity of his community, because of his week faith in God; and a social source, which exploits the political aspect, that is, the insecurity of individuals within a much larger group. Many groups, for political reasons and for the purpose of establishing a unique, absolute identity, evidence the desire for comfort and security offered by a strong identity.

Fundamentalism is a religious idea. Restating the religious aspect might seem redundant, because every fundamentalist movement claims to be a spiritual “re-birth” movement. But problems appear once we try to explain the ideological character of these movements, to reveal their social and political transformation purposes, with the help of a particular form of power. Reflecting upon the ideas of James Davison Hunter, Hava Lazarus-Zafef, Laurence L. Silberstein, Joan Scott, Lionel Caplan, Bruce Lawrence and others, we can assert that: 1) fundamentalism is a product of our modernity, and its sources of ideology cannot be situated later than the beginning of the XX-th century; 2) the crisis of identity is the central component of the fundamentalist movements, and their opposing politics fight against secularization; 3) The various forms of the conflict between the religious groups and modernity involve more of a dialectical movement, than a real opposition movement; 4) fundamentalisms produce, legitimize, and promote social forms and particular cultures as absolute; 5) fundamentalism seeks particular identities for individuals and groups, identities seen as a model for the “re-birth” of all humanity; 6) fundamentalism defines and structures experience following a set of beliefs, views, and assertions, which are vague enough not to constitute a very coherent and rigid doctrine, creating space for future developments and adaptation; 7) fundamentalisms contain too large a variety of political ideas, social needs, and legitimatising schemes to embody a unique essence.

If we judge it in the context of globalization, we will observe that fundamentalism has a large variety of forms, that it claims its existence from different cultural contexts and religious doctrines. Fundamentalism is a global phenomenon that constitutes itself as a plurality of fundamentalisms, which do not have a certain territorial or cultural circumscription, which are not related
to certain territories, but rather to global influence zones.

If we should speak of a new conflict of ideologies, that is, of the conflict between religious fundamentalisms and democratic order, than this conflict should not separate the world into “political blocks” or “political worlds”. There is no “Iron curtain” that should draw strict lines between two worlds. The fundamentalisms have a local structure that integrates itself in a large net of global structures. The conflict between a democratic ideological order and fundamentalist religions determines another kind of polarity, a polarity in which the “local” becomes “global”, and the “global” follows the trace of the “local”. Religious ideologies create identity types, which can sustain the most unexpected solidarities. The solidarity between intolerance and violence is a common pattern of totalitarian ideology. The new religious ideologies become totalitarian ideologies because of their tendencies to influence the new global order and to engage in conquest of an absolute “vital space”.

Notes

* Translated by Stefan Maftei
1 Gilles Kepel, Dumnezeu îşi ia revansa (God takes revenge), Ed. Artemis, Bucuresti, 1994, p. 8.
4 Ludwig Feuerbach, Esenta Crestinismului (The Essence of Christianity), ed. cit., p. 21.
5 “The critique of Heavens becomes the critique of earth, the critique of religion becomes the critique of right, the critique of theology becomes the critique of politics “, cf. K. Marx, F. Engels, Despre religie (On Religion), Ed. politica, Bucuresti, 1960, p. 38.
6 K. Marx, Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy), Ed. de stat pentru literatura politica, Bucuresti, 1954, p. 11.
7 K. Marx, F. Engels, Ideologia germana (The German Ideology), Ed. de stat pentru literatura politica, Bucuresti, 1956, p. 22.
9 K. Marx, Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy), ed. cit., p. 10.
10 K. Marx, Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy), ed. cit., p. 10.
12 V. I. Lenin, Cu privire la atitudinea Partidului muncitoresc fata de religie (Concerning the Attitude of the Party towards Religion), in Despre religie (On Religion), ed. cit., p. 19.
14 V. I. Lenin, Despre religie (On Religion), ed. cit., p. 10
15 V. I. Lenin, Cu privire la atitudinea Partidului muncitoresc fata de religie (Concerning the Attitude of the Party towards Religion), in Despre religie (On Religion), ed. cit., p. 21.
16 V. I. Lenin, Din “Proiectul de Program al C.C. al P. C. (b) din Rusia” (Extract from ‘The Project of The Party in Russia”), in Despre religie (On Religion), ed. cit., p. 49.
17 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology in the West, in The End of Ideology Debate edited, with an introduction by Chaim I. Waxman,


