Abstract: Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury that he looks at philosophical problems from a religious point of view has greatly puzzled commentators. The paper argues that the readings given by commentators Malcolm, Winch and Labron are illuminating, but inadequate. Second, using Wittgenstein’s “use-conception of meaning” as an example, the paper proposes a more adequate reading that emphasizes Wittgenstein’s view that “nothing is hidden” (Philosophical Investigations, para. 435). In this connection, the paper examines Fodor’s critique of Wittgenstein’s “use-conception” and shows how Fodor only refutes a “misuse-conception meaning” because he presupposes a kind of linguistic meaning, the kind that Wittgenstein emphasizes, that is “already before his eyes” (and, therefore, prior to Fodor’s theories of meaning). Wittgenstein’s view that the truth is already before one’s eyes is further explained by employing an ethical analogy with Raskolnikov’s enlightenment in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Finally, the paper addresses the difficult question whether Wittgenstein is, despite his own denials, “a religious man”, and argues that there is a non-trivial religious dimension in Wittgenstein’s life but that there are several important senses in which Wittgenstein is correct that he is not a religious person.

Key Words: Wittgenstein, Malcolm, religious point of view, Genesis, use-conception of meaning, unconcealedness, phenomenology, Dostoevsky, ethics.
When Wittgenstein was working on the latter part of the Philosophical Investigations, he said to his ... close friend ... Drury: ... “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.” ... [This] made Drury wonder whether “there are not dimensions to Wittgenstein’s thought that are still largely being ignored”... I have the same doubt [about] myself.

Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View? (1)

Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury (hereafter WRD) that he cannot help seeing “every problem”, by which he clearly includes philosophical problems, from a religious point of view is puzzling. Drury implies, and Malcolm concurs, that WRD suggests that there may be entire “dimensions” to Wittgenstein’s “later philosophy” (hereafter WittgensteinLP) that are still not understood. The present paper attempts to clarify WRD by showing how it applies to WittgensteinLP’s central view in his Philosophical Investigations, his “use-conception” of meaning. The “use-conception” includes WittgensteinLP’s view that linguistic meaning (hereafter, meaningL) is not caused by hidden processes in the brain or mind because it is “already in plain view” in the public uses of words. It is argued that WittgensteinLP’s use-conception of meaningL properly understood, illustrates his real point in WRD.

The first section argues that Shields’, Malcolm’s, Winch’s and Labron’s readings misconstrue WittgensteinLP’s point in WRD. The second discusses WittgensteinLP’s picture of the genesis of meaningL. The third explains WittgensteinLP’s notion of the unhidden character of meaningL. The fourth explains the religious point of view in WittgensteinLP’s account of meaningL. The fifth provides an ethical analogue of WittgensteinLP’s view in WRD. The sixth argues that WittgensteinLP is, by his own criterion of religiosity, not a religious man but that he would likely be judged to be religious by the more ordinary person’s criteria, and, for this latter reason, there may be an element of truth in Malcolm’s, Winch’s and Labron’s views after all (although it must be stated carefully).

The Standard Readings of Wittgenstein’s Remark to Drury

[Malcolm] explicitly disclaimed any pretensions to finality or certainty in his interpretations.... I want to make the same sort of disclaimer.

Peter Winch, “Discussion of Malcolm’s Essay” (132)

Before considering Malcolm’s, Winch’s, and Labron’s readings of WRD it is useful to examine Shields’ account of logic and sin in Wittgenstein’s views. Shields’ reading is less relevant here because he is concerned primarily with Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (hereafter WittgensteinEP), whereas Malcolm et al are concerned primarily with WittgensteinLP. For, although there is some continuity between Wittgenstein’s early and later
philosophies in this respect there are major differences as well. This is illustrated by Shield’s title, *Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein*. Though Shields’ emphasis on logic is entirely natural for Wittgenstein_\textsc{ep}, it is strained for Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}. Though Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp} does not eschew logic altogether, he does seem to demote it in status:

> What we call “sentence” and “language” has not the kind of formal unity that I imagined, but that it is a family of structures more or less closely related to each other. But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here.\(^8\)

Thus, Labron correctly points out that Shields misses the unique character of Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s views by seeing it “within a Tractarian framework,” e.g. Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s emphasis on “philosophical grammar” and “forms of life” elude Shields’ treatment.\(^9\) This does not mean Shields’ work is irrelevant. He shows that Wittgenstein_\textsc{ep} saw philosophical mistakes as akin to *sin* — which prefigures Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s conception of *philosophical* sin.\(^10\) Though Shield’s view of the religious point of view in Wittgenstein_\textsc{ep} cannot shed direct light on Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s view in *WRD*, it shows that Wittgenstein’s views on the religious aspect of philosophical views traces to his early philosophy.

Consider now Malcolm’s reading of *WRD*.

> [T]here are four analogies between Wittgenstein’s conception of the grammar of a language and his view of what is paramount in a religious life. First, in both, there is an end to explanation; second, in both there is an inclination to be amazed at the existence of something; third, into both there enters the notion of an ‘illness’; fourth, in both doing, acting, takes priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning.\(^11\)

Before one considers Malcolm’s four analogies, note that *WRD* does not assert any *analogies* between Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s conception of the grammar of a language and “what is paramount in religious life”.\(^12\) *WRD* does not mention grammar, what is paramount in religion or religious “life” at all. Malcolm here reads into *WRD* what he takes to be typical Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp} themes. But if one attends strictly to what *WRD* says, as opposed to what one believes Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp} should say about such “analogies”, *WRD* states simply that Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp} looks at such problems “from a religious point of view”.\(^13\) The notion of grammar and forms of religious life do figure into Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s *resolution* of those problems but *WRD* makes no reference to Wittgenstein_\textsc{lp}’s way of *resolving* problems. *WRD* only refers to his way of *viewing* the problems. Malcolm runs these together. To be sure, it would be surprising if there were not some link
between Wittgenstein’s way of viewing problems and his way of resolving them, but in order to conceive that link properly one must be clear what is and what is not strictly stated in WRD.

Towards this end, consider now the four analogies Malcolm offers between philosophical problems and “what is paramount in a religious life”. Note first that all four of Malcolm’s analogies are quite vague. There are many domains that share in these analogies but have nothing to do either with philosophy or with “religious life”. One can imagine examples from various disciplines, but I employ examples from social psychology.

Malcolm’s first analogy is that in Wittgenstein’s conception of the grammar of a language and in his view of what is paramount in a religious life there is an end to explanation. But this is also found in social psychology. Studies show that for identical twins nurtured in the same environment there is some (33% for males and 23% for females) concordance between gender identity disorders in the two twins. But why is the correlation different for males and females and why is the concordance in cases of similar growth environment not perfect? Social psychologists are not surprised: “That’s just the way it is. Explanations come to an end somewhere.”

Malcolm’s second analogy is that in Wittgenstein’s conception of the grammar of a language and in his view of religious life there is an inclination to be amazed at the existence of something. This too is found in social psychology. Most of the children from a certain deprived area in India end up in obscurity, but a boy named Ramanujan with virtually no formal training in mathematics becomes a recognized mathematical genius who has been compared with Euler. At age 17 he was regarded by his peers “with respectful awe” and many professional mathematicians felt the same.

Malcolm’s third analogy is that “into both there enters the notion of an ‘illness’”. But this too is found in social psychology. For example, many scholars have remarked on the connection between genius and madness. Kottler considers 10 such cases but there are many more that he could have considered. This is a natural example because Wittgenstein does compare philosophical errors to an illness. But Malcolm provides no explanation what particular point Wittgenstein intends by bringing in the “religious point of view” in WRD that could not be accomplished by the illness-comparison alone.

Finally, Malcolm claims as his fourth analogy that “in both doing (acting) takes priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning”. But this too is true in social psychology where it often happens that certain techniques show good clinical results despite the fact that no one understands “the mechanism of action”. In practical areas of social psychology, the fundamental aim is to cure the patient. It would be preferable to understand how the technique works but, if no one does, it will often be used anyways.
Although Malcolm is no doubt correct that there are analogies between Wittgenstein’s notion of the grammar of a language and religious life, his account of the analogies is too broad in that it applies to social psychology as well. Further, one could easily develop further examples from literature, physics, sports etc. Malcolm’s grid is simply not fine-grained enough to capture the point in WRD.

Winch’s remarks are also problematic. First, Winch admits that “we should not expect a very clear-cut account of what Wittgenstein meant”. Most of Winch’s remarks are criticisms of Malcolm’s views, but he admits he is not sure how deep these go. Winch’s positive alternative to Malcolm’s reading is sketchy but he does make several points. Since Wittgenstein had deep respect for Kierkegaard, Winch attempts to explain WRD by comparing Kierkegaard’s concept of religious faith as a passion with the passion in Wittgenstein’s writings. However, WRD does not say that Wittgenstein considers philosophical problems with religious passion. It says that he looks at philosophical problems from a “religious point of view” (which sounds more conceptual than emotional). After pointing out how Malcolm misinterprets WRD by reading into it notions that are not there, Winch errs in the same way.

Labron supports Malcolm’s vision of an analogy between Wittgenstein’s views and religious points of view, but Labron goes further and asserts an analogy between Wittgenstein’s thought and Hebraic, as opposed to Greek, thought. Labron cites one of Wittgenstein’s remarks to Drury in support of his reading:

Your [Drury’s] religious ideas have always seemed to me more Greek than Biblical ... [w]hereas my thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.

However, this passage refers to Wittgenstein’s “religious ideas”. Wittgenstein’s statement that his religious ideas are Hebraic rather than Greek does not imply that his philosophical views are Hebraic rather than Greek. Indeed, Wittgenstein elsewhere expresses considerable sympathy for Greek philosophy: “Wittgenstein reads Plato—the only philosopher he reads”. Wittgenstein’s remark to Bouwsma may be exaggerated but it is clear that Wittgenstein’s philosophical outlook does not reject Greek ideas tout court in favour of Hebrew ideas. Once again, WRD does not say that Wittgenstein looks at philosophical problems from any particular religious viewpoint, as if Wittgenstein might have meant that he looks at philosophical problems from a Buddhist or a Hindu point of view. Winch is correct that many passages in Wittgenstein make clear that “the phrase ‘from a religious point of view’ [in WRD] cannot be interpreted in terms of any particular theological doctrine,” e.g., Wittgenstein is not developing a philosophy from a Christian, Jewish, or Hindu point of view.

In summary, Malcolm, Winch and Labron all make useful points, but each reads ideas into WRD that are simply not there. WRD does not assert
any analogy between Wittgenstein’s philosophical views and religious views. It certainly does not mention any particular religious point of view (the Hebraic). Neither does WRD say that Wittgenstein pursues philosophical views with Kierkegaard-like religious passion. Malcolm, Winch and Labron, despite many useful insights, are clearly struggling to come to terms with WRD.

In fact, one obtains a far better model of Wittgenstein’s meaning in WRD in the following analogy with Kant. The first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative in his *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* is: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction." Consider moral subject S attempting to decide whether it is morally right to act on maxim M (that one should always tip waiters). Kant enjoins S to make a rather audacious *Gedankenexperiment*, namely, to imagine his/herself in the position of the creator of universe U and ask him/herself whether they could consistently will that M is a universal law of nature in U. Kant enjoins S to look at their moral problem from a kind of religious point of view—that of the creator. When Kant suggests this, it is not because he believes there is actually any analogy between S’s mundane problem whether to tip waiters and religious issues (let alone “paramount” religious issues). Kant enjoins S to engage in this audacious thought-experiment because he believes that doing so suggests a useful new perspective on S’s moral problem. This new perspective, however unrealistic, helps S see the problem in new light. Thus, Kant does not see actual analogies between creating universes and tipping waiters but only urges one to adopt a point of view that sheds light on the moral problem. This Kantian model, which is also conceptual rather than passionate, provides a far better model of WRD than those offered by Malcolm, Winch or Labron.

The *Genesis* of Meaning

If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse has come into being by spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust, I shall do well to examine those rags very closely to see how a mouse may have hidden in them, ... But if I am convinced that a mouse cannot have come into being from these things then this investigation will [seem] superfluous. [W]e must ... understand what it is that opposes such an examination of details in philosophy.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (52)

In *PI* Wittgenstein employs a peculiar image, i.e. the spontaneous generation of a mouse from “grey rags and dust,” to shed light on a philosophical problem. In *PI* (51) the problem is how the meaning, of words is determined by “the technique of using words.” Thus, the mouse in *PI* (52) is, so to speak, “the mouse of meaning,” and the “grey rags and dust” are the chaotic uses of words in natural languages. Thus, *PI* (52) is
considering whether meaning arises spontaneously from chaos of everyday linguistic usage. But PI (52) also suggests that if one thinks that this does happen, one should look closely to see whether meaning is somehow hidden in those chaotic uses of words—the point being that meaning is not really hidden there but that it may seem that way unless one looks more far closely at the details of those uses of words than one normally does. This close look at the details is roughly what he calls “philosophical grammar”. It is because philosophers oppose such a close examination of the details that they are driven to posit hidden mechanisms to explain the genesis of meaning. Thus, Wittgenstein’s conclusion in PI (52) is that when one looks closely at the uses of words to see how meaning does “arise” from ordinary linguistic usage the motivation for proposing hidden meaning-mechanisms evaporates.

Already Before Everyone’s Eyes

One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.

God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone’s eyes.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* (63)

Since Wittgenstein holds that the genesis of meaning is “already in plain view”, he replaces causal/mechanical accounts of meaning, with a description of what everyone already knows—except when they are doing philosophy. He clarifies this with examples.

Wittgenstein describes a “language-game” in which a sentence is expressed in an ordered set of names of coloured squares in a block itself composed of 3 lines of 3 smaller squares, i.e., “RGBGGRWW” refers to a block in which the first square on the top left is red, the square to the immediate right of that one is green, the square to the immediate right of that one is black, and so on. The sign “R” in this “game” refers to a kind of black square that may occur anywhere in the three rows of three squares, “B” refers to a kind of black square that may occur anywhere in the three rows of three squares, etc. What, Wittgenstein asks, does it mean to say that “R,” in this “language-game,” means that kind of red square?

One common sort of answer is that “R” means that kind of red square because there is a causal connection between “R” and those sorts of red squares. Causal theories of meaning, tracing to Kripke’s causal theory of reference, explain the meaning of a word by reference to the causal history of the word, how the word was introduced and transmitted, etc. One gets a different sort of causal account in the sorts of views that see language as produced by an internal meaning-mechanism. On Fodor’s
view, the meaning of a word to organism O is determined by O’s internal representation of the semantic rules it follows in its linguistic behaviour—where those internal representations are part of the causal determinants of the behaviour (e.g., Joe shows that he understands what Judy means when she shouts ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre by rapidly exiting the building)\textsuperscript{40}.

Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} is generally opposed to causal theories of meaning\textsubscript{L}, holding that such theories can only tell us how it comes about that words get used in a certain way—not what constitutes using those words meaningfully\textsubscript{L}.\textsuperscript{42} So what does “going by the words” really consist in? Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} thinks we know the answer but have somehow forgotten it,

If it is asked: “How do sentences manage to represent?”—the answer might be: “Don’t you know? You certainly see it, when you use them.” For nothing is concealed.\textsuperscript{43}

Since we already know the answer, what is it? Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} describes a “language-game” in which a person is to say “R” when they see a red square, “B” when they see a black one, etc.\textsuperscript{44} But if a person mistakenly says “R” when she sees a black square, “what is the criterion by which this is a mistake?” [LW’s emphasis] Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} writes,

There are characteristic signs of [a mistake] in the player’s behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone is doing so even without knowing his language.\textsuperscript{45}

That is, part of what determines that “R” means the red square as opposed to the black one is the public criteria which determine that saying “R” when one sees a black square is a mistake.

Such criteria often include easily identifiable behaviour. Someone says, “That’s the breast bed I ever [pause] I mean [laughing] the best [heavy intonation] bed I ever slept in.” Thus, what one needs in such cases is not a theory linking words to the world but a description of the public criteria by which the linguistic community uses the words—and that is not something one only learns at Harvard but something one learns, so to speak, at one’s mothers knee. That is, “It is in language that it’s all done”.\textsuperscript{46} The same holds true for the language-game in which one correlates letters with coloured squares.

Fodor wants more. Surely something as sublime as meaning\textsubscript{L} cannot reside in anything so mundane as such everyday criteria but must rather be “realized” in some complicated internal mechanism. Others insist that the meaning\textsubscript{L} connection is constituted by some sublime connection between words and abstract objects.\textsuperscript{47} Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} replies that, in fact, the meaning\textsubscript{L} connection is constituted by just such mundane matters.
For, he holds, the concept of meaning, is a concept pertaining to the public phenomena of human life. When one displaces this concept from its natural home into some alien context, such as neurophysiology or Platonic metaphysics no account satisfies—driving frustrated philosophers to ask: “Why is the theory of meaning so hard?”

Wittgenstein’s view is that it is hard because philosopher’s make it hard. Since the concept of meaning, is entirely foreign to such contexts nothing makes sense when it is imported into them from its natural home. Wittgenstein’s aim, therefore, is not to produce a new theory of meaning. It is to describe how meaning, does, so to speak, “arise” out of those everyday mundane phenomena of everyday word-usage. The real challenge is not to produce some sophisticated new theory. It is to understand why doing philosophy makes one demand inappropriate sorts of “theories” that can never satisfy.

Recall Hume’s remark that when doing philosophy he finds himself in a deplorable condition, surrounded by “deepest darkness,” like some “uncouth monster,” but that when he returns to the activities of common life his abstruse philosophical speculations appear “cold” and “ridiculous.” Hume sees that when doing philosophy the criteria deriving from one’s practical involvement in the world fall away—leaving him in darkness. Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s shared remedy is a return to the everyday practical activities that are “always before one’s eyes.” In that everyday practical world, philosophical sophistications appear “ridiculous” because, in a certain sense, it is philosophizing itself that is the problem. For, if Hume and Wittgenstein are right, there is something about philosophizing that separates us from our natural home and makes us forget what we ordinarily know. It would seem that the philosopher, intoxicated by the sight of the unreachable stars, is in danger of falling into that well that was right before their eyes the whole time.

**Linguistic Meaning “from a Religious Point of View”**

_How do sentences [represent things]? Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden._

Ludwig Wittgenstein, _Philosophical Investigations_ (435)

_[T]here is nothing hidden which will not become manifest._

_The Gospel of Thomas_ (300)

It is, for reasons that become clear later, useful to examine Fodor’s criticism of “use-theories” of meaning. Fodor holds that “use-theories” of meaning, “beg the question” because they hold that the fact that a word has the meaning, it does “reduces to the fact that we use it the way we do” but no such reduction is plausible. Use-theories beg the questions because they presuppose a prior theory of meaning. Consider an analogy:
A reduction requires a theory to be reduced, call it T₁, and a theory, call it T₂, to which T₁ is to be reduced. One cannot reduce heat to the mean kinetic energy of molecules unless one has one theory T₁ of the phenomenal heat and another theory T₂ of the molecular entities to which T₁ is to be reduced. Unfortunately, WittgensteinLP only gives a description of linguistic use and fails to provide a theory T₁ of meaningL. Thus, WittgensteinLP wants to reduce meaningL to use but he neglects to provide the theory of meaningL which is to be reduced to use. WittgensteinLP is as foolish as a physicist who wants to reduce phenomenal heat to the mean kinetic energy of molecules but neglects to provide the theory of phenomenal heat that he wants to reduce to the molecular theory.

Fodor may be right that “use-theories” beg the question but WittgensteinLP, who holds that “we must not advance any kind of theory,” never presents a use-theory.⁵³ Since he does not provide any theories, he obviously cannot try to reduce one theory of meaning to another. Indeed, WittgensteinLP never uses the word “reduces” in this connection. It is no wonder that WittgensteinLP does not sketch the demanded reduction—for that reduction is required by Fodor’s theoretical paradigm, not WittgensteinLP’s. On WittgensteinLP’s paradigm it is more appropriate to talk about a “use-conception” than “use-theory.”

Fodor makes a related mistake in his critique of WittgensteinLP’s view, which he sees as a kind of behaviourism, of what it is to understand the meaningL of words.

[I]f anything is clear it is that understanding a word ... isn’t a matter of how one behaves or [is] disposed to behave. ... [A]ny behaviour whatever is compatible with understanding or failing to understand any [word] ... Pay me enough and I will stand on my head when you say ‘chair’. But I know what ‘chair’ means all the same.⁵⁴

However, the fact that Fodor can be bribed to stand on his head when someone says “chair” has nothing to do with WittgensteinLP’s view of understanding words. WittgensteinLP’s notion of linguistic use is a normative notion that distinguishes proper from improper uses of words, where the former, not the latter, belong to “the use” of words.⁵⁵ Wittgenstein’s account of what it is to understand words reflects that normative notion of use. Since Fodor’s bribed behaviour constitutes a misuse of the word, he only manages to refute a “misuse theory” of meaningL, that no one defends, the view that the use (meaningL) of a word includes its misuses.

Indeed, Fodor himself tacitly acknowledges the need for a prior non-theoretical use-conception of meaningL when, responding to criticisms of his commitment to private Mentalese items, Fodor makes a curious admission: “We’ve all gotta use words when we talk”.⁵⁶ That is, Fodor’s
Theories may identify the meaning, of a word with a private “Mentalese” item, but his theories about Mentalese items are stated in English—not Mentalese and one must possess a prior understanding of the use (meaning,) of those English words to understand his theories. Thus, when engaging in Hume’s activities of common life, Fodor knows what “chair” means (how it is used) prior to any of the theories he concocts in his study. However, despite the fact that Fodor admits, even if dismissively, that he presuppose a kind of linguistic know-how that is prior to his own mentalistic theory of meaning, he seems, as Wittgenstein predicts, blind to its significance. Why is Fodor loath to explore this prior stratum of meaning, which he admits we “gotta” use when stating his theories? He does want to provide a theory of the meaning of the words we use when not in our studies … or doesn’t he?

Fodor is not interested in that prior domain of meaning, because he wants to explain it by reference to a more fundamental Mentalese language. But why does he want to explain it in that way? Recall Hume’s view that philosophizing has a way of rendering the philosopher—in-their-study as an “uncouth monster” in “the most deplorable condition” (wordless). Recall also Hume’s observation that the escape from that “deplorable condition” does not require any new theories. Quite the contrary! It was such theories that were the problem. For those theories had separated him from his true home in the world of practical activities that had been “right before [his] eyes” the whole time. Wittgenstein remarks that when doing philosophy “one must always ask oneself,”

(Is the word ever actually used this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

Part of Wittgenstein’s point here is that the escape from Fodor’s “deplorable condition” is not difficult. One need only, following Hume, return to one’s true home in the world of human activities and the darkness vanishes. But why cannot Hume or Fodor see the path to their true home that lies just outside the door of their studies? This is, in fact, a perfect illustration of Wittgenstein’s point in WRD.

One powerful statement of this idea is found in the Gospel of Thomas: “Jesus said: ‘Recognize that which is in your sight, and that which is hidden will become plain to you.’” What, precisely, will “become manifest”? The passage continues: “[I]f you will not know yourselves, you dwell in poverty and it is you who are that poverty.” In fact, the language of darkness, blindness and poverty in the Gospel of Thomas (and many other religious tracts) is found in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein describes the deplorable condition of his own age in these religious terms,
It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another—but ... it is not likely.

That is, the problem philosophers have “seeing” the truth is not a problem of intellect, leisure time, material conditions, discipline, etc. It is more like the problem that someone living in a state of sin (including “philosophical sin”) has seeing the path to salvation that is “right before their eyes.” It is a problem of self-knowledge. The Gospel of Thomas continues,

I took my place in the midst of the world ... I found all of them intoxicated;... [M]y soul became afflicted for the sons of men because they are blind in their hearts and do not have sight. ... When they shake off their wine, then they will repent.  

The idea that the solution to philosophical problems is “always before one’s eyes” but that one fails to see it because one is in a state akin to “sin” (a lack of self-knowledge akin to intoxication) is unlikely to convince Fodor (and other philosophers-in-their-studies) to repent. Indeed, Wittgenstein criticized the teaching of professional philosophy (even his own), which makes “people drunk”. Fodor (and most mainstream philosophers) want theories of meaning, and theories of the understanding of meaning. Wittgenstein’s point is that the price of such theories is blindness to the linguistic usage that one “gotta” presuppose in one’s true home that is already “right before [one’s] eyes”.

Malcolm and Winch are perplexed at Wittgenstein’s point in WRD. In fact, one of Wittgenstein’s most fundamental religious images is found in the title of Malcolm’s book: Nothing is Hidden. This title is taken word for word from English translations of the gospels (see epigraph above). In the next section this religious analogy is supplemented with a closely related ethical analogy from one of Wittgenstein’s revered religious authors: Dostoevsky.

An Ethical Analogy

He who despises most things will be a lawgiver among [the people] and he who dares most of all will be most in the right! ... [One] must be blind not to see it.
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment (Part V, Chap IV)

The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that will Make what is problematic disappear.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (27)
Since Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} was impressed by religious and moral themes in Dostoevsky\textsuperscript{64}, an example from \textit{Crime and Punishment} is illuminating. The claim is not that Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP}'s view of the sense in which the solution to philosophical problems is right before one's eyes is precisely the same as the sense in which the solution to moral problems is right before one's eyes, but only that there is a useful clarifying analogy between these.\textsuperscript{65}

In \textit{Crime and Punishment}, Raskolnikov, a former student, inflated with pride, and motivated by a feeling that he is fated to immoral acts but also by certain “philosophical theories”, decides to kill an unpleasant old lady.\textsuperscript{66} He kills her, but also kills her sister who just happened on the scene, with an axe. Raskolnikov’s “philosophical theory”, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s theory of a Master race, is that for the Masters “all is permitted”,\textsuperscript{67} i.e., the Masters are not bound by ordinary moral laws. Soon after the murder Raskolnikov becomes feverish and begins behaving strangely—as if he wants to be caught. Nevertheless, he appears to commit the perfect crime. He befriends a woman named Sonya, filled with Christian virtue but who had been forced into prostitution by desperate circumstances. He confesses to Sonya, who urges him to confess to the police, and, eventually, he does so. He is sentenced to 8 years of penal servitude in Siberia. Sonya follows him to await his release, and eventually, with Sonya’s love, he achieves redemption.

A central theme of the story is that most people are blind to the path to salvation that lies right before their eyes. Raskolnikov had been blinded by his proud philosophical theories into believing that he was superior to moral laws. But there is another view about who is really blind. Sonia states that Jesus could have miraculously saved a man from death and made even “the blind disbelieving Jews” believe.\textsuperscript{68} So is it the proud “philosopher” with theories in his/her head or the humble prostitute with Christian love in his/her heart that is really blind? Porfiry, a policeman on Raskolnikov’s trail, in an attempt to rattle him, describes the plight of modern man (i.e., he describes Raskolnikov) to Raskolnikov: “Here we have bookish dreams, a heart unhinged by theories”.\textsuperscript{69} Porfiry’s view, reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s views, is that the truth resides in the pure heart but that the heart is often misled by proud theories into failing to see what is right before one’s eyes.

After being imprisoned, Raskolnikov adjusts to a bare convict existence with no hope or companionship and becomes sullen, self-absorbed, irritated by Sonya’s visits, even rude to her.\textsuperscript{70} Eventually, he changes but it is not “the horrors of prison life” (i.e., \textit{not} his “punishment”) that change him.\textsuperscript{71} Those “horrors” are not the path to salvation. Raskolnikov’s transformation comes when, after Sonya disappears for a time due to illness, she re-appears, “still appearing ill, thin and pale.” Seeing her in that state, “something seemed to seize” Raskolnikov and “fling him at her feet,”
They were both pale and thin; but those sick pale faces were bright with the dawn of a new future, of a full resurrection into a new life. They were renewed by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of the other.\textsuperscript{72}

The breakthrough is Raskolnikov’s loss of pride. Once he abandons his \textit{sinful pride} and lowers himself to her feet he is “resurrected” into “a new life”—whereupon \textit{everything} changes. His sentence too (seven years) suddenly seems different than it had a day earlier:

Seven years, only seven years! At the beginning of their happiness at some moments they were both ready to look on those seven years as though they were seven days.\textsuperscript{73}

Since it took the Christian God seven days to create the world, this signifies that Raskolnikov’s redemption is the \textit{creation} of a \textit{new man} and a transition to a \textit{new world},

\begin{quote}
[T]hat is the beginning of a new story—the story of the gradual renewal of a man, … his gradual regeneration, … his passing from one world into another,…\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

The solution to Raskolnikov’s problems does not involve any new facts or theories. In fact, the solution had been there all along but, blinded by his pride, he had been unable to see it. It is the humble prostitute with love in her heart, not the proud philosopher with his/her theories, who can see what is “always before [one’s] eyes.” Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP} agrees: “\textit{The edifice of your pride} has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work”\textsuperscript{75}. The seven years that lay before him yesterday still lays before him today. Yesterday it was a seven years of living death. Today it is “\textit{only} seven years!” The facts are the same, but Raskolnikov has “learned to live in a way that makes the problem disappear.” That new way of living (new form of life) requires abandoning the proud theories that had led to a bloody corpse, his feverish state, Sonya’s suffering and the meaningless existence of a convict.

In a sense, therefore, Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP}’s \textit{Philosophical Investigations} describes the poverty and darkness that results from the philosopher’s intoxication with their proud theories of language and mind. The claim is \textit{not} that the philosopher \textit{literally} commits a \textit{sin} of pride. Wittgenstein\textsubscript{LP}’s claim in \textit{WRD} is that looking at philosophical problems from this religious \textit{point of view} suggests the way to dissolve these problems and return to one’s more humble true “home” in forms of human life. Just as Raskolnikov must abandon his proud theories in order to see the new path to salvation that had been right before his eyes the whole time, philosophers must abandon their proud theories about meaning, and
learn to see the more humble sort of meaning, that Fodor admits we’ve “gotta” use when not in our studies.

Wittgenstein: Not a Religious Man?

I think the question whether Wittgenstein was a ‘religious person’ is even more difficult than I realized when I [originally] wrote the Memoir [in 1958].

Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (80)

In WRD Wittgenstein only states that he uses religious points of view as a tool for gaining a new perspective on philosophical problems, but that is separate from the question whether Wittgenstein is himself a religious person. One might expect that if he finds it useful to look at philosophical problems from a religious point of view this must reflect some religious dimension in his own life—which coheres with his remark in the Forward to PR that he would like to dedicate the book to the glory of God. On the other hand, it contradicts his subsidiary remark in WRD that he is “not a religious man”. That subsidiary remark, in turn, accords with von Wright's view that Wittgenstein could not be said to be religious in any but a trivial sense of the word. It would seem that, like so many other things about this very complicated person, there are no simple answers here. Thus, any account of Wittgenstein’s own religious dimension must be carefully nuanced. But before tackling this question, it is first necessary to ask what it means to say that one is “a religious man.”

First, by saying that S is a religious person, one might mean that S adheres to certain religious doctrines, e.g., S believes that God exists. Call this the “Intellectualist Criterion” or IC! However, since Wittgenstein holds that Christianity is not a body of doctrine and that the gospels might even be false without undermining their religious importance, he is not religious in IC’s sense. Furthermore, there are people who accept religious doctrines on intellectual grounds but are not religious at all, e.g., Richard Gale holds that the Gale-Pruss cosmological argument for the existence of God actually works, but Gale stresses that has no personal interest whatsoever in such questions. IC does not state either a necessary or a sufficient for genuine religiosity.

One might also be said to be religious in the weaker sense that one is influenced by certain religious points of view. Call this the “Religious-Influence Criterion” or RIC! Since Wittgenstein was clearly influenced by religious thinkers such as Augustine and Kierkegaard, there is no doubt that he was religious in RIC’s sense, but this is a very minimal kind of religiosity. The very religious Hegel heavily influenced Marx and yet the latter could not be called religious in any significant sense. Further, it seems clear that von Wright is hasty in claiming that Wittgenstein can
only be called religious in a trivial sense. Whereas Malcolm had earlier agreed with Von Wright that Wittgenstein is not a religious person, Malcolm changed his view after he became aware of Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion eventually published in CV. Malcolm acknowledges that many remarks in CV are “religious thoughts” or bear “a religious stamp”. In one such remark, Wittgenstein alludes to a third sense in which one can be religious, namely that one is religious to the extent that one’s religious views lead one to “change... the direction of your life”. Call this the “Religious Transformation Criterion” or RTC! In a passage somewhat reminiscent of passages in Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein writes,

[R]eligious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, a way of assessing life. Instruction in religious faith, therefore, would have to [involve] an appeal to conscience.

Since RTC is Wittgenstein’s own criterion for genuine religiosity, it is clear why he states in WRD that he is “not a religious man.” Wittgenstein leads the life of a philosopher, not that of a prophet or saint. He does not make RTC’s passionate commitment to a religious “system”. Thus, Malcolm was correct that “If ‘to be a religious person’ is to ‘lead a religious life’ then ... [Wittgenstein] was not a religious person”. It is, however, important to recognize why Wittgenstein does not satisfy RTC. Malcolm had remarked that Wittgenstein understood “religious belief [to be] based on qualities of character and will that he himself did not possess.” Malcolm goes on in the same passage to report that those close to Wittgenstein had to see that he felt “that our lives are dark and ugly—a feeling that was often close to despair.” Thus, if Wittgenstein is not religious, the fault does not lie with religion. It lies with himself. This is why Malcolm acknowledged that though Wittgenstein was not a religious person, he seemed to acknowledge “the possibility of religion”. That is, even in his early Memoir Malcolm understood that even if Wittgenstein felt that he is himself personally too flawed to be genuinely religious, Wittgenstein still felt that there remains the possibility that people might become religious via an “appeal to conscience”.

Wittgenstein cites the Pauline doctrine of predestination as an example of one of the religious doctrines that may be too high for him,

[A]t my level, the Pauline doctrine of predestination is ugly nonsense, irreligiousness. Hence it is not suitable for me ... If it is a good and godly picture, then it is for someone at a quite different level ...

In keeping with RTC, Wittgenstein can say that such doctrines may be “godly” even as he admits that he is not himself at the level to be transformed by them.

It is now possible to understand why Wittgenstein says in WRD that he is “not a religious man” but also why there are “religious thoughts” in his writings. First, Wittgenstein is not a religious man by virtue of his method in WRD. WRD only states that he uses religious views to gain new philosophical perspectives but that is completely independent of the question whether he is personally religious or not. Second, Wittgenstein is not a religious man in the sense that he does not subscribe to religious doctrines (because he holds that genuine religiosity does not consist in intellectual assent to doctrines). Third, and perhaps more important, he is not a religious man in the sense that he does not lead a religious life (because he believes that he is too imperfect to lead a genuine religious life). However, all this is all consistent with the fact that his work contains “religious thoughts”. For, Wittgenstein statement that he is “not a religious man” is, in fact, the statement that he himself falls short of genuine religiosity because he is incapable of transforming his life in accord with such religious thoughts. Wittgenstein can admire genuine religiosity from afar (from the vantage point of the philosopher), and he can even wish that he could enter into genuine religiosity, but this is something of which he feels personally incapable.

This puts the earlier criticisms of Malcolm, Winch, and Labron in a new light. Although Malcolm et al misrepresent the philosophical claim in WRD, there turns out to be an important element of truth in their readings. The reason Malcolm et al go wrong in their readings of WRD is that they correctly feel something akin to religious views and/or passions (or at least a deep respect for these sorts of views and passions) in Wittgenstein’s writings (the “religious thoughts” eventually Malcolm came to see in Wittgenstein). For even if Wittgenstein is not religious by his own criterion (RTC), someone who holds genuine religiosity in such esteem and despairs at his own inability to rise to such religiosity would be judged to be religious by a great many ordinary people. Indeed, Franz Parak, with whom Wittgenstein was friends in the German prisoner of war camp, states that Wittgenstein would have most liked to become a priest and read the Bible with children. It is for such reasons that Malcolm et al find it easy to read those religious views or passions mistakenly into the philosophical claim in WRD. That is, even though Malcolm, Winch, and Labron may get the “letter” of WRD wrong they may get important aspects of the “spirit” of the Wittgensteinian text right. The respect for the genuine religious they feel in his writings is there—but it is imperative not to mistake the yearning for genuine religiosity by the self-admitted imperfect person who feels himself incapable of it with the mere philosophical tool that he describes in WRD.
Notes:

1 References to Wittgenstein’s works are as follows, to the Tractatus by proposition number, to Culture and Value by page number, to On Certainty by paragraph number, to Philosophical Investigations by paragraph number or by page number as appropriate, to Philosophical Grammar and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics by section and paragraph number, to Lecture on Religious Belief by section number. References to all other works are, unless otherwise indicated, by page number.

2 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View? (New York: Routledge, 1997), 1. Wittgenstein’s claim that he cannot help looking at philosophical problems from a religious point of view is the main claim in WRD. His subsidiary remark in WRD that he is “not a religious man” treated separately in the final section of the paper.

3 By Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is meant his Philosophical Investigations, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, On Certainty, and Culture and Value. By his early philosophy is meant his Tractatus. His Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar are transitional works. Although it is difficult to draw the distinction between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophies with precision, Wittgenstein, did distinguish sharply between his early and later ways of looking at things. See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 78, 120, 123.

4 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 89.


6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 126, 129, 435; Compare with Heidegger’s notion of the phenomenology as the letting something be seen as “unhidden”. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1962) § 7, B-C.

7 Philip Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.


9 Tim Labron, Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View, 2.


12 Peter Winch, 97.

13 Peter Winch, 97, 112.

14 Peter Winch, 97.

One might think such examples are unfair since Malcolm is clearly referring to *ultimate* explanations, not the sort of provisional explanations one might find in social psychology. However, as Peter Winch (“Discussion of Malcolm’s Essay”, 111-112), points out, Malcolm holds that all language-games are “beyond explanation.”


Peter Winch, 106.

Peter Winch, 124-132.


Peter Winch, “Discussion of Malcolm’s Essay”, 129.


Tim Labron, 74.


Similarly, by his “intentional stance” (intentional “point of view”), Dennett does not mean that living organisms actually have organic states that are analogous to intentions. He means that they do not—but that it is sometimes useful to look at them as if they do. See Daniel Dennett in *The Intentional Stance* (Cambridge: MIT, 1996).


Ludwig Wittgenstein, 89.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 48.


42 Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, 52.


44 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 51.

45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 54.

46 Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Grammar, VII, 9; See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 3.


48 Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, v. 2 (New York: Cambridge, 1979), 139.


50 Wittgenstein, exposes the artificial character of many philosophical examples. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 349; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 3, 6, 10! In his class lectures Wilfrid Sellars used to pick up a book from a student’s desk and ask, “How do I know this is not a reefer box?” In fact, he knew full well it was a book because he had just seen a student reading it—illustrating the fact that many philosophical examples seem completely divorced from genuine contexts of usage.


52 Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics, 160 n 6.


54 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, 63

55 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 81

56 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, 121.

57 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 129.

58 It is worth asking why Fodor feels the need admit something that is “always before everyone’s eyes”. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 128!


60 The Gospel of Thomas, 300. Note that the Biblical quotes used in the present paper are employed as examples of religious views. No stand on their truth or falsity is implied by their use here.


63 See also Samuel 8:13, Psalms 9:16; Chronicles 9:2; 1 Kings 10:3; 1; Matthew 10:26; Mark 4:22; Luke 8:17, 12:2; Corinthians 4:5; Acts 26:6. URL: http://biblehub.net/search.php?q=nothing+hidden. Nor is the idea limited to the Jewish and Christian parts of the Bible but it is also found in the Quran. See Maulana Muhammad Ali, trans, The Holy Quran with English Translation and Commentary (Lahore: Ahamadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam, 2002), 20, 22! Similar ideas also found in Buddhist scripture. See Donald Lopez, editor, Buddhist Scripture (New York: Penguin, 2004), 104, 465, 517! The idea that once one achieves spiritual enlightenment is achieved “nothing is hidden” from one is an idea common to many different religions.


Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View?


68 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Part IV, Chap. IV.

69 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Part VI, Chap. II.

70 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Epilogue, Chap. I.

71 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Epilogue, Chap. II.

72 Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Epilogue, Chap. II.

73 Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Epilogue, Chap. II.

74 Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Chap. II.


76 By calling it a “tool” it is not mean that it is something Wittgenstein chooses to use in this way. He may use it instinctively. It is only meant that he uses in this context with any doctrinal religious content.

77 See note 2 above!

78 Von Wright, “A Biographical Sketch”, 18.


81 Gale states this in his unpublished autobiography.


83 Norman Malcolm, 72.


85 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 53.

86 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 64.


88 Norman Malcolm, 72.

89 Norman Malcolm, 72.

90 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 64. Heidegger holds, not that having a conscience but that “wanting” to have one “attests” to the possibility of authenticity. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 54! Wittgenstein would seem to satisfy Heidegger’s criterion for the possibility of authenticity. He wants to hear the call (to genuine religiosity) of conscience but desairs that he is too imperfect to do so. Someone for whom authenticity is impossible feels no such despair. That is, Wittgenstein’s despair derives from his feeling that he could (should?) have been genuinely religious but that he is instead only a philosopher looking at religion from afar (the perspective of the mere intellect).

91 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 32. When asked whether he is a sceptic about a religious belief in life after death, Wittgenstein replies that he does not know. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Religious Belief”, § III. In these lectures Wittgenstein generally declines to take a position on religious belief and confines himself to the philosophical task of clarifying the use religious language has in the life of believers.

References


