Levente Salat
Key
words: Kymlicka, multiculturalism, Transylvania, political philosophy, Hungarian minority, democracy, ethnocultural communities, equity, collective rights |
Assoc.
Prof., Ph.D. Faculty of Political Science Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania e-mail: lsalat@edrc.osf.ro |
The Challenge of Diversity Answers and Dilemmas
previous |
In the following I will discuss three issues: (1) I will begin with the personal motivations which have directed my interest towards the study of diversity and multiculturalism; (2) I will then announce four main theses and four auxiliary theses in an attempt to define the frame of the debates; (3) finally, I shall try to outline the main points of the political theory of Will Kymlicka, the contemporary Canadian philosopher who became famous at a relatively young age. Personal reasons for the study of the diversity issue The experiences that led me to reflect upon the problems of diversity and minority status were essentially the following. The first challenge was a famous statement made by a spiritual leader of the Hungarian minority of Transylvania between the two world wars, Protestant Bishop Sándor Makkai, who, after 15 years of remarkable contributions to the organization of his community and to the development of the cultural dialogue between JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 189 the Romanian and the Hungarian intelligentsia in the post-Trianon context - he even elaborated a so-called "universal mission of the minority" - in 1936 left Romania to settle in Hungary. Soon after, he published a pamphlet in which he developed the idea that the minority status is incompatible with human dignity and, consequently, all minorities have to fight for their emancipation and to get rid of this status (Makkai, 1937). I happened to read about the topic in mid 1980's. I was intrigued, of course, because I myself was a member of a minority community with quite a number of problems and for which, given its size, Makkai's suggestion seemed to provide neither an easy solution nor one worth following. This problem became a real intellectual challenge to me in the early 90's when, after lengthy readings, I discovered the dimensions of the discrepancy between the ethnopolitical order of the world on the one hand, that is, the existence of nearly 200 states currently acknowledged by the international community, and the global ethnocultural reality on the other, marked by the existence of a number of 10,000 cultures, which represented just as many genuine parallel societies within the 200 full-fledged political communities (UNESCO, 1996). The second event that profoundly influenced me was the incident of March 1990 in Tg. Mures. The conflict began at one of the local secondary schools I had graduated myself, a school which determined to a considerable extent my views upon my identity and my relationship with the two ethnic communities that co-habited the region where I spent my early youth. Back then I had to realize that if the spirit in which I was raised is to perform a political role in the democratization process of the Romanian society, it could have dangerous consequences as far as the success of a quick transition to a firm democracy is concerned. In the years that followed, I witnessed many situations that could have, at least in part, confirmed my intuitions. Thus, I witnessed the creation of an ideological front representing the ethnopolitical options of the Hungarian minority, beginning with amendments to the Constitution, continuing with the problem of autonomy, down to the project of the Hungarian University in Romania, objectives that remain irreconcilable with the state- and nation-building strategy of the Romanian majority, despite the numerous achievements of the past few years, or even in spite of the controversial recent agreement between the PSD (Social Democrat Party) and the UDMR (The Union of Democratic Hungarians of Romania). It is important to add to the above that I do not speak here, of course, about the political options of the UDMR, which might very well lack social support. I simply interpret the results of the sociological polls conducted between 1993-2001, which are quite relevant for the opinions of both Hungarians and Romanians on this subject: there are discrepancies revealed by all conducted researches concerning the main ethnopolitical objectives of the minorities as compared to the options of the majority. Although these sociological findings theoretically ascertain some ethnopolitical tension between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 190
in Romania, fortunately, this is not the case. On the other hand, it cannot
be ignored that the Hungarian minority is overcome by a feeling of collective
failure and continues to be exposed to political manipulation under the
so-called "Hungarian danger", both elements being deeply harmful,
in my opinion, to the chances of success for the Romanian democracy. I
recall every now and then the warning of a renowned specialist in Eastern
Europe's ethno-political problems, István Bibó: a society
driven by fear and deeply traumatized, generation after generation, by
collective fear cannot be a real democratic society. Therefore, the existing
ethnopolitical discrepancies between the majority and the minority in
Romania, coupled with the wish of overcoming these discrepancies, have
deeply motivated my investigations in the theory and the philosophy of
the political.
One last incentive for my interest in
the phenomenon of multiculturalism has been the segregation proclivity
manifest at every stage of the ethnopolitical disputes between the rival
communities, reflecting both a lack of mutual trust and the failure of
the conventional institutions to regulate the coexistence of several communities
within a multicultural space.
These were the primary events and intellectual
challenges that led to my investigation of the conditions in which ethnocultural
communities can help each other in finding a mutually agreeable institutional
way of living together, or, more ambitiously, to the investigation
of the normative bases of an authentic minority existence.
The discovery of Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka's Defining the working frame Before starting on a brief critical presentation of Will Kymlicka's position, I shall review some important theses in the hope of clarifying the theoretical frame of his discourse. 1. Following an accurate analysis of the discrepancy between the actual number of states in the world and the number of distinguishable cultures therein, one might readily conclude that the current ethnopolitical arrangement of the world is morally arbitrary. 2. If we accept this thesis, we are forced to admit that the theories that emphasize the importance of security and stability in our contemporary world could become counter-productive and could cause human disaster unless ways are identified to supplement this aspect with a debate of the theories pertaining to the problem of justice and equity between cultures and communities. 3. If we feel inclined to accept this second thesis, then we will have to admit that the theoretical and conceptual instruments pertaining to the consequences of diversity and to the new ethnocultural situation of the world are outdated. We witness an almost unprecedented resurgence of the ethnocultural identities mobilizing for ethnopolitical and institutional acknowledgement, which claim for alternative conceptual and institutional intsruments. JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 191
4. Fully acknowledging the aforementioned, we must admit that political
theory remains indebted with regard to acceptable solutions for either
side in what concerns the political institutions designated to
mediate the coexistence. We, thus, must differentiate probably between
the concepts of the community and of the national state,
prevalently and traditionally understood as co-extensive notions.
To complete and reinforce what has been
said so far, four additional theses can be added, representing some of
the issues of contemporary political thought and pinpointing some of the
discrepancies in the basic concepts, as well as their consequences upon
the strategies and policy practices of the marginalized minority communities.
a) The first additional thesis speaks
of an emerging consensus by the majority of theorists on the inefficiency
of the legislative frame of the representative majority democracies and
the inadequacy of the juridical protection of minorities.
In accordance with the current practices
of the international community, the main institutions of a state, which
are founded on the principles of representative democracy, are used and
exploited by the so-called "official nation" (as a rule, the
cultural and linguistic majority) to pursue its own interests. This will
lead eventually to the exclusion of the minority culture from the public
sphere. This, in turn, results from the underrating of the minority cultures,
and is perceived as a powerful force of assimilation, foreboding the gradual
dissolution of the traditional communities, seen frequently as an at Our experience so far testifies that due
to the prevalence of the "majority rule" which assigns an exclusive
status to the will of the majority and, in the case of the ethnoculturally
divided societies guarantees for the internal democracy and for the effective
functioning of political institutions of coexistence remain a challenge.
b) The second additional thesis shows
a more and more widespread opinion among the experts according to which
the universal human rights cannot preserve the equality of chances and
a full guarantee of the minority's right to freedom.
The universal human rights, as guaranteed
by the ethno-culturally non neuter institutions of the state in
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 192
question, rather than by a super-national, neuter and universal institution,
benefits the citizens belonging to the mainstream majority culture. This
then will double the effort on the part of the minority
members, who want to preserve their language or other specific traditions
while engaging in finding a pathway through the dominant culture as well
as through the minority culture.
For the long term, this inequality of
chances has also assimilationist consequences that can only be counterbalanced
by providing further special rights. The specialists concerned with the
matter insist that for the universal human rights to produce the same
effects in case of the citizens of the majority culture and the citizens
of the minority culture alike, it is necessary for the universal human
rights to be supplemented by a new "generation" of rights focusing
on the needs of the community - i.e. the minority rights.
c). The third thesis points out that what
has been stated so far has special significance for Central and Eastern
Europe not just in terms of our special interest, but rather purporting
to the unfulfilled, rival ambitions to create a national state and the
suspicions with which such an endeavor was subsequently met with, all
of which are constitutive of a most serious obstacle in the development
of the political institutions of coexistence of cultures and nations.
The competing ambitions of establishing nation-states in the region have
always tried to exclude the others, determining more and more political
repression, producing, with each generation, new arguments involving a
mutual lack of trust, conjuring up the "historical" sufferings.
It si to be feared that if the region cannot step away from this vicious
circle of mutual and collective accusations, there is a risk of falling
into a dangerous game where the ambitions of a national state are instigated
to adopt an ethnic purification policy and of a more or less "peaceful"
assimilation policy.
d.) The last additional thesis speaks
about the reaction to the difficulties of the democratization process
in the culturally divided post-communist societies, which, to use only
some more or less recent examples in history, such as that of Northern
Ireland, Israel, or of the more fortunate South Tyrol, warn that the liberty
of a community might be achieved only by methods that do not exclude
ab ovo the possibility of human sacrifice.
Wide ranging advocates of this position
believe that neither the redefinition or the gradual adaptation of the
institutional frame of the representative democracy, nor the struggle
for the minority rights and the attempts to change the collective mentality
can yield a definite solution for the conflicts between the ethnocultural
communities living alongside in the same country. In their opinion, only
the unilateral, consistently applied methods, accepting even human
loss, can ensure the acknowledgement of the minority's will, guaranteeing
a long term viable solution. Although the principles underlying such opinions
are difficult either to ascertain or to reject reasonably, one should
be aware that the relative inefficiency - within the context of
a traditional, representative majority of the Westminster type democracy
- of the struggle for minority rights by parliamentary methods
can determine, as a consequence, a
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 193
gradual increase in numbers among the endorsers of such theories. As we
shall see in what follows, the so-called "perverse effects"
of the double standards applied by the intergovernmental international
organizations such as the OSCE play a very important part in influencing
these opinions (Kymlicka, 2001).
The normative consequences of the diversity
in Will Kymlicka's theory
Let us now move on to the presentation
of Will Kymlicka's political philosophy, the proponent of no less than
a rational and argumentative grounding of ethnocultural equity in answer
to the problems, capable, at least in my interpretation, to normatively
found a theory on the authentic existence of the minority. The presentation
that follows synthesizes the ideas in several of Kymlicka's works published
between 1992-2001, the most systematic of which is Multicultural Citizenship
(Kymlicka, 1995). The Premises of the Liberal Theory of Minority Rights Two concerns have played a crucial role in fundamenting Will Kymlicka's endavour to elaborate a liberal theory on the consequences of diversity: the lack of general principles and of a normative basis for ethnocultural equity and justice, and the fact that in the absence of a coherent liberal offer regarding the principles of ethnocultural justice and minority rights, consistent with the liberal orientation, rival ethnocultural groups in numerous regions of the world continue to accuse each other for having started and sustained protracted conflicts, without any chance to reconcile their stands. In the context of questions that are regularly raised by members of ethnocultural minorities, as regards the chances of their communal survival, the problem is usually not that the traditional theory of universal human rights offers inadequate answers, but that it does not provide any answer at all, and thus the required wide consensus within the international community on the acceptable solutions for all parties involved in treatment of ethnopolitical conflicts is ab ovo impossible. For example, from the fact that freedom of speech is granted, one cannot deduce any prescription as for the language used to exercise this right, just as the right to vote and be elected cannot in itself solve the controversial issue of internal borders and of power sharing among ethnocultural groups that feel mutually threatened by the sheer existence of the other. In the absence of general principles and of a normative basis for ethnocultural equity and justice, what happens most often is that the answers to the questions regarding the conditions in which ethnocultural minorities are integrated in the political communities recognized by the international community are given by the majority nations, according to their own interests, within the institutional framework of representative democracy based on the principle of the majority, which - paradoxically - is perceived by the minorities as social injustice contrary to the spirit of democracy. JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 194
The feeling of subjugation that results from this practice underlies both
the sources of ethnopolitical mobilization discussed by authors like Horowitz
(1985), Gurr and Harff (1994) or Lake and Rothchild (1998), and the differences
between the ethnopolitical options of the majority and minority that Zellner
(1999) identified.
The situation is further aggravated by
the fact that the social theory that legitimizes these practices is deeply
rooted in the history of political thinking. The great classics of social
philosophy and almost all the traditional political theories have used
the concept of ethnoculturally homogeneous society, considering that the
prototype of the political community is the polis of ancient Greece.
The most influential authors of political theory kept in mind the ideal
situation of the political nation, a homogeneous community from
the point of view of origin, language and culture, even if they themselves
were the citizens of multicultural states or empires. Throughout history,
the use of methods to regulate ethnocultural conflicts by eliminating
cultural differences - genocide, forced mass population transfer, assimilation
and secession - has always taken place in the more or less tacit spirit
of the hypothesis that an ethnoculturally homogeneous community is the
only viable solution to ensure long-term stability and the prevention
of conflicts that may occur within such communities.
The second aspect of the motivation that
underlay the elaboration of a liberal theory of minority rights pertains
to Kymlicka's remark that the fate of the world's ethnocultural minorities
- especially of those who live in post-colonial democracies and in the
states that started building a democracy after the end of the Cold War
- is predominantly in the hands of xenophobic nationalists, religious
extremists or military dictators, who may not hesitate to use force in
their endeavour to manage problems arising from ethnocultural diversity.
In the absence of a coherent liberal offer regarding the principles of
ethnocultural justice and minority rights consistent with the liberal
orientation, the chances of liberal democracy as form of government may
remain slight in the affected regions. Moreover, the peace and stability
of large parts of the world will continue to be at the mercy of nationalist
political entrepreneurs who can take advantage of the inequitable situation
of any ethnocultural community involved in the strategic dilemmas of co-existence
in the same geographical area. The theoretical fundament of a possible
international consensus regarding the conditions of equitable multicultural
co-existence, acceptable to all parties involved, can therefore be conceived
rightly as a prerequisite of overcoming crises in which rival ethnocultural
groups in numerous regions of the world accuse each other for having started
and sustained protracted conflicts, which seem to be impossible to resolve.
JSRI
No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 195
Terminological Premises of the Theory A first objective of the liberal theory of minority rights is to identify and eliminate those internal contradictions of the liberal discourse - regarding the consequences of diversity - that can be blamed for the failure of conventional liberalism in the case of multicultural societies. Such clarifications seem to be necessary especially regarding three very often used concepts: the notion of multiculturality, the concept of ethnocultural neutrality of the modern state and the term of collective rights. Due to the way in which the concept of multiculturality has become so common in public discourse, tending to "mean everything and nothing in the same time" (Kincheloe-Steinberg, 1997), one cannot distinguish between the different aspects of ethnocultural diversity which this concept covers in concrete cases. During the early '90s a general tendency to treat the situation and issues of ethnocultural groups in the same manner could be observed, without taking into account the nature and origin of the forms in which they appeared and are present today in different parts of the world. In fact, different types of ethnocultural communities have been accommodated throughout history in very much different conditions in political communities and the types of state existing at the time, which mainly determines their present situation, the nature of the problems they are faced with and, quite importantly, the ethnopolitical strategy they choose in the relation they are going to maintain with the majority nation. According to Kymlicka, ignoring to differentiate between two basic categories of ethnocultural groups can have unpleasant consequences, both in the political theory and in the practice of international relations. In the first case, ethnocultural diversity has its origins in the fact that certain communities, which in the past used to be active and complete societies from the institutional standpoint, the tradition of self-governance included, were incorporated in a larger state. This incorporation usually happened against their will, as a result of colonization, conquest or territorial transfer from one empire to the other, though examples of voluntary incorporation as a result of federalization are also known. In the second case, ethnic plurality results from the immigration of individuals who come from underprivileged or underdeveloped regions of the world. The immigrants usually belong to different ethnocultural communities, the traditions of which remain an important determinant of their everyday life. Unless this essential distinction is not ignored, we can notice that those communities that were incorporated in new states generally tend to create parallel societies, which are more or less segregated within the political nation. These communities pursue the accomplishment of different forms of autonomy and self-governance, considering that this is the only way in which they can ensure the preservation of their culture, language and community life characterized by specific traditions. These communities are called national minorities, according to Kymlicka. JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 196
Immigrants, on the other hand, who left their country of origin as a result
of their own decision, are pursuing rapid integration in the society that
accepted them as immigrants. The decision to immigrate is usually taken
as a result of economic or, sometimes, political reasons and the objective
is to become the citizen of a more prosperous, more democratic or freer
country. The quick learning of the language, the integration in the state
institutions and in the dominant culture are in these circumstances the
immigrant's interest. The groups of immigrants, whom Kymlicka calls ethnic
groups, do not lose their interest for their identity and neither
their ethnocultural allegiance - for instance, they continue to preserve
certain traditions, traditional costumes, religion, culinary traditions,
etc - but these interests are usually of secondary importance as compared
to their interest to obtain citizenship.
The conceptual difference between national
minorities and ethnic groups, empirically confirmed by Gurr's
(1994) causal analysis, bears important normative consequences: the two
causes generate different problems, which cannot be overlooked by the
methods of ethnopolitical conflict prevention and management. The attempts
to equate these two distinct aspects of ethnocultural diversity and to
treat them through similar methods generally betray hidden political interests
and, instead of offering solutions, they become part of the problem.
Another terminological confusion which
is frequently encountered in public discourse refers to the so-called
ethnocultural neutrality of the modern secular state. The claims
of the national minorities are often labelled by the opponents of minority
rights as tribal, pre-modern nationalism, and are compared to "civic
nationalism" of the majority nations, which does not take into account
ethnocultural identities but defines the state as an ethnically and culturally
neutral structure, which grants equal rights and has equal expectations
from all its citizens, regardless of their particularities. Thus, civic
nationalism characterizes more evolved periods of social development,
and it differs from "ethnic nationalism" by that it does not
aim at the institutional preservation and reproduction of a certain culture
or of a certain ethnic identity: it strives instead to fundament a citizens'
community, according to the principles of democracy and equality accepted
by everyone. Starting from these principles, the advocates of civic nationalism
declare that while majority nations leave behind them the "infant
disease" of ethnic nationalism, in agreement with the requirements
of modernity, the national minorities and ethnic groups invoke the spirit
of the 19th century through their claims.
The ethnocultural neutrality of the state
perceived as such is regarded by Kymlicka as a myth with no empirical
support in reality. In his opinion, each state that can be included in
the category of liberal democracies has passed through a period in its
development in which the spread of a so-called "societal culture"
on its territory constituted the reason that led to the mobilization of
most social energies. According to the most widespread theories of modernization,
gradual modernization of the society created the need for adequately
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 197
trained workforce, characterized by enhanced mobility. In the absence
of a public training system, in a common language that respects the standards
of the country, it is hard to imagine that the citizens will set off with
equal chances in the competition on the labour market. For a prosperous
country it is imperative that its citizens be ready to make the sacrifices
that the system based on reciprocal social services asks for, and obviously
the citizens characterized by their awareness of the `us' and a common
identity are readier to make these sacrifices.
Societal culture is thus territorially-concentrated,
it generally appears as a consequence of the process of modernization,
and its main characteristic is that it encompasses all institutions of
the society, both of the private and the public sphere. Through the common
language it provides meaningful ways of life across the full range of
human activities. Societal culture includes therefore each domain of the
communal existence except the cultural or religious customs characteristic
for small or family communities, which are accommodated, but not necessarily
reflected. Therefore, societal culture refers to less than the ethnographic
meaning of the concept of culture - it is `thinner' than this - but, through
the pluralism that describes it, at the same time it represents a wider
range of options than those contained in the ethnographic sense of the
term culture.
The emergence of a societal culture on
the territory of a state it is usually the result of an intentional and
consistent government policy. The first and foremost decision that must
be made by a government for the consolidation of a societal culture is
connected to language. When a government decides what language to use
when communicating with its citizens, what the language of instruction
in schools is, what the language used by people in state offices, courts,
healthcare institutions is, then it also makes the most important decision
regarding the future of societal culture. (This implicitly means that
the language that is not supported by a certain societal culture, in the
conditions of modern industrialized societies is condemned first to gradual
neglect, and then to disappearance. Such a language can be kept alive
in a ritualized form and for a shorter or longer while by the elite -
often fanaticized - or it can be preserved, for an equally uncertain stretch
of time, within the traditional, isolated communities outside the mainstream
of the society.)
The process of building and consolidating
a societal culture is usually at the same time a strategy of "nation-building"
- in Zellner's (1999) sense -, due to the simple fact that the language
of the societal culture is generally the language of the ethnocultural
majority that inhabits that country. The decisions taken by a government
as regards the declared official language on the territory of the country,
as well as the one concerning the language of instruction in schools,
the official holidays, the conditions of being granted citizenship, the
official symbols of the state can be interpreted not only as reflexes
of ethnocentrist prejudices, but also as endeavours to create, in a way
that is accessible to every citizen, the conditions of institutionalized
liberty and equality. These decisions unavoidably define a certain
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 198
national identity, even if they do not make use of the language of ethnonationalism.
In such conditions the ethnocultural neutrality of the state or
a rigorous division between the state and ethnicity exist only in ideologically
loaded discourses.
In the process of nation-building the
citizens belonging to the culture of the majority are privileged whether
intentionally or not, as compared to those who do not speak the official
language, and those who are socialized in another culture. Those ethnocultural
communities that face this disadvantage may choose among three strategic
alternatives: isolation, integration or assimilation and
engagement in a process of building their own societal culture.
The different categories of ethnocultural communities choose one or the
other of these alternatives depending on their specificity.
As a rule, isolation or exclusion is the
option of isolationist religious sects, which voluntarily accept exclusion
from the mainstream of society, which they hold as irrelevant from the
point of view of their theological beliefs.
Integration - and from the perspective
of several generations, assimilation - is generally chosen by the communities
that result from the process of immigration. According to empirical data,
there are very few cases of immigrants that protest against the obligation
to learn the official language of the adoptive country or that refuse
to educate their children in the language of the state. It is obvious
to them that a sound knowledge of the language spoken by the majority
is an indispensable condition to access social services and opportuni The third alternative of response to the
disadvantages resulting from the majorities' nation-building strategy
generally characterizes national minorities, who respond to these challenges
with their own endeavours of nation-building. In their case, due to the
ethnocultural particularities that characterize them, the issue is not
that they may remain excluded from public institutions, the economy or
the academic sphere, which use another language as a means of communication.
In their case the societal culture and the linguistic barriers set up
by the majority jeopardize the traditional institutional system of the
minority, which fulfils several functions of a distinct societal culture.
The minorities' characteristic response to these challenges is usually
manifest through an opposition against the integrationist trends, which
they perceive as assimilationist policies that jeopardize the future of
the community. The means they deploy in their fight for official recognition
of their language and culture do not differ from the nation-building attempts
of the majority. For them it is just as important that the common language
make all their own cultural meanings accessible to all the members of
the minority, or to provide access to meaningful ways of life across the
full range of human activities. The nation-building strategies deployed
by the minorities cannot therefore be considered any less modern than
the corresponding projects
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 199
of the majority, because both take into account all that seems indispensable
for the ethnocultural community to survive in the conditions of modernity.
The concept of collective rights
has also been the reason for much confusion within the liberal theory
conceived in conventional terms. The most frequent approaches of this
issue try first of all to find the division between the individual and
collective nature of rights, looking for answers to questions such as:
is it the individual or the community that is the subject of certain rights;
is the use of rights in some cases individual or collective; and, last
but not least, do certain rights suppose the existence of groups, of collectives
so as to be practiced or simply make it possible to be referred to. This
manner of treating the issues has proved to be unproductive, generating
rigid and formal points of view, without contributing to the normative
clarification of the problems that arise from ethnopolitical conflicts.
Examining the specific claims of ethnocultural communities from this perspective
we can discover, for instance, that several of those demands of the minorities
that regularly generate tension belong to the category of `individual'
rights, such as the right to use one's mother tongue in courts and in
dealing with state authorities, or the right to be exempted from certain
civic obligations stipulated by law, which are contrary to one's religious
belief. The fundamental provisions of the legal system specific of liberal
democracies on the other hand - such as the right to representation, the
right to assemble and the freedom of the press - can hardly be interpreted
as individual rights. The most typical cases of Another category of confusions that burdens
the issue of minority rights originates in debate that took place between
the liberals and the communitarians in the second half of the `70s and
the first half of the'80s, about the moral primordiality of the individual
or of the community. As a result of the views expressed in these debates
all those who tried to militate for one form or another of collective
rights risked being labelled as communitarian and being excluded ab
ovo from among those who claimed to be liberal.
Trying to eliminate these confusions,
Kymlicka offers two categories of relevant arguments: he reviews the forms
of differentiated citizenship that can be found in the practice
of most liberal democracies, and dispels the widespread misconception
that these institutionalized forms of collective rights, meant to guarantee
equality between different ethnocultural groups necessarily lead to the
denial of individual rights.
The cases of institutionalized solutions
of collective rights and of special status that currently exist in different
states of the world can be divided into three basic categories: the
right to autonomy, polyethnic rights and special rights
of representation.
The right to autonomy or some sort
of self-government is claimed and generally obtained by national minorities
that demand different forms of regional power or of political autonomy
because they consider that their survival as a community and the development
of their own
JSRI
No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 200
culture can only be ensured in this way. Polyethnic rights consist
in certain specific stipulations meant to ensure the possibility to affirm
and preserve the ethnocultural particularity of ethnic groups and religious
minorities that resulted from the process of immigration. These cultural-religious
allegiances should not entail negative economic consequences and should
not endanger the groups' integration into the political, academic or cultural
institutions of the dominant society. The minimum of polyethnic rights
is meant to defend against discrimination and prejudices (especially in
the case of visible minorities), and to extend the school curriculum in
such a way as to reflect the history of ethnies and their contribution
to the life and culture of the country. The special rights of representation
are reserved to social groups that are considered to be the victims of
systemic and persistent discrimination. In these cases the traditional
way of interests representation - based on the outcomes of the usual electoral
process - cannot warrant the necessary protection, which calls for special
measures to ensure the effective representation of the discriminated groups
in the political system. Such institutionalized solutions are found in
most liberal democracies; practically, in every modern state with a democratic
system one or several forms of the above-mentioned special group rights
are applied.
Concerning the relation between specific
group rights and individual rights, Kymlicka mentions two complementary
aspects of the claims that national minorities and ethnic groups have,
which are usually overlooked by theoreticians who elaborate on the issue
of In most cases, the liberal critics of
collective rights raise objections against what they consider to be internal
restrictions. They express their concern about the fact that as a result
of institutionalizing collective rights, the ethnocultural communities
may limit the individual freedom of their members with the help of state
power, in the name of group solidarity. Some liberal critics wage attacks
upon the measures of external protection, too, which concern mainly inter-community
relations, pointing out that under the guise of protecting group particularities,
situations of inequity could be institutionalized at the disadvantage
of members of the majority communities.
JSRI
No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 201
In Kymlicka's opinion, reference to some counterexamples, however illustrative
they may be in their context, cannot invalidate the experience of dozens,
sometimes hundreds of years of effective social practice. He states that
each of the three categories of specific group rights is able to warrant
the external protection of the ethnocultural community in relation
with the surrounding majority. The right to special representation offers
the assurance that the minorities' opinions will not be ignored or overlooked
in decisions made to affect the entire population of the country. Autonomy,
in the spirit of the principles of majority democracy, eliminates the
possibility of excluding the minorities from resolving issues of critical
importance for the preservation of their culture, while polyethnic rights
defend some aspects of cultural and religious traditions which the market
cannot sustain, or which are disadvantaged by certain legal stipulations.
All the three categories of rights level the disadvantages of minority
communities entailed by political decisions and the economic pressure
of the majority. In addition, in most cases, external protection is not
in conflict with individual rights, as it only regards the inter-community
relations between the majority and the minority, and it does not influence
the internal relations of the minority, or the relations between the minority
community and its members.
Consequently, the concept of collective
rights favours confusion to the extent it ignores to take into account,
in a fairly nuanced manner, the variety of differentiated citizenship
characteristic of contemporary liberal democracies, on the one hand, and
if it mixes the different aspects of external protection with internal
restrictions, on the other hand, thus suggesting a false dichotomy between
collective and individual rights. The Main Provisions of the Theory While the liberal thinkers in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century were preoccupied by the theoretical consequences of the situation of minorities and of ethnic groups (especially in the context of colonial administration, without ever reaching, however, a consensus on the normative consequences of the accumulated experience), the views of the liberal authors in the second half of the 20th century is characterized predominantly by the circumspect avoidance of the issue, by "benign neglect" and by favouring anti-discriminatory positions against those that support the need for institutionalized forms of protection. The change in attitude manifest in the removal of the problem from the agenda of political and academic debates is due mainly to the following three factors: the collapse of the British colonial empire, the polarization of interests during the cold war, and the domination of American thinkers in the history of liberalism after World War II. The aversion to minority rights, which so well characterizes the political theory of the second half of the century, is the combined result of the failure of the minority protection system set up by the League of Nations, on the one hand, of some unexpected consequences JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 202
of the civil rights movement in America, on the other, and, thirdly, of
the ethnic revival of some groups of immigrants in the United States.
The combination of these circumstances resulted in exaggerated generalizations
that had a decisive role in distorting the liberal tradition, leading
to the ingrained idea that the institutionalization of minority rights
would mean to renounce the liberal principles of equality and justice.
This idea is, therefore, relatively new in the philosophy of liberal politics,
its origins being linked to clearly identifiable stages in the evolution
of the history of ideas. Its large scale spread has had consequences that
are hard to ignore: it has generated tensions and contradictions within
liberal thinking, and it has led - in flagrant contradiction with some
early liberal beliefs - to the refusal to accept, in the case of national
minorities incorporated in the frameworks of states dominated by other
nations, what is considered to be natural in the case of state-forming
majority nations: the political recognition and institutionalized defense
of ethnocultural identity.
The more and more widespread awareness
of these contradictions within liberalism represents a major challenge
for the contemporary political philosophy both in the western world, and
in the case of developing states or states that are in full transition
toward a consolidated democratic system. Based on the unfortunately rich
experience in ethnopolitical conflicts and on the limited effectiveness
of the methods meant to prevent and manage them, it is impossible to overlook
the fact that the theoretical basis of liberal democracies and the authenticity
of liberal thinking are weakened by prejudices and preconceived ethnocentric
ideas, by the exaggerated generalization of the importance given to some
particular cases, as well as by the confusion made between some circumstantial
ethnopolitical strategies and what are considered to be universal moral
principles.
The liberal theory of minority rights
or, in an equivalent denomination, the theory of multicultural citizenship,
elaborated by Will Kymlicka, seeks to eliminate these contradictions from
within the liberal tradition. The method the author chose can be described
briefly as an endeavour to integrate into the theory of classical liberalism
the normative consequences of the forms of differentiated citizenship
that exist in contemporary liberal democracies, examples that have been
minimized or ignored in both public and academic discourses due to preponderantly
political reasons. Kymlicka's theoretical approach undertakes the reconsideration,
up to the ultimate consequences, of the liberal principles, as well as
the use of ideologically clarified concepts in a critical spirit, which
generates so far unexplored contexts.
In essence, the message of Will Kymlicka's
theory is built around two major theses. The first states that
minority rights are not only not in contradiction with the basic
principle of individual liberty and autonomy, but - in the particular
conditions of minority existence - they practically create the circumstances
in which these principles produce their effect and become more than
sheer political declarations. Consequently, there is a more profound relation
between individual liberty and the person's membership in a cultural community,
complete
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 203
from institutional point of view, than it has been assumed during the
preceding stages of liberal thinking. Most people want to live their life
in their own culture and desire to have access to meaningful ways of life
within their culture's system of institutions, and in this perspective
access to opportunities transmitted through cultural membership and by
the societal culture is a major condition of individual liberty.
This allegiance to one's own culture characterizes both the members of
the majority nations, dominant within political communities, and those
of the national minority communities, so that this feeling must be regarded
as closely linked to human nature, justified and legitimate under all
circumstances. Access to opportunities transmitted through cultural allegiances
as well as membership in a societal culture can be considered rightfully
as being part of the primary goods, and therefore their institutionalized
protection is in full agreement with the liberal principles.
The second thesis reflects the
author's belief that special group rights, if circumspectly defined and
well differentiated, can ensure effective equality between the majority
and minority, in perfect harmony with the classical liberal spirit.
From the liberal perspective there are three methods to plea in favour
of specific group rights: through invoking the principle of equality,
through making reference to the historical or international treatises,
and through highlighting the advantages of multiculturality, modes
characterized by the tacit presupposition that the one who wants the minority
rights to be implemented will have to provide the necessary proofs. In
Kymlicka's opinion the question can be also reversed, In order to grasp the justified character
of this standpoint, it must be remarked that the liberal tradition bears
a serious inconsistency in this respect, too. According to the principle
of the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state, frequently invoked
in the context in which claims for granting minority rights are refused,
a consistently liberal position should under no circumstances take into
account community allegiances or the ethnocultural identity of the citizens.
Valuing personal liberty and individual autonomy above all, the liberals'
supreme aim should be to spiritualize and - in a distant perspective -
to eliminate all borders, because in a world without borders the spectre
of options and alternatives at the individuals' discretion would be considerably
widened. However, liberals are not interested only in warranting universal
rights and equal chances to individuals, but also in the institutional
protection of cultural membership, even at the expense of limiting and
severely conditioning immigration. The advocates of liberalism admit,
therefore, even though only tacitly (like Rawls and Dworkin, for instance)
that individuals belong to different societal cultures, which ensures
the context of their liberty and informed choice: the fact that in that
part of the world also, which functions according to the principles of
liberal democracy, there are
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 204
several states, is due to the fact that people belong to different cultures,
and their comfort within these familiar frameworks is not indifferent
to them.
Making these truths explicit - which are
rarely uttered, though they are defining as regards the ethnopolitical
reality of the modern world - we will find it easy to realize that in
the case of a multinational country the official unwillingness to institutionalize
special group rights will have to be considered as a severe inconsistency
in applying liberal principles: the recognition and institutionalized
protection of cultural membership cannot be guaranteed in the case of
one ethnocultural community and refused in the case of others. The uncontested
freedom of the liberal state to decide on its own in the case of claims
for citizenship and to limit access to it in such a way as to have the
functions of societal culture protected obliges that state to take into
account the expectations referring to the institutionalization of differentiated
citizenship, too. In Kymlicka's opinion, it results from here that those
liberal theoreticians that accept the limitations of citizenship to a
certain category of people without offering clarifying arguments to the
legitimate nature of these limitations or to its compatibility with the
liberal principles have a hard and ungrateful task: if they wish to be
consistent with themselves, they are forced to offer arguments, in a manner
that does not avoid the above-mentioned, to sustain the rejection of the
justified character of special group rights.
The thesis referring to the moral equality
of ethnocultural communities leads us to the conclusion that in the context
of debates on minority rights, the fundamental question is not whether
or not one can officially acknowledge the differences between different
communities or ethnocultural groups - the undeniable existence of liberal
democracies is the very answer to this question - but whether the special
differences characteristic of national minorities can or cannot make the
object of such official recognition. It is interesting to remark that
liberal practice and theory answer this question differently. The literature
on political theory is characterized by a relatively unanimous consensus
insofar as the refusal of most groups' rights is concerned, but in practice,
as we have seen, we can encounter numerous and diverse institutional forms
of differentiated citizenship. The theoretical approaches are based not
so much upon moral philosophy, but rather on contextual arguments invoking
stability and international peace, or on references to the consensus of
majority democracy, or social harmony in general. Even though these worries
are legitimate, the arguments linked to them are not sound enough in order
to sustain the institutional forms of ethnocultural inequity. On
the contrary: the unilateral rejection of claims referring to minority
rights, as well as the setting up of ethnocratic systems that ignore the
interests of communities belonging to other cultures jeopardizes both
peace and international security, democratic consensus and social harmony.
Two collateral problems result from the
two basic theses of the liberal theory of minority rights, in connection
with which we must demonstrate that the fundamental theses of the theory
do not generate non-liberal
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 205
consequences. On the one hand, it is necessary to elaborate on the answer
given by the liberal theory of minority rights to the challenges represented
by intolerant ethnocultural groups, who apply restrictive measures
within the community, which are unacceptable from the liberal perspective.
On the other hand, it must be explained what the source of solidarity
in liberal democracies that institutionalize minority rights will be,
and what will prevent ethnoculturally diverse societies that apply the
provisions of the liberal theory of minority rights - or, in other words,
the theory of multicultural citizenship - from slipping into the uncontrolled
phenomenon of successive secessions.
As for the first aspect, the author points
out that the refusal to conform to liberal principles is not a problem
that only concerns minorities. Both minority communities and majorities
are equally faced with the challenges of non-liberal interests, often
springing from dissentions on ethnopolitical strategy options and from
community apprehensions that spring from the feeling of mutual threat,
and that much common effort will be necessary for problems as such to
be resolved without negative consequences for individual freedom and autonomy.
As for the second aspect, we must keep
in mind that in history liberals have repeatedly insisted on the procedural
and legal definition of the concept of citizenship, hoping in this
way to fundament social solidarity. However, despite frequent reference
to a so-called `civic identity', the liberal understanding of citizenship
and of what it would imply has had, along the years and decades, a powerful
load of substance, identity and membership in the political community.
It is still not clear how this load could be made explicit - or overcome
- in the conditions of political communities that are divided from ethnocultural
point of view. The fellow-feeling that should ideally characterize the
citizens of a multinational democratic state should be a unifying one,
without suggesting, however, the blending of different identities. As
this feeling has not been articulated yet, what we have so far is the
dilemmatic evidence of historical experience: granting the right to self-governance
to the national minorities that desire this statute may endanger social
unity and solidarity, because it promotes the concepts of distinct political
communities; the denial of these rights may become equally destabilizing,
however, as it aggravates the feeling of exclusion, it feeds collective
apprehension linked to the uncertain perspectives of the community's future,
and in this way fundaments the secessionist option.
As a synthesis regarding the normative
significance of the liberal theory of minority rights, as elaborated by
Will Kymlicka, we can remark that the theory in general brings proofs
not only to support the need for the liberal definition of the conditions
of effective equality between groups, but it also supports the statement
that in what regards the members of non-dominant ethnocultural communities,
the authentic effects of individual rights and of universal human rights
are only accomplished if institutionalized equality between communities
is warranted. Otherwise, sooner or later, we must consider the disappearance
of ethnocultural differences - even in the
JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 206 conditions of rule of law, as well as within the most tolerant and most neutral social medium. Bibliography Gurr, Ted Robert-Harff, Barbara: Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford, Westview Press, 1994 Horowitz, Donald L.: Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, University of California Press, 1985 Huntington, Samuel P.: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order), Ed. Antet, Bucuresti, Kincheloe, Joe L.-Steinberg, Sherley R.: Changing Multiculturalism, Buckingham-Philadelphia, Open University Press, 1997 Kymlicka, Will-Opalski, Magda (eds.): Can Liberal Pluralism Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001 Kymlicka, Will: Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995 Lake, David A.-Rothchild, Donald (eds.): The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1998 Makkai, Sándor: "Nem lehet", in: Láthatár, 1937/2, 49-53. Zellner, Wolfgang.: On the Effectiveness of the OSCE Minority Regime. Comparative Case Studies on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE, Hamburg, Institut für Friedenforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 1999 Our Creative Diversity. Report of the World Comission on Culture and Development, UNESCO, Paris, 1996. JSRI No.3 /Winter 2002 p. 207 JSRI
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